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Foreword
This study was elaborated as a reference document for the Meeting of Government Experts on Population 
and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (Saint Lucia, 6-9 October 1992). This meeting took 
place prior to the regional meeting (Mexico City, May 1993) preparatory to the International Conference 
on Population and Development to be held in Cairo in September 1994.
Since the Saint Lucia meeting provided an environment for government experts to share thoughts 
and experiences with a view to preparing for the dd)ates to be held in Mexico City, it seemed appropriate 
to contribute a series of documents to serve as reference papers at the sessions. Tlie documents prepared 
cover the various topics identifíed on the agenda; the present study, in particular, presents an overall view 
of population dynamics in the region and their relationship to economic and social development.
Chapter I discusses the cunent demographic situation and trends, the components of population 
growth and the structure by age groups in the countries of the region, including an analysis that tsjces into 
account the heterogeneity of the demographic transition process.
Chapter II deals with topics relating to mobility and spatial distribution, with special emphasis on 
international and internal migrations and the urbanization process.
In view of the importance of alleviating poverty in the framework of changing production patterns 
with social equity. Chapter III analyses the demographic expressions of social inequalities within 
countries. It also discusses some repercussions of these differential demographic behaviours on the socio­
demographic reproduction of poverty.
Lastly, Chapter IV relates the above-mentioned situation and trends with future requirements for 
jobs, social services, etc., seeking to identify the main implications of population dynamics for the design 
of economic and social development policies.
This document was prepared in CELADE, with the help of, inter alia. Ms. Susana Schkolnik and 
Messrs. Jorge Bravo, José Miguel Guzmán, Jorge Martinez and Jorge Rodriguez. The work was 
coordinated by Juan Chackiel and Miguel Villa.

SUMMARY
The population of Latin America and the Caribbean was 2.8 times higher in 1992 than in 1950, reaching 
a figure of 460 million people. Steadily falling mortality rates and persistently high birth rates caused 
demographic growth to speed up until Ae mid-1960s, when it slackened its pace. During that period of 
rapid population growth, the region experienced sustained economic expansion, ftieled by the effects of 
import-substituting industrialization. Along with changes in production and an increase in gross domestic 
product (GDP), linkages among social structures were generated, which helped strengthen the middle and 
blue-collar classes. This social mobility, coupled with significantly higher levels of education, began to 
develop in conjunction with an urbanization process involving mass population movements out of rural 
areas.
All of these factors encouraged changes in certain values handed down from the past, including 
those related to reproductive briiaviour, so that a perception of an ideal family size that was smaller than 
the traditional ideal began to spread, and became attainable through the availability of contraceptive 
methods. Consequently, the average number of children borne by Latin American women dropped from 
6 (in the 1950s) to 5 (in the early 1970s), and then to slightly over 3 in the period 1990-1995. This 
decrease in fertility gradually slowed down demographic g ro \^ ; whereas the rate of increase in the 
1950s would have caused the population to double in 25 years, that phenomenon would take 40 years at 
the 1990 rate.
Much of the economic and social progress achieved by Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
postwar p^iod was undermined by the setbacks sufrered in the 1980s. Even though the population grew 
at a slower rate than in previous decades, as fertility continued to decline, real per capita output in 1989 
reverted to its level of 13 years earlier. Many indicators eloquently testify to the seriousness of this 
regressive cycle, whose inertia constitutes a burdensome legacy with which the countries of the region 
will have to cope during the final decade of the twentieth century. On top of the external debt burden and 
macroeconomic imbalances, they will have to address the disparities between the composition of regional 
exports and the nature of international demand, in addition to the deterioration of physical infrastructure 
and production equipment as a result of posqioned investment. These circumstances conspire against the 
objective of closing the technology and productivity gaps which separate the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean from the industrialized nations.
However, the 1980s were a "lost decade" not only in economic terms; the reverses suffered in the 
social sphere have had repercussions of even greater severity. On the one hand, owing to decreased 
resource allocations, the quality of essential services (such as health and education) has fallen sharply; 
on the other, the erosive effect of recession on labour markets has led to an increased incidence of 
unemployment and marginality. Moreover, measures intended to mitigate the impact of the crisis were 
generally regressive in terms of income distribution, so that their side effects were especially hard on 
workers and the middle classes. This, in turn, accentuated social inequalities and increased poverty; 
between 1980 and 1986, the growth of the number of poor people was nearly triple the growtfi of the 
population as a whole. The multiple and severe consequences of the "lost decade" tested Govenunents’ 
capacity to respond to economic reverses, pushing conventional planning into the background and 
weakening the State’s position as an agent of production and social management.
Despite the crisis, fertility continued to decline in the 1980s at a rate even higher than predicted, 
and infant mortality also followed its downward trend of recent years. This situation may be attributable 
to the delayed effects of earlier economic and social changes, such as the extension of primary education, 
the improvement of health systems, urbanization and the development of mass conununication media.
Although demographic growth in the 1980s was lower than in previous decades, it should be noted 
that, because of the high fertility rates recorded in the past, the number of women of childbearing age 
increased, so that decreased current fertility did not prevent the number of births from rising. 
Consequently, demand for social services also tended to rise, so that shortcomings in the supply of these 
services took on serious dimensions. Likewise, the number of young people entering the workforce grew 
faster than in the past, a phenomenon which was amplified by the increase in women’s employment. In 
sum, the effects of demographic inertia, in combination with regressive economic and social processes, 
generated repercussions which will continue to be felt in the coming years.
The magnitude of the crisis has revealed a host of social and economic problems that have 
historically plagued the region. This hard experience has taught a series of lessons, on the basis of which 
the countries have begun to cast about for new solutions different from those of the past. Gaining ground 
as part of this effort is a strategic proposal for changing production patterns which, while being 
environmentally sustainable, includes as an integral component the achievement of greater social equity, 
in a context of democratic management styles. Since the population issue is an inseparable part of this 
great challenge of building a better future, its inclusion in the proposal is indispensable.
Undoubtedly, steady improvement of the competitiveness of Latin American and Caribbean 
economies is a prerequisite for growth in the modem world; this calls for the systematic incorporation 
of technical progress into the production process, generating more jobs and using environmentally 
sustainable methods. This effort cannot succeed without an effective investment in human resources, since 
job training leads to increased labour productivity, genuine comparative advantages and higher added 
value in production. From this perspective, population represents not only a condition to be dealt with, 
but also a wealth of opportunities for making a significant contribution to the necessary raising of human 
capital.
The lessons of history show that the solidity of economic growth also depends on socio-political 
stability, which, in turn, requires conditions of social equity. This is why the strategic proposal includes, 
in the interests of realism, changing production patterns with social equity as a dual objective, making 
both aims the target of both economic and social policy. Thus, its basic goals include minimizing the 
incidence of poverty, developing the potential talents of individuals in all sectors of society and selecting 
methods that will protect the effective freedom of present and future generations by preventing unfair 
distribution of the fruits of progress. Once again, population has an unmistakable presence in these areas; 
its modalities of change are inseparable from efforts towards greater social equity. Bound up with this 
objective are measures to foster freedom of choice in determining family size and place of residence 
within each country.
Evidence points to a relatively widespread tendency among couples to want fewer children, i.e., 
to produce smaller families. This phenomenon favours die reduction of the population’s growth rate, 
which dovetails with the objectives of various countries in the region, whose Governments consider 
decreased demographic groi\1h beneficial to their development strategies.
It is therefore undeniable that demogr^hic variables affect both changing production patterns and 
social equity. The viability of actions designed to raise the human coital needed for changing production 
patterns is largely dependent on an understanding of demographic trends. From this understanding emerge 
the basic principles to be taken into account in the quest for greater social equity. The current status and 
tendencies expected of demographic dynamics in the different countries of the region, as well as their 
repercussions on the economic and social system, which are the subject v f  this document, demand that 
Governments begin immediately to recognize that they are factors in the processes of stagnation and 
change, and that, as they consist of social realities, their behaviour can be influenced through deliberate 
actions such as public policies. This has been demonstrated in the area of public health, through notable 
successes in reducing mortality rates; nevertheless, in many countries the issues of population growth and 
spatial distribution still require the adoption of decisions to seek socially desirable objectives through the 
use of ethically acceptable instruments.
With regard to the demographic situation and trends, current projections indicate that the population 
of Latin America and the Caribbean will grow by about 81 million people during the final decade of the 
twentieth century; since this increase is very similar to that of the preceding decade in absolute terms, 
it manifests the effect of demographic inertia. Although the regional population’s growth rate has fallen, 
its potential to expand remains high because its age structure, based primarily on earlier fertility trends, 
is quite youthful. Therefore, the Latin American and Caribbean rate of demographic increase remains 
similar to that of the world population as a whole (1.7%). In the first part of this document, the process 
of change in the region’s population is described in terms of the concept of demographic transition. Of 
course, the process takes place at di^erent speeds and by different means in the various countries of the 
region, exhibiting forms that vary according to social group and territorial unit. In systematizing general 
trends with an analysis of gross national birth and mortality rates for the period 1985-1990, the document 
identifies four types of situations in the region.
One group of countries, in which demographic transition is still incipient, is marked by widespread 
poverty, limited access to social services and a predominantly rural population. Under these 
circumstances, high birth and mortality rates persist, with a large proportion of children and youths 
representing great reproductive potential. Bolivia and Haiti comprise this group, whose average natural 
growth rate is around 2.5% a year.
A second group, at a moderate stage of transition and with limited urbanization, shows the fastest 
natural growth (averaging about 3% a year) as a result of declining mortality rates and persistently high 
birth rates. These countries are El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay. While they 
have made progress in reducing mortality (thereby causing a rejuvenation of the population and an 
increase in dependency indexes), this progress has yet to reach vast sectors of the rural population and 
those living below the poverty line; given the high proportion of children and youths, birth rates are 
likely to remain high in the short term. In Guatemala, for instance, where the crisis of the 1980s 
increased the percentage of poor and indigent people, high birth and mortality rates have been observed 
in the poorer (and particularly in the indigent) strata, resulting in a large proportion of children and 
youths in the country’s poorest sectors, thus demonstrating that these sectors as a whole have not yet been 
incorporated into the process of demographic transition.
Three fourths of the region’s inhabitants live in predominantly urban countries in full demographic 
transition, as shown by their declining birth rates and mortality rates, which have fallen considerably 
thanks to public health measures undertaken within a relatively youthful age structure (resulting from the 
decrease in fertility) which is less vulnerable to the risk of death. Average natural growth is around 2%
a year in these countries, namely Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guyana, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.
Lastly, a group of countries at an advanced stage of transition show the highest degree of 
urbanization and relatively low average yearly population growth (on the order of 1%), owing to 
comparatively lower birth rates and moderate or low mortality rates; some of these countries, in which 
fertility has been decreasing for some time, are characterized by an ageing of the population. Countries 
in this group include Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Cuba, Guadeloupe, Jamaica, Martinique, 
Puerto Rico and Uruguay.
Probably the most notable demographic change in Latin America and the Caribbean has been the 
decrease in fertility, which has taken place at great speed, especially since the end of the 1960s, in a 
reversal of the region’s experience up to that time. Despite die intensity of this trend, the average number 
of children per woman in the first half of the 1990s is still over 4 in seven countries, and over 3 in six 
others. In some of these countries, demographic and health surveys conducted in the 1980s revealed a 
high incidence of unwanted fertility, especially among the poorest women. Because of the recent onset 
of the process and the youthful age structure of many nations, the number of births in the 1990s is 
expected to be higher in absolute terms than in the preceding decade, nearly doubling the rate observed 
during the 1950s. Perhaps the sharpest decline in the overall fertility rate was experienced by countries 
in ftill transition, where the decrease between the early 1960s and the early 1990s amounted to 50%.
The change in the reproductive behaviour of most of the Latin American and Caribbean population 
is associated with the economic and social transformation experienced by the region in the postwar 
period. The desire for fewer children, which previously had existed only in limited segments of society, 
was popularized by various economic, social and cultur^ factors; this go^ then became attainable through 
access to contraceptive methods. It should be pointed out that two sets of determining factors were 
operative in this regard: one concerning fertility (e.g., contraception) and one concerning structural 
aspects of society, the economy and culture. Changes in these latter areas (which led to higher levels of 
education, an increasingly urban-based economy, the growing integration of women workers into jobs 
outside the home and the erosion of traditional gender relations) redefined the incentives and disincentives 
for producing large families, and increased the direct and indirect costs of raising children. Thus, the 
preference for fewer children was gradually transmitted to households in different social strata and 
different residential contexts, leading to a growing acceptance of birth control, which became less costly 
in both market and subjective terms.
Demographic variables affect the family and the formation of households in a number of ways. 
Trends in fertility, mortality and migration can influence family and household size, predominant family 
configurations, the concomitance of different generations and the types of housing required. For example, 
the decline in fertility has translated into a decrease in average household size in a number of countries 
in the region; rural-to-urban migration has promoted the spread of nuclear households in rural areas; and 
increased life expectancy has enabled a growing number of grandparents to know their children’s 
children. The ultimate manifestations of these demographic trends in the institution of the family, such 
as the effect of the decline in fertility on the decrease in household size and the increased social 
interaction between overlapping generations, on actual social interactions among them, are determined 
by social factors related, inter alia, to structural models for the family and for households, economic 
conditions of families, the availability of new housing, and cultural compatibility between older and 
younger generations.
The decline in fertility has not been uniform throughout the region or within countries. Towards 
the end of the 1980s, over half of all women of childbearing age in the countries in fìlli demogr^hic 
transition were using some type of contraceptive method. In contrast, in countries where the transition 
is still incipient or barely moderate, fewer than half were doing so. In addition to the differences observed 
among the countries of the region, a marked heterogeneity exists within each of them. The poverty 
affecting all of the countries may be the most obvious manifestation of the backwardness suffered by 
certain groups, in terms of social equity. One piece of evidence in this regard is that women in the most 
disadvantaged socio-economic strata have a higher average number of children; similarly, higher fertility 
in rural areas is associated with tenant farmers, non-land-owning workers and ethnic minorities, who are 
largely excluded from the benefits of material progress; many women in these groups consistently assert 
that a high proportion of their actual fertility is unwanted. Thus, the adoption of family planning methods 
seems to have followed the lines of social inequality; its unavailability to certain groups makes them 
virtually unable to exercise their essential r^roductive rights, and deprives couples of the freedom to 
decide how many children they wish to have.
On top of these inequalities, shortcomings in the areas of family planning and of education, 
information and communication on sexual and reproductive matters appear to be the cause of two major 
problems: illegal abortion, which seriously endangers women’s health, and teenage pregnancy. Although 
its true dimensions are still difficult to determine, abortion seems to be a frequent practice in most of the 
countries, mainly among young women; at the same time, since 1950 the percentage of children bom to 
women between the ages of IS and 19 has grown in most countries of the region. Illegal abortion, teenage 
pregnancy and illegitimacy have become part of the acute inequity syndrome that characterizes Latin 
American and Caribbean societies and produces socio-economic consequences in various areas. At least 
two can be identified in the case of teenage pregnancy. First, at the level of the individuals involved, the 
fact of giving birth at these ages is more likely to cause problems, through either the biological risk it 
often entails, the loss of educational and job opportunities usually suffered by the parents, or the family 
conflicts it may engender. Second, at the level of society, teenage fertility can lead to severe losses of 
human coital when adolescent parents drop out of school or the workforce, which in turn promotes the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty.
One of the great achievements of Latin America and the Caribbean in the postwar period has been 
the gradual control of mortality rates, as reflected in the 15-year extension of life expectancy at birth 
since 1950; in the period 1985-1990, this indicator was close to 67 years, and is expected to reach 70 by 
the year 2000. This progress is linked to the absorption of medicid and public-health technologies and 
to endogenous factors of economic and social development in the region, such as the increase in real 
income, higher levels of education and the mitigation of certain environmental risks through basic 
sanitation measures.
Many of the gains in life expectancy have resulted from a decline in infant mortality, which used 
to be high in most of the countries (in 1950, over 100 out of every 1,000 newborns died before reaching 
the age of one year). This historic debt demanded preventive action, which was usually inexpensive and 
readily enhanced by improvements in the personal and family characteristics mentioned earlier. However, 
progress slowed down and in the 1980s, as indicated previously, the mortality rate decreased less than 
it had in previous decades. Although this phenomenon could have been influenced by the crisis, which 
led to reduced resource allocations to the health sector, it should be kept in mind that progress in 
mortality reduction becomes more difficult when easily preventable and treatable illnesses have been 
conquered and others, normally associated with ageing and requiring more costly medical treatment, 
become more common.
Beyond the successes achieved, mention should be made of the sharp differences with respect to 
the risk of death. Average life expectancy in the region at the beginning of the 1990s is similar to that 
of 40 years ago in the developed countries of North America. Discrepancies within the region itself are 
of similar magnitude; countries which only recently began their demogrt^hic transition, characterized by 
low indexes of well-being, highly rural populations and precarious health and sanitation services, still 
show life expectancies at birth which are some 15 years lower than those of other countries whose 
transition is more advanced and whose material living conditions are better, where this indicator reaches 
75 years. These differences show that even in a context of crisis and postponement of investment in basic 
services, the decrease in fertility in the latter group of countries has had a positive effect on the decrease 
in infant mortality, essentially because it lowers the proportion of high-risk births. In turn, the high rates 
of infant mortality observed in high-fertility countries could mean that, for no fewer than 10 countries, 
the goal of health for all by the year 2000 will be impossible to achieve. Equally serious are the 
discrepancies observed among different socio-economic strata and residential areas within each of the 
various countries; these inequities are manifested by a high risk of death in poor sectors, including those 
in the most disadvantaged areas of large cities, where many deaths are caused by illnesses which are not 
necessarily fatal. For example, indigent populations in Guatemala exhibit a life expectancy at birth 11 
years less than that of the population living above the poverty line. Furthermore, as recent history 
dramatically shows, many countries have experienced signs of epidemiological involution with new 
outbreaks of illnesses thought to have been controlled.
Owing to the tendency of fertility and mortality rates to decline, the Latin American and Caribbean 
population, which experienced a rejuvenation up to the 1960s, is currently in transition towards an older 
age structure, with a gradual percentage decrease in the proportion of children under 15 and an increase 
in the proportion of elderly people over 65. While the average conditions prevailing in the region indicate 
a movement in this direction, the different countries —as well as the different social strata identified in 
the region— manifest this movement to varying degrees depending on their current stage of demographic 
transition. Countries in the initial stages of the process still show a high and growing proportion of 
children and youths, as do countries at a moderate stage of transition, where rejuvenation is promoted 
by the persistence of high fertility rates and by decreases in infant mortality. Nations in full demographic 
transition show a lower and declining proportion of children, although the percentage still reflects the 
high growth rates of the past, which have translated into a high proportion of women of childbearing age. 
Only where the transition is well advanced do children under 15 represent less than one third of the total 
population, while people 65 and over represent about 8%.
In general, emphasis has been placed on the adverse socio-economic effects of population ageing, 
mainly related to problems in financing pension funds, increases in the costs of medical treatment and 
the emergence of rigidity in the labour market. It is anticipated that the proportion of the population over 
65 will be less than 13% in all countries of the region in the year 2000; this estimate helps put the ageing 
process in proper perspective, avoiding spurious comparisons with the situation in more developed 
countries. Beyond the inevitable problems generated by this process, which undoubtedly will become 
more serious in the next century, imaginative policies are required if it is to be addressed in a positive 
way. This implies, inter alia, adjusting the financing of pensions and health services to the new 
demographic conditions, introducing programmes to care for the elderly, and developing the capacities 
of older people and encouraging their involvement in productive activities.
Although changes in age structure are slow (evidencing the effects of demographic inertia), they 
must be taken into account in any development strategy. Thus, in the century’s final decade, it is expected 
that out of the total population increase in Latin America and the Caribbean, some 80% (67 million
people) will be between the ages of IS and 64, so that huge numbers of people will be entering the labour 
market and reproductive life; the other 20% (16 million people) will be more or less evenly distributed 
between those under IS and those over 6S. In other words, the requirements generated by the high 
fertility rates of the past will coexist with those generated by a gradual ageing of the population in the 
future. From a demographic perspective, then, one of the greatest challenges to be taken up in the short 
term is the generation of an enormous number of jobs. However, the socio-economic effects of generating 
these productive jobs could be more beneficial than ever by virtue of the population changes already 
described. First, the lower dependency ratios produced by die percentage increase in the economically 
active population will lighten each worker’s economic burden. Second, the decrease in mortality rates and 
advances in the health field tend to increase the availability and productivity of labour. Third, better 
control of fertility promotes greater participation by women in the labour market and greater equity 
between the sexes.
As for the more distant future, it has been projected that the population’s growth rate will 
tqiproximate 1 % around the year 2010, and will reach 0 halfway through the twenty-first century, when 
the region will have some 800 million inhabitants. As indicated earlier, these trends and their 
repercussions in terms of age structure and requirements will vary according to each country’s stage of 
demographic transition. In the so-called "social sectors", for example, it is possible to estimate the 
magnitude of the changes in the provision of basic social services to be ushered in by the advancement 
of demogr^hic transition. This type of analysis illustrates the importance of trends in population growth, 
the components of such growth, the population’s age structure and spatial distribution in controlling the 
rate of expansion and determining the nature of the social services required. Projections for the final 
decade of the century predict the specific impact of population changes on the main social sectors, with 
great differences among countries according to their stage of demographic transition. The figures suggest 
that progress in demogr^hic transition tends to relieve the pressure exerted by population growth on the 
provision of most social services, especially those related to maternal and child care and basic education. 
For instance, whereas hospital births in El Salvador will have to increase by 22% between 1990 and the 
year 2000 simply to maintain the coverage level of the late 1980s, Uruguay would reach the same 
objective merely by maintaining its 1990 rate up to the year 2000. Nevertheless, at advanced stages of 
transition, requirements which usually entail high costs take on greater importance, such as those related 
to university education, retirement pensions, care for the elderly and medical treatment for illnesses 
difficult to prevent. In addition, since demographic transition tends to go hand in hand with urbanization, 
the former’s progress is empirically linked to a concentration of the required services in urban areas.
The mobility and spatial distribution of the population is a very interesting aspect because of those 
of its features that are peculiar to the region. Population mobility, in its many variations, has become a 
dimension of economic, social and cultural reality which goes beyond the strictly demographic. Although 
the laws of nearly all the countries provide for freedom of movement as one of the basic human rights, 
various stumbling-blocks stand in the way of the enjoyment of this right. Many population movements 
arise out of circumstances which could hardly be regarded as the exercise of a right; at times, such as 
in the case of international migration, legal restrictions may be so rigid as to threaten the freedom of 
movement. These circumstances must be taken into account —as is done in the second part of the 
document— in any analysis of population shifts and relocations in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Whereas in the past the region was open to large flows of population from other continents, 
beginning in the second half of the twentieth century these international migrations have clearly declined, 
and their impact appears to be slight, except in very specific areas. On the other hand, mobility 
(temporary, seasonal or cyclical) and emigration of the inhabitants from the region itself have become
g
more significant. Although the actual number of persons in "illegal" situations is unknown, in no case 
has the presence of foreigners, as measured by the censuses taken in the 1980s, amounted to more than 
10% of the total population of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. The lack of information 
about the number of illegal residents is a problem not only for purposes of learning more about territorial 
mobility but also in terms of the social and economic impact of these residents, the interests of the 
countries involved and the imperative need to protect the human rights of persons in this situation. 
Migratory "amnesties" in some of the main countries of destination seem to indicate that illegal 
immigrants move in ways similar to those of legal residents. It is possible to identify two major migratory 
patterns in the Latin American and Caribbean population: one within the region and the other towards 
the industrialized countries, primarily the United States. Excluding from the latter group Mexicans and 
natives of neighbouring Caribbean countries, whose migrations could best be described as "border" 
movements, the volume of migrants in both patterns is fairly similar.
Intrarégional migration has taken on a great deal of significance. Around 1980, some 2 million 
persons lived in South American countries other than where they were bom: Argentina and Venezuela 
had the largest concentration of migrants who were natives of neighbouring countries; Paraguayans, 
Chileans, Bolivians and Uruguayans made up the first wave, and Colombians the second. Anodier 2 
million persons were uprooted in the Central American subregion as a result of the socio-political 
conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s. Lastly, it is estimated that no fewer than 300,000 persons moved from 
the Caribbean basin to live in other countries. In all these cases, migrant flows appear to be highly 
sensitive to existing economic and political conditions in the countries of origin and destination, with 
sharp fluctuations and some signs of return migration. Migration to the United States took on special 
importance beginning in the 1960s; from the rapidity with which this pattern developed, it became evident 
that the United States was the main destination of regional emigrants: whereas the 1970 census counted 
2 million Latin American and Caribbean emigrants, that of 1980 reported a doubling of this figure; there 
are indications that migrant flows again increased in the 1980s, as the region experienced the effects of 
the severe economic recession. The number of migrants from Mexico, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Colombia and other Caribbean countries and from Central America is particularly striking; Mexicans 
alone represented over half the natives of the region residing in the United States, according to the 1980 
census.
Although the "expulsive" nature of population movements in the region has often been noted, the 
net (negative) balance of international migration for the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean has 
amounted to an aimual average of some 375,000 persons during the five-year period 1985-1990, 
equivalent to a rate of -1 per thousand. Of course, this rate is higher in some countries, such as those of 
the Caribbean subregion, than in others. This fact allows for a more accurate assessment of the 
"expulsive" nature of the phenomenon; moreover, a large proportion of migrants are only temporarily 
on the move, and return to their countries of origin after a certain time. On the other hand, emigration 
to countries outside the region is more complex; this type of movement includes persons of a different 
sort, some being received as refugees and exiles, and others being "illegal immigrants". A significant 
aspect of migration to the United States, especially the "historical" migration from neighbouring 
countries, is that of the sending of remittances, which has been an important source of foreign exchange 
in the native countries of the migrants.
It is often held that emigration is an escape valve for the labour markets of the countries of origin, 
rq)resenting a vehicle for raising the migrants’ standard of living. When the place of destination is outside 
the region, however, the emigration also involves the loss of human capital, which is perceived as a 
reverse transfer of technology, at times encouraged by the countries of destination through their
inunigration laws. In turn, an eventual mass return migration, or forced re-migration, represents a 
considerable risk for many countries. Uncertainties about the future of international migration are 
numerous; initiatives to promote market integration, greater trade liberalization, new hiring practices and 
the implementation of strategies to change production patterns with social equity are some of the 
influential factors involved. This is another demographic dimension that must be taken into account by 
the Governments of the region in defining their policies and programmes.
A number of aspects of the spatial distribution of the population should be highlighted. In the latter 
half of the twentieth century, the trend for the Latin American and Caribbean population to be 
concentrated in certain locations was further consolidated, even though, at the same time, hitherto vacant 
areas were occupied to a greater extent. While the region’s population is still extremely heterogeneous, 
there has also been a common denominator in the shift from a predominance of rural dwellers, as late 
as 19S0, towards a situation in which nearby three fourths of the population resides in urban areas. While 
there are some exceptions, urban residency became the norm in countries which had already experienced 
the initial stages of demographic transition, a circumstance which was closely related to the presence of 
new factors that were conducive to a decline in mortality and a change in the norms of reproductive 
bdiaviour. The steady increase in the percentage of urban dwellers has occurred chiefly because of heavy 
migration from the rural area; in turn, the growth of the population living in urban areas occurred 
principally because of a natural increase in that population. While urban dwellers have become the 
majority, the number of rural inhabitants would seem to be approaching stability; declines in absolute 
terms have been registered in a number of countries.
The urbanization of Latin American and Caribbean societies could not have taken place to such an 
extent without changes in the economic base of the region. More than half the economically active 
population in 1950 was employed in the rural area; 40 years later, around one third of the labour force 
is employed in agriculture. Of course, these percentages vary from country to country, reflecting the great 
economic and social heterogeneity of the region; it is common, however, for the urban labour force to 
be much more productive than its rural counterpart. Urban centres became, early on, the seat of State 
institutions, services and import-substitution industries, whose development was made possible, in part, 
by policies that helped to bring down the relative cost of the labour force and its daily reproduction. 
Similarly, die relative concentration of the population in the cities helped the various social sectors to 
represent their interests more effectively, and hence the State had to provide them with basic services.
One constant characteristic of regional agriculture has been its inequity, accentuated by the lack 
of access to basic productive resources, frequently controllal by a handful of producers; under such 
conditions, the rural population has eked out a living on small farms whose negligible yields restrict 
economic possibilities to the range of poverty. The weakness of their organizational mechanisms has 
prevented these groups from becoming a presence in social decision-making spheres, and, hence, they 
are cut off from basic services, which can only be provided at extremely high cost, when the population 
is so spread out. In this context, the endurance of "traditional" values comes as no surprise; in the 
absence of any real prospects for social mobility, such values reinforce high-fertility reproductive norms, 
whose effect is frequently countered by high mortality indexes. Because of the difficulties confronting 
these groups of farmers, who have no technical support or credit facilities, their demographic increase 
leads to an uncontrolled exploitation of the land, with severe environmental repercussions, and to 
overpopulation, factors which trigger either temporary or permanent migrations. This sequence of events 
implies that, to a large extent, the origin of rurid poverty does not lie in overpopulation but rather in the 
lack of any kind of genuinely even distribution of benefits. In turn, "modem" methods of mral
organization of production have introduced the phenomenon of wage labour, though not on a steady basis, 
which involves the seasonal use of the labour force, a part of which lives in the cities.
Unlike the dispersion of rural inhabitants, urban areas are characterized by relatively high 
population density. In 1990, there were more people living in the region’s 38 largest cities (those having 
one million or more inhabitants) than in the entire countryside of Latin America and the Caribbean. At 
the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, the "million-inhabitant” cities accounted for 
11% of the region’s inhabitants; 40 years later, the figure had risen to 30%. None the less, the large 
cities did not grow "disproportionately", as the percentage of urban dwellers has tended to remain fairly 
constant. Moreover, the rates of increase in those cities are clearly on the decline and, between 1970 and 
1990 at least, were below those for less populous urban centres. Lastly, available date indicate that 
growth has been most intense in cities that have only recently attained the million mark: the 31 cities with 
more than a million inhabitants in 1990 which had not yet reached that figure in 1950 accounted for an 
increasing share of the total urban population, moving from 15% in 1950 to 20% in 1990; the seven cities 
that had been in the "million" category the longest, however, experienced a steady relative decline over 
the same period.
While the above figures somewhat attenuate the severe assessment of urban population density, they 
do not refute the enormous complexity of managing large human settlements, some of which, ranking 
among the largest on the planet, are without precedent in human history. The fact that crowding and 
pollution are currently among the most pressing environmental problems in the more heavily populated 
cities cannot be ignored; these problems, however, are associated more with patterns of resource use than 
with mere population density. Equal caution should be used in forming judgments of many other "critical" 
situations that are particularly glaring in such megalopolises but which, strictly speaking, are not a direct 
consequence of their size or their growth rate, but rather of the prevailing inequities in the region’s 
societies. One clear manifestation of this is the extreme social segregation in land use and claims to land 
ownership. Similarly, the posq>onement of basic investments, especially during the recession of the 1980s, 
has led to serious inadequacies in infrastructure and services, whose effects will be felt more keenly in 
the 1990s.
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Underlying changes in population distribution in Latin American and Caribbean territory are the 
result not only of differences in the pace of natural growth but also of migration and internal mobility. 
It should be noted that recent manifestations of these processes have increasingly included various kinds 
of temporary migrations which, together with the already established movements of seasonal agricultural 
workers, involve vast groups of people. Thus, urban-to-rural movements, linked to the "modernization" 
of agriculture and agro-industry, have gained in importance; in addition, there are the mining-related 
movements and rural-to-urban movements related to temporary employment opportunities in construction 
and in certain services. Changes in the functioning of the labour markets, the recessionary impact of the 
crisis of the 1980s, the new direction of economic policies, the growing investment of capital in 
agriculture and mining, the diversification of exports into non-traditional areas and the progress made in 
transport and communications are among the factors that have determined the patterns of the population’s 
territorial mobility and enhanced the significance of temporary movements.
In raising the issue of internal migration, the advance of the population towards internal, resource- 
rich borders, for purposes either of official or "spontaneous" colonization, or of exploiting forests and 
minerals, should be mentioned. In this case, too, temporary and cyclical movements, which create the 
image of a perpetually changing front, can be discerned. Unlike what might have been expected in the 
past, it has been proven that the resources along these borders are not inexhaustible and are an integral
part of a delicate ecological balance. The old idea of a rural population in the interior of South America 
as a means of easing the potential pressures of demographic growth has not materialized either; as census 
data indicate, the purpose of migration towards the border has largely been the establishment and 
strengthening of urban centres within these "new" territories. The explanation for much of the irr^arable 
damage to the environment and of this movement towards urban areas appears to lie in the processes of 
substitution and replacement taking place: bdiind the farmers and pioneers has arisen w  influential 
farming and livestock agro-industry which is capital intensive and whose technology is essentially 
polluting and environmentally destructive.
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The literature on internal migration in the region emphasizes the flow from the rural to the urban 
areas. While this type of flow continues to occur in some countries, it seems to be losing momentum. 
As urbanization has stepped up, mobility has acquired greater significance within urban systems, 
connecting cities of different sizes in various locations; many of these movements occur wiüiin the 
framework of corporate structures and government agencies under decentralization policies or among 
various sectors of activity based in the urban area. Equally apparent is a trend for migration to diminish 
with change of residence, which would imply a redefinition of living spaces. While sufficient evidence 
is not available, this drop in the relative intensity of migration would seem to reflect the impact of the 
1980 crisis, which chiefly affected the "formal" sectors of employment; accordingly, temporary 
movements seem to have, in part, replaced the role that migration had in the past. Similarly, these data 
indicate that traditional poles of migration, i.e., big cities, registered an abrupt decline in their 
immigration rates, while zones from which movements usually originated had increased their capacity to 
retain their population, as their lower emigration rates would suggest. These changes have been 
accompanied by fairly well-defined mobility and migration profiles. The vast majority of those who 
migrate are young adults, predominantly semi-skilled workers. Perhaps the most remarkable statistics, 
however, are those relating to gender, reaffirming that women represent the majority in the flows towards 
the urban area, while men more frequently relocate to rural areas. This last point is particularly true of 
internal movements to colonize and settle border areas; none the less, women have become particularly 
important in certain seasonal movements related to harvests and agro-industrial activity.
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I. DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION AND TRENDS
A. DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION AND MOST IMPORTANT CHANGES SINCE 1950
The population of Latin America and the Caribbean grew from 165 million, in 1950, to around 460 
million, in 1992, accounting for approximately 8.5% of the total world population at the present time. 
The absolute increase of nearly 300 million persons is the result of high rates of demographic growth 
whidi, in many countries were around or higher than 3% up to the mid-1960s (see Annexes A-1 and 
A 2). Those rates resulted from constantly falling death rates —observed since the end of the Second 
World War or even earlier— and persistently high birth rates. These trends occurred —at least up to the 
mid-1970s— together with sustained economic growth in most countries of the region. During that period, 
economic growth was sufficiently great to produce such increases in the per cipita gross domestic product 
as to generate high expectations in marginated sectors of the population of gaining access to the fruits of 
development.
In this context and based to a large extent on more or less explicit family planning programmes, 
a sharp drop in the number of children per woman began to occur in many countries. In that way, rising 
birth rates began to fall, a fact observed in the region as a whole by the end of the 1970s, dissipating —at 
least partially— fears of uncontrolled population growth. Generally, the phenomenon of lower birth rates 
spread to most countries and, within them, from the better educated sectors in urban areas to the poorly 
educated sectors of rural areas.
The economic crisis which began to affect the region at the end of the 1970s led to a clear and 
sustained drop in the per capita gross domestic product between 1980 and 1989. That situation, although 
certainly not of the same intensity in all countries, deteriorated standards of living generally and increased 
levels of poverty and indigence (ECLAC, 1990). It is important to note that, when the crisis was at its 
height, most countries were in a process of demographic transition which apparently was not affected by 
that crisis, although the crisis certainly did have important demographic effects in other areas, such as 
family composition, marriage, and migratory movements, especially in those sectors most affected by the 
crisis. Those phenomena must be researched in greater depth, basically in light of the results of the 1990 
censuses, the results of which are now becoming available. During the 1980s, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, as a whole, had an average annual population growth rate of 2.1%, while a rate of 1.7% is 
expected for the 1990s, meaning an increase of 81 million persons. Those growth rates are similar to 
those expected for the global average and for Asia, with higher rates expected only in Africa (2.9%). The 
persistence of growth, in spite of changes in fertility, is to be explained mainly by the potential for 
population growth found in youthful age structures. And there lies the challenge to recover the levels of 
well-being lost in most countries during the 1980s.
Moreover, one of the characteristic traits of Latin American population distribution is its relatively 
high degree of urbanization, a fact which has distinguished it from other developing regions for many 
years. In 1950, nearly 60% of Latin Americans lived in areas defined as rural but, by 1990, less than 
30% live in those areas and, by the year 2000, it is expected that three quarters of the population will 
live in urban areas. This process, which is an integral element of die model of concentrational 
development which prevail^ in Latin American countries, is thought to be one factor which has 
facilitated the process of demographic transition, insofar as it has allowed for the more rapid extension 
of educational systems, new cultural habits and modern technologies.
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1. Typology of countries according to stages 
of demographic transition
"Demographic transition" refers to a process observed in diverse societies, consisting in evolution from 
high birth and death rates to low levels in those variables, achieved by passage through distinct phases. 
Although a "theory of demographic transition" does exist, sparking sharp controversy in academic circles, 
for the practical purposes of this paper reference will be made to the empirical process of demographic 
change as observed, in general, in most societies. It could be thought that this process of demographic 
transition is an integral part of the social changes which have occurred in the region, although the 
relationship between that transition and those changes is complex and has not been sufficiently clarified. 
The process has been fairly heterogeneous in the countries of the region, both among countries and within 
them, as well as in terms of geographical areas and social sectors, in the sense that populations in 
different stages co-exist. Countries in which women, on average, bear 6 children contrast sharply with 
those in which they bear approximately 2 children; at the same time, there are countries in which life 
expectancy at birth is less than 60 years, while in others it is around 75 years.
The countries of the region are grouped, below, according to the stage of demographic transition 
through which they are currently passing. As in every classification effort, each group contains exceptions 
and a certain degree of heterogeneity, especially given that the countries currently in the same stage may 
be experiencing different intensities of change in the trends of their demographic variables. Gross birth 
and death rates were used for this Table. Although those indicators do not reflect fertility and mortality 
levels accurately, they do determine population growth and reveal, moreover, the influence of the 
population age structures (see Box I.l). Statistical estimates for the 1985-1990 period were used in the 
generation of this Table: a rate higher than 32 per thousand was defined as high; a rate between 24 and 
32 per thousand, moderate; and a rate lower than 24 per thousand, low. As well, mortality rates higher 
than 11 p ^  thousand were defined as high; those between 7 and 11, moderate; and rates lower than 7, 
low.' The other factor of demographic change is international migration which, given its relatively slight 
influence on growth and population structures and because trends are not easily foreseeable, was not taken 
into account in the generation of this Table. It is, however, examined in Section A of Chapter II.
' In the following description, it is understood that all references are made with respect to values 
obtained in the region. Developed countries, in most cases, have lower fertility and mortality rates.
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Box I . l
LATIN ANERICA AND THB CARIBBEAN: COONTRX SITUATICNf ACCORDING TO 
CDRRENT STAGE IN DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITI(»I,
1985-1990



















































B irth  ra te : HIGH: 32 -  45 MODERATE: 24 -  32 LOW: 10 -  24
M ortality  ra te :  HIGH: 1 1 - 1 6  MODERATE: 7 - 1 1  LOW: 4 - 7
Note: The number next to  the country names corresponds to  the  na tu ra l 
growth ra te , expressed as a percentage.
Source: CELADE, United Nations (1992).
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On this basis, the following groups were defined;
Group I. Indpient transition. Countries with high birth rates and high mortality rates 
(moderate natural growth on the order of 2.5%); Bolivia and Haiti.
Those countries have high fertility rates, which have not changed or only very little in the period 
under consideration, and mortality rates which have decreased only slightly. Iliis produces a moderate 
rate of growth which, on average, is around 2.5% (Box I.l). The high rates found in these countries are 
due to the fact that an significant majority of the population lives in poverty and in rural areas, limiting 
access to information, health care and family planning services. Given their high fertility rates, these 
populations are mainly composed by children and youth, requiring focus on maternal-infant care, 
programs of primary health services and policies which will tend to reduce the intergenerational 
transmission of poverty.
Group II. Moderate transition. Countries with high birth rates and moderate mortality 
rates (high natural growth, around 3%); El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Paraguay.
Due to the high birth rates and moderate decreases in mortality rates observed in these countries, 
the average annual rate of population growth is high, around 3%, or even higher in some countries. In 
this group, Paraguay is an exception, both because it is outside the Central American subregion and 
because it has a relatively lower mortality rate than the other countries of the Group. In these countries, 
as in those of Group I, diere are vast sectors of rural population which, given their conditions of social 
insertion, are not yet able to accede to the benefits of economic progress and, therefore, have high birth 
and mortality rates, although important advances have been made in the latter area. The decrease in die 
mortality rate, which has occurred mainly in the younger age groups, has produced a rejuvenation in the 
age structures of the population and, consequently, an accentuation of the problems inherent in a 
population with higher degrees of dependence. For the near future, it is expected that the growth rate will 
drop as a result of probable further decreases in the birth rate. Even so, growth rates will continue to be 
high, as a result of the youthhil age structure of those populations and because mortality rates should still 
drop considerably.
Group III. In full transition. Countries with moderate birth rates and moderate to low mortality 
rates (moderate natural growth, around 2%): Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Guyana, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad 
and Tobago, and Venezuela.
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This Group contains the majority of the population of Latin America, because it includes half of 
the countries of the region and, among them, those with the most inhabitants (see Box 1.2). The low gross 
mortality rate (over all, less than 7 per thousand) which characterizes this Group, can be explained; on 
the one hand, by the progress made by many of these countries in the area of health services, but, 
basically, by the age structures produced by lower birth rates. Those lower rates have led to 
proportionally high concentrations of the population in the younger ages, with low mortality rates, and 
in those ages in which women are most fertile. Because of this, there are relatively fewer deaths and, 
also, relatively more births, both factors which tend to produce moderate growth rates. On average, this 
Group has grown at a rate of 2.1% in recent years which, as could be expected, is similar to that of the 
region as a whole. It is expected that for the coming decade, its growth rate will drop to 1.7% as a result 
of continued decreases in birth rates. That growth will not be less due to the inertia of age structures, 
which are still very young.
In these countries, important changes have been occurring in demographic behavior which create 
new challenges. Changes in mortality rates and age structures imply substantial variations in 
epidemiological profiles, demands on the educational system, on employment and social security services. 
Although there is a positive trend toward a reduction of dependent relationships, produced by a lower 
percentage of children, new concerns emerge, such as an increased occurrence of those chronic illnesses 
proper to the adult ages —which entail higher prevention and care costs— and increased pressure on the 
labour market, resulting from high population growth rates in previous decades. To these phenomena, 
the persistence of significant social inequalities must be added, which have their impact in those sectors 
without access to the benefits of development, including access to family planning information and 
services. With few exceptions, in most countries there has been a strong process of urbanization which, 
together with other factors, explains these striking changes in demographic patterns.
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Box 1.2
POPULATION SIZE AND GROWTH BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES 
IN DIFFERENT STAGES OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION. 
PERIOD: 1990-2000
Most of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean (7S%) is undergoing a process of demographic transition, 
that is, they are experiencing significant changes in their mortality and birth rates which will lead to moderate growth 
rates in the coming years (1.7%). However, there are still countries in the region with high rates of growth, caused by 
their high birth rates. For this reason, the countries of Groups I and II (in incipient and moderate bansition), which 
represent 10% of the population of the region, will contribute 16% of the increase which will occur during the 1990s. 
On the other hand, the countries in more advanced stages of transition (Group IV) represent 15% of the total population 





1990 441 14 29 332 66
2000 523 17 39 393 74
Percentage of total 100 3 7 75 15
Aimual average growth
(%) 1.7 2.2 3.0 1.7 1.1
Increase (millions) 82 3 10 61 8
Percentage of increases 100 4 12 74 10
Source: CELADE.
Group rv. Advanced transition. Countries with low birth rates and moderate to low mortality 
rates (low natural growth, around 1%); Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Cuba, 
Guadaloupe, Jamaica, Martinique, Puerto Rico and Uruguay.
In this group, two sub-groups are clearly evident. On the one hand, there are countries which have 
had low birth and mortality rates for a long time, such as Argentina, Uruguay and, to a lesser degree, 
Cuba, whose age structures are similar to those of more developed countries. Argentina and Uruguay 
have higher gross mortality rates, due in part to their older age structures produced by their historically 
low birth rates. On the other hand, there are countries which, in recent years, have achieved important 
decreases in their birth and morality rates but which, given their relatively young populations —which 
lead to a high potential for growth— still have higher rates of growth. In this sub-group, Bahamas, Chile 
and Jamaica (with natural growth rates between 1.5 and 1.7%) are to be found. Except for the Caribbean 
countries, the low overall birth rates and high life expectancies of these countries occur within a context 
of marked urbanization, involving over 80% of the population (in Argentina and Uruguay, close to 90%). 
The fact that these countries have older populations and experience the demands proper to this stage of 
transition does not mean that the problems of infant maternal care are not a concern. It is presumed that 
the low birth rates of these countries occur together with high rates of abortions and persistently high 




Beginning in the mid-1970s, in some Latin American countries, an accentuation in the process of birth 
rate transition began to be observed, which, gradually, spread throughout the region. Since 1950 and 
before this process began, average birth rates remained around 6 children per woman and the range of 
variation of the overall birth rate among countries implied a difference of 4.5 children. In the 1985-1990 
period, the average fell to 3.4 children per woman and, even though these levels have fallen in all 
countries, the differences between extreme fertility values remain at 4 children per woman.
Given that the decrease in fertility is recent and that the age structure of many countries is still 
young, the annual number of births in Latin America has increased from 7 million to 12 million between 
the 1950-1955 and 1985-1990 periods, in absolute numbers, meaning considerable increases in most 
countries. However, in some countries in the advanced stages of demographic transition, decreased 
fertility has already produced a certain degree of stability in the number of births.
Important differences in the levels and trends of birth rates among countries are evident (see Annex 
A-3). In countries classified as being in incipient or moderate transition (Groups I and II), the overall 
birth rate is still high (between approximately 4.5 and 6 children per woman). The trend, observed since 
the middle of this century and up to 1985-1990, is toward a decrease of between 1 and 2 children. 
Although there are groups of low fertility in every country, mainly among urban and better educated 
women —with averages of 2 and 3 children per woman—, the greater part of the population has a high 
fertility rate, a phenomenon related to socioeconomic and cultural factors and to the less extensive use 
of modem contraceptive methods.
From the point of view of fertility, since 1950, the most important phenomenon has occurred 
among Group m  countries, classified as being in full transition. In those countries, the overall birth 
rate, which was of 6-7 children per woman in mid century, dropped to 3-4 children, a decrease of 50%. 
Colombia and Dominican Republic have the greatest decrease, of 3.9 and 3.6 children per woman, 
respectively, in the period under consideration. In countries with the greatest change in birth 
rates, knowledge of modem contraceptive methods among women is practically 100% and use of 
them is over 45%, with the exceptions of Pern and Ecuador which have the highest birth rates of the 
Group.
Finally, among Group IV countries, in advanced transition, with rates of up to 3 children 
per woman, two groups can be distinguished. On the one hand, Uruguay and Argentina, with low 
levels of fertility since mid century, have not changed significantly during the period, while in 
the other countries the decrease has been on the order of 2 and 3 children per woman. Among 
these, Cuba, Barbados and Martinique are outstanding, presenting overall birth rates below the 
replacement rate.
Changes in average fertility levels are related to changes in fertility age structures. It has been 
observed that decreased fertility usually occurs among younger women, with the greatest contribution to 
the total number of children coming from women between 20 and 34 years of age, and has important 
consequences for maternal-infant health care, given that those ages present the fewest problems from die 
point of view of possible risks to the mother and the child (see Annex A-4 and Table 1.1). It is important 
to note that the greatest decreases in fertility have been detected in the group of women over 34 years 
of age.
Within this context, there is growing concern for the high number of pregnancies and births among 
mothers younger than 20 years of age, occurring during a period of change with respect to sexual 
attitudes and conduct which favour exposure to sexually transmitted diseases and higher ages for first 
sexual contact.
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This concern for the impact of adolescent fertility is based on the fact that, although there has been 
a general trend toward lower rates in the 15-19 year old group since mid century (Annex A-4), the 
absolute number of births in that group has risen in all countries, due to increased numbers of 
adolescents, produced, in turn, by the high birth rates of the past. Nicaragua experienced the greatest 
relative increase in the number of births among women between 15 and 19 years of age (more than 
200%) between 1950-1955 and 1985-1990, while Uruguay experienced an increase of only 17%. Most 




LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL ANNUAL BIRTHS AND PERCENTAGE OF BIRTHS 
BY WOMEN'S AGE GROUPS DURING SELECTED FIVE YEAR PERIODS,




Percentage of births by women's age groups "
Countries Middle ages 
20-34 years 15-
High risk ages 
19 years 35 + years
1950-55 1985-90 1995-00 1950-55 1985-90 1950-55 1985-90 1950-55 1985-90
Group I
Bolivia 138 248 274 69.0 71.5 10.6 12.4 20.4 16.1
Haiti 148 224 258 64.1 71.2 8.3 8.0 27.6 20.7
Group II
El Salvador 100 172 192 72.3 66.2 14.9 23.5 12.8 10.2
Guaten»la 164 350 415 68.1 69.9 17.4 17.1 14,5 13.0
Honduras 78 189 217 68.1 70.1 15.3 16.5 16.6 13.4
Nicaragua 65 150 176 69.6 67.2 16.0 22.0 14.4 10.8
Paraguay 69 139 161 70.9 71.9 10.5 11.7 18.7 16.4
Group III
Brazi1 2590 3801 3474 71.7 78.8 9.3 9.0 19.1 12.2
Colonfcia 607 802 802 69.1 74.0 13.1 15.5 17.9 10.5
Costa Rica 45 82 87 72.8 73.1 12.5 16.8 14.7 10.2
Ecuador 166 321 335 67.3 73.9 14.3 13.9 18.4 12.2
Mexico 1333 2400 2466 71.0 72.0 12.6 18.3 16.3 9.7
Panama 36 62 63 69.6 72.1 17.1 18.5 13.3 9.4
Peru 384 636 670 67.3 72.8 13.8 12,4 19.0 14.8
Dominican Rep. 129 213 208 68.7 76.4 16.5 13.8 14.8 9.8
Venezuela 263 519 539 70.4 73.9 15.5 14.4 14.1 11.7
Group IV
Argentina 458 669 698 75.2 73.7 10.7 13.7 14.2 12.7
Cuba 182 182 181 76.4 69.8 10.2 26.1 13.4 4.1
Chi le 239 301 309 70.7 76.5 10.4 13.6 19.0 9.8
Uruguay 49 54 54 75.1 74.4 12.2 13.8 12.7 11,9
Source: CELADE.
* Percentage of births refers to the quotient obtained between births and in the age groups under 
consideration and total births in each country.
In Latin America, the range of variations in the birth rate of the 15-19 year old group, in 
1985-1990, oscillates between 48 per thousand in Brazil and 160 per thousand in Nicaragua. Generally, 
rates in the countries of Groups I and II are higher than those in Groups III and IV, with the exception 
of Haiti, which has a low rate, second to Brazil. Among those with the highest rates —higher than 100 
per thousand— are Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, countries in the stage of moderate transition. 
Together with Brazil and Haiti, already mentioned, the lowest rates, around or lower than 70 per 
thousand, are found in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay (Group IV) and Peru (Group III).
As for the evolution of those rates in that age group, between 1950-1955 and 1985-1990, available 
information indicates that most have fallen steadily from one five-year period to the other, in proportions 
which vary between 1% in Nicaragua to 52% in Dominican Republic. However, the evolution in three 
countries of Group IV, Argentina, Cuba and Uruguay, in which birth rates have risen in this age group, 
must be noted as exceptions.
At the same time, these data must be viewed with caution, given that information on children of 
younger mothers is usually deficient in several ways. For this reason, it is thought that the data do not 
portray the contemporary situation with the desired precision, nor do they allow for exact identification 
of the direction of more recent trends, for which national-level, reliable figures are not, generally, 
available (Wulf, 1986).
Brazil is one Latin American country for which studies of adolescent fertility exist. These reveal 
that the birth rate among women between 15 and 19 years of age seems to have increased slightly 
between 1970 and 1981-1986 (Henriquez et al., 1989). For other countries, such as Dominican Republic 
and Panama (Wulf, 1986), data from surveys taken in hospitals, which indicate an increase in the 
proportion of births among adolescent women, could point to a phenomenon similar to that observed in 
Brazil, if the trend is confirmed. Moreover, comparative data from Peru indicate that, even though the 
specific birth rate among 15-19 year old women has remained nearly the same during the last 15 years, 
the birth rate among urban adolescents declined, while it rose among rural young women, from 115 to 
137 per thousand (Ferrando, Singh and Wulf, 1989).
Both for its social effects and its negative impact on the health of mothers and children, adolescent 
pregnancies are a problem which requires further study and the search for effective solutions, related to 
education for youth and access to knowledge about and use of family planning methods. Given its 
particular characteristics, this phenomenon could lead to an increase in pregnancies and more abortions.
Lower birth rates have not occurred with the same intensity in all social groups. One aspect of this 
reality which is a source of concern for the governments of the region is the persistence of differences 
in fertility among groups which reflect serious disparities in standards of living. Pockets of high fertility 
exist which, in some countries, represent a very important percentage of the population and are linked 
mainly to residence in rural areas, low levels of education and more poorly paid work, with differences 
of up to 3 or 4 children. This problematic must be analysed in the awareness fliat an important percentage 
of births among the women of the countries of the region were undesired, as is demonstrated in the 
Demographic and Health Surveys taken in the 1980s. Bolivia and Peru are noteworthy examples, given 
that, at the time of the surveys, one in three children appear as undesired. What is more, the poorer 
social groups and those in rural areas have generally greater percentages of undesired births.
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Differences in fertility among groups within a country —in absolute terms— are less when that 
country is more advanced in the process of fertility transition. In fact, in Chile and Cuba, countries in 
which the decrease has been more pronounced and which currently have birth rates classifié as low 
(Group IV), there is a clear convergence between urban and rural birth rates, toward ^proximately 2 
and 3 children.
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In countries with intermediate birth rates (Group III), for example, Dominican Rq>ublic and 
Panama, changes in both urban and rural areas have been observed, although they have been, generally, 
less marked than in Chile and Cuba, and only recently is the trend toward convergence mentioned above 
emerging. In those countries, although the transition process is more advanced in urban areas, it is 
expected that more important changes will occur in rural areas, at least in those countries in which urban 
fertility has already reached low levels.
At die other extreme, in countries with continued, high fertility (Groups I and II), such as 
Guatemala and Honduras, decreases have only been detected in the capital cities —approximately between 
10 and 15%—, while change in rural areas has not yet been observed. Further details with respect to 
differences in birth rates within countries are presented in Chapter III.
The concentration of populations in urban centres, more wide-spread education, broader health care 
coverage and, in general, access to improved and healthier living conditions for large sectors of the 
population are factors which have conditioned the decreases in birth rates in Latin America. However, 
those factors have not affected fertility directly. Rather, they have operated through other variables which, 
in turn, affect fertility, such as marriage patterns and the age at which first unions occur, the norms 
which govern sexual relations within unions, the factors which affect exposure to conceptions, including 
mainly the use of contraceptives, and factors which affect pregnancies and births. These elements are 
present in every society but there are differences among them in terms of the levels of relative importance 
assigned to each or in the particular combination in which they are to be found, given that these faaors 
are related to beliefs and values generally very strongly rooted in cultural traditions.
There is consensus that, among the determinant factors related to fertility, the element most closely 
related to decreased fertility in Latin America is the use of contraceptives. Due to urbanization, expanded 
education, changes in women’s situation and the efforts of family planning programmes, among other 
factors, family planning information has been disseminated throughout the countries of the region.
In countries for which there is information, it has been observed that, in those in hill transition 
(Group III), the proportion of women who use contraceptives is high and is concentrated in the use of 
more modem methods, while in countries with high birth rates (Groups I and II), fewer women use 
contraceptives. According to the latest available data, the use of modem contraceptives is approximately 
55% in Brazil and Colombia; around 45% in El Salvador, Mexico, Dominican Republic and Trinidad 
and Tobago; 35% in Ecuador and Paraguay; and around 20% in Bolivia and Guatemala (Demographic 
and Health Surveys, 1991). Countries in which these studies have not been implemented are Argentina, 
Chile, Cuba and Umguay, all of which currently have low birth rates. Although information with respect 
to the use of contraceptives in those countries is not available, it can be supposed that, given their low 
birth rates, their use must be high.
Abortion is another mechanism for reducing birth rates widely used in Latin America. Given that, 
with the exception of Cuba, abortions are illegal in the region, it is practically impossible to obtain 
reliable information with respect to the true magnitude of the phenomenon. However, there is reason to 
believe that the annual number of abortions practiced in the region is very high.
In fact, although its true magnitude is unknown, abortion is used to space births and eliminate 
undesired pregnancies. When practiced in unsanitary conditions or very frequently, it can have negative 
consequences for women’s health. It is believed ¿at the rates of hospiudizations and deaths due to 
complications related to abortions are high, but the documentation is very incomplete and difficult to 
obtain. In Brazil, for example, information has been generated, on the basis of extr^lations from 
several hospital experiences, to the effect that, in the early 1980s, there were approximately 3 million 
abortions a year. That same information indicates that most abortions occur among urban women, of low 
socioeconomic extraction who do not use contraceptives (Merrick, 1983).
Population projections made in recent decades clearly demonstrate the current limitations for 
projecting changes in birth rates. Although decreases were anticipated, it was not foreseen that Latin 
America would reduce its birth rate nearly 40% in 20 years.
As for the coming years, projections of lower birth rates are fundamentally based on die levels and 
trends observed in the different countries. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the impact of 
development strategies and the continued expansion of mass communications in many countries of the 
region may lead large sectors of the population to adopt the small family as an ideal, influenced by the 
more wide-spread assimilation of certain patterns of consumption and life style, including improved access 
to the means of controlling natality. Future birth rate decreases depend on the speed of this process.
Although, an average of 2.8 children per woman is expected for the last five year period of the 
century, according to available projections, it is also foreseen that, by 2020, the region as a whole will 
attain its replacement level diat is, ¿ e  birth rate necessary for a population to maintain the number of its 
members. In analysis by individual countries, those of Groups I and II still have high overall birth rates 
of around 5 children and should arrive at a net rate of reproduction, equal to 1, ten years later than the 
regional average. By around 1990, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Martinique and Puerto Rico had already 
arrived at rq)lacement levels of fertility, while the other countries of Groups III and IV should have 
overall rates of less than 2.5 children by the year 2010 and several of them should reach their 
replacement levels around that same year. These changes will have important effects on population growth 




Research performed in the late 1980s makes it possible to examine the level of knowledge about and use of 
contracq>tives in several countries of the region. As can be sem, there is an important gap betweoi 
knowledge about contraceptives and their use. The magnitude of the number of undesired childrra can also 
be observed, constituting one of the indicators of the unsatisfied demand for contraceptive methods.
PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN CURRENTLY MARRIED BETWEEN 15-49 YEARS OF AGE 
BY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT AND USE OF CONTRACEPTIVES 




















Bolivia 1989 68 30 12 1.8
Groun II
El Salvador 1985 93 47 45 1.1
Guatemala * 1987 72 23 19 0.7
Paraguay 1990 96 48 35 -
GrouD III
Brazil * 1986 100 66 57 0.7
Colombia 1986 100 66 55 0.5
Ecuador 1987 90 44 36 0.7
Mexico 1987 93 53 45 -
Peru 1986 86 46 23 1.5
Dominican R^ublic 1986 99 50 47 1.0
Trinidad and Tobago 1987 99 53 44
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys (1991). 
* For womra between 15-44 years of age.
C. MORTALITY
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One of the most notable achievements attained in Latin America since the Second World War has been 
the sharp reduction of overall death rates, implying a significant increase in life expectancy at birth in 
most countries (see Annex A-5). This indicator, which was around 52 years for the bulk of the population 
in 1950-1955, rose an average of two years per five year period, reaching 66.7 years for the 1985-1990 
period. It is estimated that a child bom in the year 2000 will live to be 70 years old, which is the World 
Health Organization goal for the end of the century, called, "Health for All by the Year 2000" 
(SPT-2000),
This gain of nearly 15 years of life expectancy at birth is mainly due to reductions of death rates 
among the early years of life and, especially, infant mortality, given the fact that, among older persons, 
the decrease has been much less.
As well, the decrease in mortality among women during the period under consideration has been 
much greater than among men; that is, the increase in life expectancy at birth for women has been greater 
than for men (16 and 14 years, respectively). This phenomenon has led to increased differentiation by 
sex in average life spans, which, in general for the region, has grown from little more than 3 years to 
around 6 years. By observing a group of countries whose vital statistics permit confidence in the quality 
of estimates disaggregated by sex (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay 
and Venezuela) (CELADE, 1990), it can be seen that, for the 1985-1990 period, differences fall between 
6-7 years in Chile, Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela, while, in Costa Rica, Cuba and Guatemala they 
fall between 3.5 and 4.7 years (the extremes are Chile, with 7 years of difference between men and 
women and Cuba, with 3.5 years). These differences show that the biological determinants of the 
differences in survival by sex are conditioned by the effects of each country’s specific context, which 
involves such variables as the magnitude of health risks which characterize the economic activities 
performed by the active population, mainly male, the level of women’s participation in those activities, 
nutritional patterns, etc.
Estimates for different countries reveal a trend toward increasingly lower gains in life expectancy 
at birth. In particular, the 1980s, in nearly all countries, seem to have been witness to a lower net 
decrease of mortality than that observed in earlier decades. This phenomenon could reflect the diverse 
kinds of difficulties associated with the economic and social crisis and, at the same time, reveal how 
difficult it is to achieve further reductions, as diseases, relatively easy to treat and prevent, are brought 
under control.
The process of change briefly described above did not follow the same curve nor did it begin from 
the same level in all countries of the region. The extremes of current Latin American reality, with respect 
to levels of mortality, are represented by, one the one hand, Haiti and Bolivia, found in Group I, with 
life expectancies at birth lower than 60 years (54.7 years in the case of Haiti) and, on the other hand, by 
Costa Rica and Cuba, with averages slightly over 75 years.
If the trends in Groups of countries are analysed, several important facts appear: first, the important 
gains in average life spans realized by countries which began with very low levels is noteworthy. This 
is the case for Peru, Guatemala, El S^vador, Nicaragua and Honduras. Beginning in the 1950s with life 
expectancies of 42-45 years, they currently are achieving values of 61-64 years for that indicator, which 
is a total gain of 20 years. Bolivia is another country in which life expectancy rose significantly; however.
given the low level from which it began, Bolivia still had average life spans of less than 60 years in the 
198S-1990 period. None of these countries, which generally belong to the Groups of countries in incipient 
and moderate stages of transition, will achieve the SPT-2000 goal of 70 years by the end of the century. 
They will, however, be near that figure.
Another group of countries, which began with higher levels of life expectancy in the 1950-1955 
period (between 46-55 years), has achieved averages of 64-70 years for the 1985-1990 period. Among 
these are the countries of Group HI, such as Brazil, Ecuador, £>ominican R^ublic, Colombia, Mexico 
and Venezuela: the first three of these will not achieve die goal of 70 years life expectancy at birth by 
the year 2000, although they will be near that dgure. Another two countries which began with averages 
below 55 years are Chile and Panama, but their progress was much more pronounced and led them to 
surpass the goal of 70 years during the 1985-1990 period. A case to the contrary is found in Paraguay, 
which began the 1950s with a life expectancy at birth over 60 years but which has not achieved 
significant advances, scarcely reaching 67 years of life expectancy for the 1985-1990 period.
Argentina and Uruguay, whose demographic transition was already advanced in the 1950s, achieved 
significant advances, especisdly in the 1960s, but did not achieve the same degree of success as Cuba and 
Costa Rica, countries which, even beginning with lower life expectancies, have surpassed 75 year life 
expectancies during the most recent period. What converts these two countries into important points of 
reference within the Latin American context is not so much the magnitude of the absolute gains achieved 
during the period under analysis, but rather the fact that those gains were achieved when death rates were 
already fairly low, a stage in which further advances are more difficult.
With respect to the non-Latin Caribbean zone, the situation is similar to that in Latin American 
countries with low mortality, given that, for the 1985-1990 period, life expectancies were over 70 years. 
Guyana and Surinam are exceptions, with life expectancies lower than 70 years. Guyana will not reach 
the goal of 70 years life expectancy by the year 2000.
Although, in general, levels and trends in death rates correspond to the stages of demographic 
transition used to classify countries in the first Chapter, that correspondence is not always complete. Some 
countries, such as Paraguay and Costa Rica, have high life expectancies in terms of the stage of transition 
in which they are classified; other countries, such as Peru, have very low life expectancies compared with 
other countries classified in Group III. These apparent discrepancies are explained, in part, by the fact 
that birth and death rates are not always in the same phase of the transition process.
Comparison of the levels and trends of Latin American death rates with the same variables of the 
developed countries of North America (Canada and the United States) reveals that the gap in life 
expectancies has become less pronounced. The difference between these two subregions has changed from 
17 to 10 years. In spite of this fact, it must be kept in mind that the current levels of life expectancy in 
the region are similar to those obtained in Canada and the United States 40 years ago, when neither the 
current knowledge nor the means for preventing and treating an important number of diseases existed 
(CELADE, 1990).
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Moreover, as noted above, the magnitude of the decrease in mortality has been different among 
age groups, with much greater decreases occurring among the younger ages. Thus, for example, it has 
been established that for three countries (Chile, Guatemala and Mexico) around half of the increase in 
life expectancies gained between the end of the 1960s and the early 1980s was due to reduced death rates 
in the first five years of life.
In annex A-6, it can be seen that, for Latin America as a whole, infant mortality fell more than 
50% between 1950-1955 and 1985-1990. Overall, in 1950-1955, no Latin American country had an infant 
mortality rate lower than 50 per thousand and only 6 had rates lower than 100 per thousand. By 
1985-1990, the situation was completely difiierent: 10 countries had rates lower than 50 per thousand and 
none had a rate over 100 per thousand. It must be noted, however, that, in Latin America, excluding the 
non-latin Caribbean, only 8 of the 20 countries will achieve the SPT-2000 goal of a mortality rate lower 
than 30 per thousand.
When the situation is analysed by country, several aspects emerge which should be noted. First, 
among those countries with high infant mortality are Bolivia and Haiti, which belong to the incipient 
transition group, with rates bordering on 100 infant deaths per thousand live births. They are followed 
by Peru, which has a rate of 90 per thousand. Nearly 10% of total births of the region occur in these 
three countries, which also have the highest death rates.
A second group of countries, with infant mortality around 60-70 per thousand during the period 
under consideration, is made up by Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Brazil, Ecuador, 
Guatemala and El Salvador. Nearly half the total births of the region during the period under 
consideration occurred in these countries.
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According to projections performed by CELADE —jointly with national organisms— none of the 
countries of these first two groups will achieve the SPT-2000 goal.
A third group consists of countries with infant mortality rates of between 35 and 50 per thousand, 
including Paraguay, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela. During the 1985-1990 period, one in three 
children of the region was bom in these countries. With the exception of Paraguay and possibly 
Colombia, they will achieve rates lower than 30 per thousand by the year 2000. A fourth group consists 
of countries which, in 1985-1990, had rates of between 20 and 35 per thousand. This group includes 
Argentina and Uruguay —countries in advanced transition— and Panama. Finally, there are Chile, Cuba 
and Costa Rica, countries with death rates of less than 20 per thousand. In these last two groups, which 
have the lowest death rates in Latin America, slightly more than 10% of births occur.
With respect to the non-Latin Caribbean, most countries have rates lower than 20 per thousand. 
As occurred in the analysis of life expectancy at birth, Guyana and Surinam are exceptions, with rates 
of 56 and 33 per thousand, respectively, during 1985-1990.
The levels of infant mortality mentioned above have been achieved in very different contexts, 
although they share certain characteristics. Among these, in recent years and in most countries, is 
the priority given to activities geared to reduce infant mortality. Mass vaccination and oral 
rehydration programmes together with improved and expanded health services are only a few of 
the programmes designed to achieve improved probabilities of infant survival. As well, the role 
played by lower birth rates and their positive effects on the reduction of infant mortality, by 
reducing the proportion of births with higher risk of death, must be taken into account, as mentioned
in the previous section. It is no surprise, then, that, even in the context of the economic crisis 
which i^ected the region in the 1980s, no interruption in the decrease of infant mortality is observed, 
at least at national levels, although in some cases it is true that the decrease itself is slight, as was also 
seen to be the case for life expectancy at birth. In this sense, it is important to h i^ight die signifícant 
advances adiieved even in contexts of deficient sanitary conditions. Tlie experience of countries, which 
have made notable progress, such as Cuba, Costa Rica and Chile, has demonstrated that, even within 
contexts of economic restrictions, those achievements are possible and that important changes can still 
be made.
Those advances cannot, however, lead to the conclusion that the struggle against precocious death 
has concluded in victory. When the behaviour of indicators within countries is observed, important 
differences in infant mortality among social and geographic groups are observed. High infant death risk 
levels persist in poor sectors, among children of womra with low levels of education or who live in poor 
housing conditions (see Cht^ter III, on inequities in demographic behaviour). Even within the same city, 
there are notable differences in infant death rates. The identification and census of those groups must lead 
the way to fiirther progress and to the elimination of the social inequity inherited from the past, which 
it is necessary and possible to overcome.
As well, when Latin America is compared with developed countries, striking difierences are 
observed. In countries with high infant mortality rates, the risk of infant death is fifteen times greater than 
in developed coimtries. Moreover, even in the better off Latin American countries, infant mortality is 
from three to four times higher than in those developed countries most advanced in the control of early 
mortality.
With respect to mortality by cause, the reduction of infectious diseases (diarrheas, acute respiratory 
infections and immune-preventible diseases) has been one of the most significant factors of change 
in death rates.  ̂ Given that control of those diseases has been associated mainly with reductions of 
infant and diildhood mortality, those deaths due to diseases which are chronic to adults (cancer 
and cardiovascular) have become ever more important in the structure of deaths by cause, as well as 
those related to violence (WHO, 1990). This phenomenon is aggravated by the ageing of population 
age structures, producing relative increases in the size of the older age groups, which are more prone 
to that type of disease.  ̂ The conclusion is, therefore, that the new stage for Latin American poses 
new challenges in the struggle to prolong life, within which a central role will be played by degenerative 
diseases, the treatment of which is usually more difficult and more costly.
The correlation between the structure of deaths by groups of causes and the level of mortality 
associated with them has been demonstrated with great clarity on the basis of data from the 1980s 
for several countries of the region with relatively reliable records (PAHO, 1990). Table 1.2 clearly 
shows that, in Guatemala, a country with high death rates, communicable diseases still account for 
a considerable number of deaths (47% of total deaths). In contrast, in countries such as 
Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba and Costa Rica, the percentage of deaths related to those causes is S-8%.
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 ̂This phenomenon can be observed in all cases in which vital statistics have permitted this type of 
research. See, for example, the following documents: Yasaki, 1990 (Study of the State of S3o Paulo, 
1975-83); Ruiz, 1982 (Venezuela 1968-78); Diaz, 1987 (Guatemala 1960-79).
’ In this context, it is important to highlight the importance of a preventive focus for health 
programmes, since it is well known that many elder adult diseases have their roots in adolescence.
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Table 1.2
LATIN AMERICA: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY MAJOR GROUPS OF CAUSES OF DEATH 
AND DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES














TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
-COMMUNICABLE DISEASES 5.4 8.4 12.2 7.4 46.6
-TUMORS 24.4 19.2 19,9 21.6 3.6
-DISEASES OF THE 43.9 43.7 30.0 28.7 6.6
CIRCULATORY SYSTEM
-PERI-NATAL DISEASES 2.4 1.7 2,7 5.9 12.1
-INJURY OR POISONING 6.0 11.6 13.2 11.3 13.8
-ALL OTHER CATEGORIES 17.9 15.4 22.0 25.1 17,3
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH
(1985-90) 72.0 75.2 71.5 74,7 62.0
POPULATION (1990) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
0-14 years 25.8 22.7 30.6 36.2 45.4
15-64 years 62.6 68.8 63.4 59.6 51.4
65 or over 11.6 8.5 6.0 4.2 3.2
DEATHS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
0-14 years 6.9 5.7 9,8 17.4 54,5
15-64 years 26.5 31.4 33,9 31.6 26.8
65 or over 66.6 62.9 56.3 51.0 18,7
Source: CELADE (1991).
Moreover, tumors and circulatory diseases account for a significant portion of total deaths in countries 
with low mortality. Such is the case for Uruguay, where two of every three persons die of those causes. 
This is so, not only because those countries have managed to reduce mortality from communicable 
diseases drastically, but also because, as can be seen in the same Table, they have greater percentages 
of elderly persons.
In spite of the changes noted above, it is still worrisome that, even before low levels of mortality 
were achieved, in many countries there are signs that diseases are reappearing which were thought to be 
under control and whose appearance and lethal effects are, undoubtedly, related to living conditions and 
the capacity of health service systems to deal with them. Outstanding examples are the reappearances of 
malaria, cholera and tuberculosis. It has been noted that malaria persists or has become more frequent 
in areas where it already existed and it has reappeared in areas in which it had been eradicated. This has 
been confirmed not only by increased numbers of cases of malaria; several countries have also been 
concerned by increased numbers of deaths from the disease (WHO, 1990). With respect to cholera, it has 
been seen how that disease has appeared and had important effects in Peru and, to a less degree, in other 
countries. A combination of factors, such as sanitary conditions, access to health services and sanitary 
education, seem to have played a significant role in the spread of this disease, in its persistence and lethal 
effects.
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The study of the dissemination patterns of AIDS and the prospects for its dissemination among 
Latin American populations also constitute an important health challenge. This is a case in which the 
importance of investing in prevention is clear, especially if the economic limitations of the region and the 
high costs of treatment of this disease are kept in mind.
Another challenge which the region must face as it reduces death rates involves lowering the levels 
of maternal mortality, which is still at alarming levels in many countries. These rates remain high as a 
result of the people’s limited access to deliveries attended by specialized personnel and of the high 
frequency of abortions.
At the same time, the frequency and increase of deaths by violence is one of the serious problems 
which the health sector of the region must face. This phenomenon constitutes an important area for 
research and action in the region. It is found very notably in several countries (Peru, Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Colombia, among others) and is associated with political and ethnic repression, terrorism, drug 
traffic and, generally, with the lack of opportunities, goals and perspectives which afflicts a significant 
number of youth in many countries. The growing importance of deaths in automobile accidents is another 
of the undesirable consequences of the process of urbanization and economic growth.
Finally, the need for incorporating the environmental dimension into health concerns seems to be 
acquiring new relevance, given the patterns of industrialization and management of agriculture which 
characterize most countries of the region. As one of its effects, this process leads to the seldom controlled 
discharge of a growing number of different industrial wastes, which increases the exposure of broad 
sectors of the population to products which, due to their toxicity, constitute health dangers and even a 
threat to the survival of that population (WHO, 1990). The high levels of contamination to which workers 
are exposed on the job are also very harmful, as occurs in mining operations. These facts make it 
necessary to locate human survival and quality of life as central concerns in the search for sustainable 
development.
The elements outlined above reveal the necessity of accurate measurements of death rates by causes. 
In this sense, it is most important to improve the qudity of vital statistics. In general, it can be said that 
the need to measure levels of adult and infant mortality directly still exists, given that many countries still 
operate on the basis of model-generated estimates.
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D. POPULATION GROWTH AND AGE STRUCTURES
Changes in the demogr^hic components of the region, basically in birth rates, are also producing 
changes in population age structures. As was to be expected, the general trend is towards the overall 
ageing of the age structure, understood as the process of the proportional reduction of the number of 
children and the progressive increase of the elderly population. The ageing process of the population of 
the region occurs in very direct correlation to birth and death rate trends and, therefore, with the stages 
of demographic transition. Thus, the population age structure also expresses the placement of each 
country in the process of demographic transition. At any rate, modifications in the relative distribution 
of the population by age occur slowly and can only be clearly appreciated in the mid and long terms.
In the initial stage of demographic transition, which corresponds to high birth and death rates, 
children and youth constitute large segments of the population and there are very few elderly persons. 
In Group I, the percentage of those under 15 years of age is around 42%, while those over 65 years is 
around 4% (Annex A-7).
In the following stage of transition, in which death rates fall and birth rates drop only slightly 
(Group II), the population becomes younger, with a greater proportion of children (45% in 1990). This 
phenomenon occurs because the death rate which decreases most is that which affects very young 
children, having the same effect as an increase in fertility. This results in a lower percentage of elderly 
population (3%).
The countries of Group III, which has been defined as hill transition, already have a lower 
percentage of those younger than 15 years of age (36% in 1990). This proportion is still high as a result 
of high fertility in the past which produces a large number of women in their fertile years. Note that the 
decrease in the proportion of children is compensated for by an increase in the middle years, while the 
percentage of those over 65 years of age is 4% (Annex A-7).
In those countries in the most advanced stage of transition, the percentage of elderly is double that 
of countries in the initial stage. According to Annex A-7, populations in this group have 28%, younger 
than 15 years of age, and 10%, elderly.
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Box 1.4
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLUTION 
OF COMPOSITION BY AGE IN THE 1990s
In tenns of the demands to be faced, 81% of the total population increase which Latin America and the 
Caribbean will experience in the 1990s will occur in the middle age groups (67 million persons), an 
inq>ortant number of whom will be incorporated into the labour mariiet and will enter their reproductive 
years. Those younger than 15 will absorb 10% of the growth (8 million persons) and the elderly, a similar 
percentage. In this sense, the most relevant characteristic for the region at the present time is the coexist^ce 
of demands, g iv^  that, even though the effects of high past fertility are still being felt, the symptoms of 
elderly populations are already beginning to be felt. These average figures embrace considerable dispersion, 
as has bem noted throughout this paper. Thus, for example, in Guatemala, the group of those younger than 
IS years will grow at a rate of 2.3% while the group of those over 64 will grow at a rate of 4.4%. In 
Brazil, meanwhile, die rates will be -0.3 and 3.3 %, respectively. Moreover, it is important to anticipate long 
term changes which must be considered so as to avoid the negative experiraces of countries in more 
advanced stages of transition which have not been able to the stress of die ever greater demands on social 
security and health services arising from the elderly population.




15-64 65 and over
Population (millions)
1990 441 158 262 21
2000 523 166 329 28
Percentage of the population
1990 100 35.8 59.5 4.7
2000 100 31.7 62.9 5.4
Annual average growth (%) 1.7 0.5 2.3 3.0
Increase (millions) 82 8 67 7
Percentage increase 100 10 81 9
Source: CELADE.
Although the analysis of the relative distribution of the population in age groups allows for situating 
countries in the different stages of demographic transition, as noted above, trends change only slowly. 
In forty years, the overall population of Latin America and the Caribbean has evolved from the first stage 
(40% children), passing through a rejuvenation in the 1960s as a result of the gains made in reduced 
infant mortality, acquiring, at the present time, the characteristics of the third stage (36% children), that 
is, a relatively young population, with strong representations of children and young adults. Given the 
supposed demographic trend changes for the future, by 2025, for example, the age structure of Bolivia 
will still be younger than that of Uruguay at the present time. Undoubtedly, this could be different if birth 
rates drop more rapidly than has been expected until recently, a phenomenon which seems to be 
beginning to occur. Generally, it can be concluded that population structures will only change in the mid 
and long terms for countries in different moments of demographic transition.
In spite of this, a notable phenomenon are the differences of absolute and relative growth which 
will occur in the different age groups in the 1990s (annex A-8) and which determine the demands to 
which priority should be given. The general characteristic is that, in those countries which are entering 
into demographic transition, growth rates are high and similar for all ages. In those cases, given that they 
are young populations, absolute growth among those younger than 15 years will be up to 15 times higher 
than that of the elderly population. On the other had, as birth rates fall, the growth rate for children drops 
substantially, while the rate for the elderly maintains its high levels, as a result to previous high fertility. 
Thus, in Group IV, the population 65 years and over grows at a rate of around 2%, while the 0-14 year 
old group grows at 0.5%. In absolute terms, this implies growth in the number of elderly which is 30 
greater than that of children.
Trend projections of demographic components analysed for the mid and long terms show lower 
population growth rates. From nearly 2% currently, they will drop to around 1% in the year 2010 and 
to lower than that figure in 2025 in most countries. Hypothetically, it is thought that the region could 
arrive at a combination of birth and death rates which could, on average, lead to each woman having 
around two children by around 2020 and that at least one of those children would be a daughter who 
would r^lace the mother in her reproductive function. If that were to occur, zero growth would be 
achieved and, therefore, a stable limit population which would, subsequently, sufrer little change. 
However, as a result of still young age distributions, that situation would only be achieved many years 
later, probably by the year 2050, with a population of around 800 million persons for the region. In an 
exercise of long term projection prepared by CELADE, in that year, only Cuba, which already has birth 
levels below replacement levels, would achieve a negative growth rate.
It is interesting to observe that, in the 1950-1990 period, the population grew 167%, reaching 441 
million persons. The prevalent high growth rates of that period produced that striking increase. However, 
according to current projections, which suppose decreasing growth rates, the population of the region will 
increase 60% over the same number of years in the fiiture (1990-2025), arriving at a population of 700 
million persons. The relative weight of Latin America and the Caribbean in the world total, according 
to "World Population Prospects" of the United Nations (United Nations, 1992), is on the order of 8.2% 
and will be the same in 2050. This regional constancy at global levels contrasts with what will occur in 
Africa, which will rise from 12 to 19%, reducing the relative importance of the populations of Europe 
and East Asia.
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As a result of the supposed convergence of birth rates toward replacement levels, the relative 
distribution of population be ages in the region will be characterized by a trend, also convergent, toward 
a more elderly population. By the middle of the next century, the population younger than IS years of 
age will account for 20% of the total in most countries. However, significant differences remain at the 
present time, with some countries having populations with 40% children and others, with less than 30%. 
As a result of the anticipated changes in age structures, the relation of dependence will tend to decease, 
initially —due to the reduction in the percentage of children—, to subsequently recover part of its value, 
due to the increase in the number of elderly persons. At any rate, the current relation of dependence —70 
persons in inactive ages for every 100 in their active years— will already reach values of around 50% 
by the year 2010 in the region, although countries such as Bolivia and Guatemala will still maintain 
relations similar to those currently prevalent in the region (see Table 1.3). These trends will have a strong 
impact on demands for education, health and social security services and on employment, a situation 
which will be examined in Chapter IV of this p^er.
The convergence of birth rate trends with those in population age structures means that, at the 
present time in many countries of the region, the number of births is reaching its maximum historic 
values and will decrease in the future, with the consequent el^ects on demand for maternal-infant attention 
and other services related to infancy. However, the same phenomenon will only occur in the countries 
of Groups I and II within two or three decades.
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In summary, as a result of changes in demographic changes, mainly in birth rates, there will also 
be changes in population composition by ages and in other related aspects, such as, for example, 
epidemiological profiles, relations of dependence and, therefore, in the structure of demand for basic 
services. In the short and mid terms, these changes imply coexistent demands because there will continue 
to be sharp increases in the numbers of children and persons in their middle years, to which will be added 
a similar situation in the elderly population.
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Table 1.3
DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS FOR LATIN AMERICA 





Bolivia Guatemala Mexico Brazil Argentina
1990
Pop.(thousands) 430182 7171 9197 84486 149042 32322
TGF s / 3.1 4.6 5.4 3.2 2.7 2.8
e(0) b/ 69 62 65 70 66 72
r natural c/ 2.1 2.5 3.1 2.3 1.6 1.2
X pop. - 15 years 36 41 45 38 34 30
Depend, ratio (X) ^  69 82 95 72 65 64
2010
Pop.(thousands) 587106 11087 15827 118455 194002 40193
TGF 2.3 3.0 3.6 2.2 2.1 2.3
e(0) 72 69 71 74 71 73
r natural 1.2 1.8 2.3 1.3 1.0 0.9
X pop. - 15 years 28 35 39 29 25 26
Depend.ratio (X) 51 ¿5 76 52 47 56
2025
Pop.(thousands) 686450 14096 21668 137483 219673 45505
TGF 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.0 2.0 2.2
e(0) 74 70 72 79 72 74
r natural 0.8 1.3 1.7 0.9 0.5 0.6
X pop. - 15 years 24 29 33 23 22 24
Depe^.ratio (X) 47 54 60 47 47 54
2050
Pop.(thousands) 785448 17931 29599 158124 235455 51362
TGF 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.1
e(0) sL 74 70 72 79 72 74
r natural 0.3 0.7 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.4
X pop. - 15 years 21 22 23 20 19 21
Depend.ratio (X) 54 50 48 55 56 55
Source: Chackiel (1992).
§/ Overall fertility rate.
^  Life expectancy at birth.
c/ Natural rate of growth (percentages).
^  ((-15)+(65+))/(15-64)
e/ The e(0) were maintained for 2020-2025.
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n. POPULATION MOBILITY AND SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION
A. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
In Latin Am^ica, the movement of persons across international frontiers have become a complex 
phenomenon. They have mainly consisted in movements for purposes of residence —which is the very 
definition of international migration— and temporary displacements associated with seasonal fluctuations 
in economic activities. Both of these categories include the return to the country of origin, forced 
displacements involving refugees and displaced persons, undocumented migrants, long distance migrations 
and those to neighboring countries. Lately, a growing form of migration consists in the circulation of 
persons within the context of the opening of national markets and the globalization of the economy.
All of this means that international must be understood as a concept closer to that of the general 
mobility of persons, so that its importance undoubtedly transcends the strictly demographic consequences 
which, certainly, continue to be felt in several nations. Thus, international migration is an issue of 
concern given its repercussion in multiple dimensions, such as, for example, for countries which mainly 
receive immigrants and for those whose emigrants imply a certain degree of selectivity involving a 
possible loss of human resources or, from another point of view, when emigration constitutes a 
mechanism of sending the so-called "returns" back to the country of origin.
Usually, the typification of migratory movements is complicated by the lack of reliable information, 
a situation aggravated by, among other factors, "illegal" migration, the nature of which hinders adequate 
quantification both of the flow and stock (numbers) of migrants. This information problem has been 
highlighted for a long time as a central issue in the area of international migration, a issue difficult to 
resolve and which may become more difficult yet in light of the new modalities of population mobility.
In the past, when migration in several Latin American countries occurred for purposes of 
permanent residence, its demographic impact on growth and population age and sex structures was 
variable only over the long term, being concentrated in certain territories and localities. Currently, except 
in certain countries with small populations, the phenomenon does not seem to be producing important 
demogr^hic consequences at national levels —at least in the long term— and perhaps this trend holds 
due to its possible loss of significance relative to migration for purposes of permanent residence.
Up to the first half of this century, international migration was very important for several countries 
of the region, mainly due to the numbers of European immigrants, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, 
Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela and English-speaking Caribbean countries. Although of low relative 
importance in comparison with the total population, the Europeans represented 60% (some 3 million 
persons) of the foreigners in censuses around 1980 in 13 Latin American countries, a figure which is
surely larger than in previous decades/ From the point of view of their contribution to demographic 
growth, there is evidence to show that, for example, in Argentina, in several periods between 1870 and 
1970, immigration represented up to 70% of total population growth at the end of the last century and 
60% in the early 1900s, a percentage which declini progressively since the 1950s. This means that that 
country experienced one of the greatest demogr^hic and social impacts of European immigration in the 
region becchini and Lattes, 1975).
With the exceptions of the omissions of unknown fractions of undocumented migrants and of the 
probable changes in recent years, related to economic adjustments and contractions, annex 9 shows the 
evolution of the population enumerated in censuses in countries other than those of origin around 1970 
and 1980. It is noteworthy that the relative weight is not more than 10% of the total population in each 
country, although in some cases it may be greater is its distribution within sub-national regions is 
considered.
Given the lack of reliable estimates of numbers of undocumented migrants, there have been 
frequent conjectures with respect to those countries which usually record high numbers of immigrants. 
One way of partial approach to the issue consists in considering the results of "voluntary legalization" 
actions. Thus, in Venezuela, 270 thousand foreigners (92% Colombians) regularized their situation 
between 1980 and 1981 (Torrealba, 1992); and in the United States, 3 million persons (75% Mexicans) 
sought legalization of their residence in the country between 1982 and 1987 (Percy and Warren, 1992). 
Thus, the migration of undocumented persons represents another serious problem which must be faced, 
both in terms of diagnosis and control measures adequate to the interests of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, with due care for human rights.
Currently, international migration in the region is characterized by two basic patterns; intrarégional 
and that oriental toward industrialized countries, mainly the United States. If the Mexicans in that country 
are excluded and without considering most Caribbean countries, censuses of around 1980 reveal figures 
relatively similar in both patterns. Both phenomena involve persons with diverse qualifications; an 
association more or less frequent is that established according to the distance migrants move, insofar as 
greater selectivity is found in movements involving longer distances, such as of South Americans to the 
United States. TTiere is less selectivity in those cases of traditional migration linked to conditions of 
poverty, such as Haitian migration to the United States, Canada and other Caribbean nations. The 
migration which affects persons obliged to move x , as occurred in Central America until recently, 
constitutes another type of movement which usually involves groups of persons with diverse 
sociodemographic characteristics (entire families, professionals, small farmers, youth, the elderly).
Intrarégional migration has increased considerably. The most recent information available indicates 
that, in the 1980s, 2 million Latin Americans were living in the region in countries other than their 
country of birth. Argentina and Venezuela had the highest numbers of Latin American immigrants, 
coming especially from neighboring countries. Thus, in the case of Argentina, most were Paraguayans, 
Chileans, Bolivians and Uruguayans, while,in Venezuela, most were Colombians who constituted the 
movement of greatest magnitude in the region. In the case of Uruguayans, emigration, nearly all of which 
was oriented toward Argentina, attained a rate similar to the rate of mortality between 1970-1975 and the 
negative migratory balance doubled natural growth in 1974, an occurrence in a country of small relative *
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* Another 2 million foreigners appearing in censuses in those 13 countries came mainly from the Latin 
American and Caribbean region itself.
demographic size (Fortuna and Niedworok, 1985). The relevant phenomenon of migration in the Central 
American sub-region can be added to this description; it is estimated that 2 millions migrated during the 
1980s within the context of the general crisis and conflicts which affected that region (CIREFCA, 1989).
In recent years, important numbers of persons have been returning to Central America as a result 
of peace accords, a phenomenon seen to occur previously in South American countries which have 
recovered democratic systems (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay), although in those countries the numbers are 
small. In any case, the return to the country of origin is a facet little studied to date and it seems clear 
that it is an important challenge for national societies in terms of the social reinsertion of migrants and 
refugees. In some cases, the return may have been obligatory for those residing in countries which 
suffered severe economic crises during the 1980s, as was the case for a number of Colombians in 
Venezuela. Nevertheless, that country continued to receive immigrants during that decade, as is indicated 
by the preliminary figures of the 1990 census, given that the total number of foreigners and of 
Colombians is unchanged from that of 1981. These trends demonstrate the dynamic which international 
migratory movements can generate, as well as the effects of momentary situations —both in countries of 
origin and those of destination— on variations in their dimensions.
Migration in the Caribbean basin is particular to that area for several reasons. One reason concerns 
the strong incidence of the international flow of person (that is, recurring movements with clear proposals 
to return), favoured perhaps by geographical proximity. There is evidence that countries, such as 
Bahamas, together with receiving an enormous continent of immigrants who plan to stay, have also been 
the transitory destination of persons from other islands, as is the case, for example, for Haitians. Another 
peculiarity of the Caribbean is that international emigration is a decisive demographic component in 
several countries, such as Dominique and Grenada, among others. Still, in spite of the intensity of 
movements within the sub-region, those undertaken for purposes of residence account for only 300 
thousand persons, according to census information from around 1980, a flgure which accounts for only 
1% of the population of the area (Simmons and Guengat, 1992). On the other hand, extraterritorial 
migrants reached considerably higher figures, given that the population bom in Cuba, Jamaica, 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados, recorded in the 1980 census in the 
United States, amounted to 1.2 millions.
The emigration of Latin Americans and Caribbeans to the United States has constituted a clear 
migratory trend, especially since the second half of this century, when it became the principal destination 
for regional emigration. Its magnitude is notable in absolute terms and has affected Mexico, Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, Colombia and several Central American and Caribbean countries notoriously. 
Migration to the United States is complex in composition given the coexistence of highly qualified 
persons, undocumented migrants and those taken in as refugees and displaced persons. Generally, nearby 
and Caribbean countries have had historical migratory links with the United States, which have been 
sensitive to momentary situations of diverse nature and to changes in migration law. Returns to countries 
of origin is a characteristic of this migration and they lend it great importance in terms of a significant 
influx of funds and contributions to the subsistence of family groups. This has been demonstrated by 
research related to Central American countries which concluded that those returns have tripled export 
income (El Salvador; ECLAC, 1992b).
Mexicans in the United States, of whom there were more than 2 million in 1980, constitute the 
most important fraction of the foreign population in that country. That same year, more than 4 million 
Latin Americans and Caribbeans were recorded by the census in the United States, a figure double that 
of 1970 (Annex A-10). Admission statistics for Latin Americans and Caribbeans and, especially, for
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Central Americans who entered as immigrants have risen in the last two decades (Table II. 1), which 
should be reflected to some extent in the North American census of 1990.
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The Latin American and Caribbean character as a population "sender” is often an issue in 
discussions of international migration in the region, frequently addressed in an alarmist tone. However, 
that phenomenon must be understood in its true dimensions. According to the current estimates of 
population projections for twenty Latin American countries —even taking the limitations of available data 
into account— the net annual negative balance of regional migration will be of some 375 thousand persons 
for 1985-1990, or a rate of only -1 per thousand. Even though it is true that the population loss will occur 
throughout the Caribbean sub-region, what ought to be noticed is that the "expulsion” from the region 
as a whole arises from the migratory behaviour of only a few countries, in some of which that 
phenomenon does not have sq>preciable demogr^hic effects. Proper analysis must also include the fact 
that emigration is not always permanent, even in diose cases in which a change of habitual residence is 
sought.
The attraction of the United States as a place for the development of professional activities 
(especially given the possibilities of receiving higher income) has led to a significant presence of Latin 
American professionals and technicians there. However, that phenomenon does not only occur in that 
country but is also found within the region itself. This issue is important for the repercussions which 
receiving or sending qualified human resources always has for developing countries, that is, when it is 
perceived as a modality of technology transfer. The migration law of the United States has had a major 
impact on the admission of new Latin American immigrants, who have seen their numbers reduced with 
respect to total admissions, although, in practice, the number of professional and technical migrants 
doubled between 1970 and 1980, affecting some countries more dian others (see annex A-10). It is 
probable that the 1990 North American census will also show an increase in Latin American and 
Caribbean qualified labour, except for a proportional reduction of some flows from Central America, if 
the admissions data for 1974 are compared with those for 1989 (Percy and Warren, 1992). It is also 
probable that, as a result of changes in the North American law, the profile of professional migrants will 
have changed with respect to previous decades. Within Latin America, the available census data from the 
1980s shows that Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil were, up to that time, the main receivers in the region, 
while Colombia, Chile and Argentina again had the greatest numbers of emigrants destined preferentially 
to the counties mentioned above (see Annex A-11).
Given the characteristics of international mobility and the weakness of the available empirical data, 
it is not possible to describe recent trends clearly nor is it, therefore, possible to propose solidly based 
hypotheses about the its behaviour beyond the short term. It is clear that international migration does not 
usually continue over time in such a way as to project its behaviour, as occurs with birth and death rates. 
This is one reason why population projections, generally, suppose that it will not affect demogrj^hic 
trends in most countries very much. However, unresolved problems related to the quality of data (flows, 
numbers, undocumented persons); numerous unknown factors posed by the process of return (favoured 
by the processes of social pacification and democratization, or the effects of the economic crisis of the 
1980s); the impact of Caribbean migration to the United States; concern with trends in the migration of 
highly qualified person (even though it does not involve the intention of permanent residence change); 
and the existence of persons returning, which constitutes an essential motive for international migration, 
are all clearly identifiable and interrelated aspects, among perhaps many others, which assign the 
phenomenon a transcendence which, as indicated above, goes beyond demographic concerns and requires 
special attention to understand it better.
UNITED STATES: POPULATION ADMITTED AS IMMIGRANTS, 1970-1989
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Table II.1
Countries Immigrants admitted (thousands)
or region 1970-1979 % 1980-1989 %
Total 4231 100.00 5811 100.00
Mexico 609 14.39 662 11.39
The Caribbean 732 17.30 839 14.44
Cuba 271 6.41 163 2.81
Dominican Rep. 139 3.29 225 3.87
H aiti 58 1.37 122 2.10
Jamaica 136 3.21 205 3.53
Trinidad and Tobago 63 1.49 37 0.64
Others 65 1.54 87 1.50
Central America 118 2.79 264 4.54
El Salvador 29 0.69 96 1.65
Guatemala 23 0.54 45 0.77
Honduras 16 0.38 37 0.64
Nicaragua 11 0.26 30 0.52
Paneuna 20 0.47 29 0.50
Others 19 0.45 27 0.46
South America 260 6.15 394 6.78
B razil 14 0.33 21 0.36
Colombia 72 1.70 107 1.84
Ecuador 47 1.11 47 0.81
Guyana 40 0.95 91 1.57
Peru 25 0.59 50 0.86
Others 62 1.47 78 1.34
Canada 113 2.67 114 1.96
Europe 827 19.55 655 11.27
Asia 1453 34.34 2681 46.14
Africa 83 1.96 163 2.81
Oceania 36 0.85 39 0.67
Source; INS (1979) and (1989).
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Boxili
MIGRATION AND CRISIS IN VENEZUELA; THE CASE OF 
COLOMBIANS IN THE 1980s
According to coisus figures, between 1981 and 1990, the number of Colombians résidât in Vmezuela grew 
only slightly, from 508 thousand to 530 thousand, a time during whidi they represented son^what more than 
half of the foreigners in the country. These figures demonstrate Úiat, conpired to previous periods, 
Colombian immigration dropped off considerably during the 1980s (in 1971, around 180 thousand bom in 
Colombia were recorded by c^isus), although this was not sufficiait to counteract one of the most persistât 
historical ph^omena in Latin America: the presrace of a significant contingmt of Colombians in V«iezuela. 
Up to the first half of the decade, migration back to the country of origin predominated, accounting for a 
negative migratory balance of Colombians. At any rate, the slight growth of the Colombian population in 
Vraezuela betwe^ the last two censuses ratifies the continuance of traditional migratory tr^ds because it 
compensated for those who died or who returned to Colombia during that period.
The return of Colombians seems to have affected a specific set of persons, as a result of the behaviour 
of certain components of the situation of crisis. This has been associated with lower oil income and limitations 
on international credit which directly affected production and influ^ced the devaluation of national currency 
and financial processes. In that context, one of the most sensitive sectors, as is usually the case, was 
constroction, which occupied a large proportion of the non-agricultural Colombia work force: unemploym^t 
indexes were more than double national unemployment indexes between 1981 and 1986, which could be one 
of the principal detonating factors of the return process. Other factors associated with that process are related 
to the devaluation of the bolivar, mainly affecting certain groups whose income suffered in comparative terms. 
However, due to low rmemployment rates in the agricultural sector, to the scant impact on the buying power 
of poorly paid workers, as was to be expected, and to the deterioration of the employmœt situation in 
Colombia, return flows were not greater, although many workers remained in precarious situations in 
Vraezuela. At the same time, the employment dynamics expressed in the persistent demand for agricultural 
and domestic workers, together with the implementation of coal mining programmes located in specific areas 
such as Guajira, help explain continued frontier movements and, thus, the slight increase observed in the total 
number of Colombians in 1990.
Most of these census data, as well as for all departures, refer to workers who entered the country 
legally. The graeral trend of undocumented immigration could have followed that of legal immigration, 
although it is probable that, in that case, returns would have been fewer, given die low expectations of and 
possibilities for upward social mobility in dieir country of origin for a very poorly qualified population.
Rrferences: Central Office of Statistics and Information (1992), Preliminary 1990 Census Figures. Torrealba, R.
(1988), "Mercados de trabajo y migraciones laborales entre Colombia y Venezuela en el contexto de 
la crisis venezolana: 1980-1986", in G. Bidegain G. (Comp.), Las migraciones laborales 
colombo-venezolanas. ILDIS-UCAB-Nueva Sociedad, Caracas.
In spite of these restrictions, it is possible to suppose that, within the modalities of international 
migration, a kind of transitory mobility or circulation is clearly emerging, especially within the region, 
which may have even more varied demographic and social effects than movements for purposes of 
residence. Migration will continue to be characterized by sensitivity to momentary situations, although 
perhaps more predictably; where differences in economic opportunities Qobs, s^aries) become more 
evident, population movements can be expected to increase temporarily. But, apart from those situations 
and the dynamics of migratory movements encouraged by the circuits already established -which impose 
a minimum basis for projecting future movements-, uncertainty arises with respect to what will h^pen 
in a context of the consolidated democracy and productive equity, as factors which may retain population, 
subject to new modalities of integration and the openness of national markets, which, in turn, may 
increase migratory movements. This uncertainty is valid insofar as certain integration initiatives do not 
take into account aspects related to labour mobUity.
Thus, the historical patterns of mobility and specific facts, such as agreements among countries 
with a view to increasing commerce (Mexico-United States-Canada, Mercosur), together with 
developments in transportation and communications systems, are some of the aspects which will mark 
the probable evolution of international migratory trends in the region.
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B. SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION AND URBANIZATION
The process of population redistribution in Latin America after the Second World War has combined the 
persistence of the more than secular trends towards concentration with a broadening of the horizons of 
territorial occupation. Increased concentration in ever more extensive areas has not hindered the opening 
of ancient unpopulated areas, the "internal frontiers", toward which a growing proportion of demogrtqihic 
factors have been moving. An important contribution to the gradual reduction of population "gaps" has 
been made by advances toward the Amazon and Orinoco basins which, accounting for somewhat more 
than 40% of the surface of the region, caused their populations to more than quadruple between 19S0 and 
1980. As a result of these complementary centripetal and centrifugal trends, a relatively important loss 
of population in long-established areas, with essentially agro-extractive economic bases, has occurred 
simultaneously with patterns of demographic concentration and dispersion.
As a synthetic, although abstract, expression of the increased use of space in the region, it is worth 
noting that Ae average population density in Latin America —following the rhythm of demographic 
growth— tripled between 1950 and 1990. However, the magnitude recorded in 1990 (little less than 22 
persons per square km), continues to be considerably less than that of other regions of the planet. At any 
rate, the regional average does not reveal the great variety among national demographic densities, which 
range from 7 inhabitants per square km in Bolivia, to 230 in Haiti and El Salvador (see annex A-12). 
While figures for South American countries, except for Ecuador and Colombia, fall below the regional 
average, in Mesoamerica, except for Nicaragua and Panama, the figures more than double that reference 
figure. Since, generally, the rhythm of demographic growth has been greater in the more densely 
populated countries, the panorama around 1990 reveals sharper differences than in previous years. As 
well, an aggregate indicator, such as national density, does not reveal the considerable contrasts which 
occur at local levels. Moreover, given that demographic density is only one relation between two gross 
quantities, it is unable to reveal or to measure so complex a correlation as that involved in the notion of 
population pressure on natural resources.
Changes in the modalities of population distribution in the insular territories of the Caribbean have 
also been important, especially because they have occurred within relatively small areas. A frequent 
trend, with historical roots, has been the increase in the relative importance of the population in littoral 
areas, a phenomenon encouraged by tourist industry development in certain localities, the evaluation of 
which would require finer analysis. It must also be recogniz^ that certain recent modifications in patterns 
of demographic distribution are closely linked to the effects of international migration and mobility, as 
can be observed in the case of the Bahamas, among other localities, where the differences between the 
demographic dynamism of the Family Islands and that of the rest of the archipelago are becoming ever 
more marked. As holds for the rest of the region, population densities in the countries of the Caribbean 
Community are also very different, one from another. Thus, in those located on the Northern coast of 
South America, such as Guyana and Surinam, national averages are lower than S persons per square km, 
while in the insular sector proper, density values are considerably higher, as occurs in Barbados, where 
density is nearly 600 inhabitants per square km.
One of the distinctive sociodemographic characteristics of Latin American within the Third World 
is its relatively high degree of urbanization. In 1950, only four of every ten Latin Americans lived in 
urban centres; by 1990, on the contrary, 71 % of the population of the region was classified as urban (see 
annex A-13). With respect to the countries of the Caribbean basin, it is important to distinguish between 
those with relatively reduced territorial and demographic dimensions, in which urban-rural boundaries 
are frankly diffuse, as is observed in Barbados or Grenada, and those larger countries in which most of 
the population lives in urban areas, as in Jamaica, Puerto Rico or Trinidad and Tobago. Again, the 
incidence of international movements has affected the degree of urbanization in several Caribbean 
countries decisively, the fluctuations observed in Surinam being a case in point.
Although the degree of urbanization in the different countries of Latin America has increased over 
time, the rhythm of increase, or rate of urbanization, has been variable. It increased sharply between 
1930 and 1950, when overall population growth was spurred by abrupt declines in death rates. However, 
after the first half of this century and having attained an urban majority in the region, the rhythm of 
increase of the degree of urbanization lost impetus, which occurred immediately prior to the appearance, 
within the total population, of the trend toward lower birth rates, the first symptoms of which appeared 
within urban social contexts. At any rate, given the high urban percentage of the population of the region, 
it should not be a surprise that the rate urbanization has been declining in recent decades. However, the 
speed with which it shifted from increase to decline remains noteworthy, a phenomenon which, in other 
zones, seems to have taken longer periods of time.
Although taking different routes, several countries are coming to be similar to each other in terms 
of degrees of urbanization. This apparent trend toward convergence coincides with the negative 
association generally observed between the urban percentage of the population and its rate of increase. 
Thus, in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, with their high degrees of urbanization, that indicator has risen 
only slightly in recent decades. On the contrary, in 1990, in a number of countries, the persistence of 
urban dynamism presages important future increases in the urban percentage of the total population, other 
factors remaining the same. This would seem to be the case for Haiti, Bolivia, Ecuador, Dominican 
Republic, Honduras and Paraguay.
44
By classifying Latin American countries according to degree of urban percentage in 1990, it is 
possible to identify four categories which, in turn, are associated to a certain extent with the different 
instances of demographic transition (see annex A-13). The first includes those nations with degrees of 
urbanization over 80%. These are Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela. The first three, which are 
classified in the advanced stage of demographic transition (or Group IV), stand out because they have had 
predominately urban populations for some time, to the extent that absolute growth of those areas 
surpassed growth of the respective total populations, meaning that the number of rural inhabitants in 1990 
was less than that of 60 years ago. As could be expected, the rate of urbanization in those three countries 
has been lower than the regional average. Venezuela, on the other hand, has been characterized by a 
sweeping increase in its urban percentage, rapidly achieving the highest values in the region, while its 
rural population declined (that population in 1990 was similar to that of 1940). This behaviour, proper 
to high growth rates, corresponds to full demogr^hic transition (Group III).
A second category of countries includes some of the most populous of the Latin American region, 
such as Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Peru, which, in 1990, held 67% of the inhabitants of the region 
and which are in full demographic transition (Group III). In all of them, urbanization was over 69%, in 
1990, and its evolution has been marked by high rates of urbanization. The case of Brazil is outstanding, 
given that the number of urban dwellers multiplied by a factor of 13.8 between 1930 and 1990, while 
its rural population declined during the 1980s until it was one magnitude less than in 1960. A fifth 
member of this category is Cuba, which displays fairly peculiar behaviour; it is a country in the advanced 
stage of demogriq)hic transition (Group IV) and its urbanization is "old”, but with a notably low rate of 
urban growth, except in 1970, when its rural population began to decline in absolute terms.
The third category of countries displays a somewhat low degree of urbanization and includes those 
countries in different stages of demographic transition, although none of them is in the more advanced 
stages (IV). A first sub-group to be noted is that formed by Ecuador, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic, 
all with more than 55% urban populations, in 1990. The case of Dominican Republic stands out because, 
thanks to its high rate of urbanization, within a context of rapid population growth, its urban inhabitants, 
in 1990, were 17.2 times more numerous than in 1930. A second sub-group includes Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Panama and Paraguay, which share a degree of urbanization between 45 and 53%. While 
the three Central American countries have had low rates of urbanization in the last 20 years, suggesting 
the deceleration of an initially vigorous process, indicators for the two South American countries show 
increases beginning in the 1960s.
Finally, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras comprise the fourth category, with degrees of urbanization 
lower than 41%, in 1990. These countries are classified in the initial stages of demographic transition 
(moderate and incipient) (Groups I and II). Within this sub-group, Guatemala is outstanding, with steady, 
high rates of urbanization until the 1940s, when they began to decline. Meanwhile, Haiti and Honduras 
seem to have begun their processes of urbanization later, maintaining high levels until the end of the 
period.
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In spite of the fact that this classification, based on the degree of urbanization achieved by Latin 
American countries in 1990, coincides fairly well with the stages of demographic transition according to 
figures for the same year, that coincidence is not perfect. Such imperfection makes it possible to suggest 
that the relations between the two processes, urbanization and demographic transition, are more complex 
than those expressed by the indicators used here. In all rigour, demographic transition must be understood 
as a plurality of possible bdiaviours and not as a kind of unique model of evolution; the true moving 
forces of transition correspond to sociocultural and economic factors which give validity to demographic
conduct. At the same time, urbanization is a process of change, multi-dimensioiud in character, the 
peculiar quality of which, beyond die ways in which population is located within the territory, is 
generated by the historical matrix within which it occurs. Therefore, improved understanding of the 
relations between the two processes would require lending attention to the specificities of their evolution 
in each particular society, an observation relevant both for what distinguishes one country from anodier, 
as well as for differences within them.
When the inequalities in demographic bdiaviour are analysed in greater depth, according to specific 
social and spatial contexts, it is seen that the intensities and changes in birth and death rates correlate 
more closely with urbanization than can be observed at the level of large groupings of countries. An 
example of this type of considerations is the frequent empirical discovery of the greater incidence of 
biological reproduction in rural areas, compared to urban areas; something similar is noted with respect 
to the moment in which decreases in relevant values occur, because it has been observed that these 
changes tend to become evident first in urban areas. However, mere urban classification of places reveals 
itself to be an insufficient key for understanding die differences which appear when the conditions of birth 
and death rates among countries, and even among specific localities, are compared. In those 
circumstances, the heterogeneity of historical matrixes, within which the conditions which determine 
urban realities, becomes evident.
Examination of the way in which the urbanization process of a given population evolves requires 
consideration of the sources of demographic input. From this perspective, it is usefiil to distinguish 
between two terms which, although intimately related and often used as synonyms, have difierent 
meanings; the concept of urbanization and that of urban population growth. Distinguishing these terms 
is not only useful because it provides improved understanding of the matter under consideration, but also 
because policy concerns are involved. While urbanization is a process which ends when it becomes 
impossible to increase the proportion of the total population resident in urban localities (that is, when the 
entire population becomes urban and the rural population ceases to exist), urban growth or increase in 
the number of inhabitants in localities classified as urban can continue, even if the entire population has 
become urban, because it will always depend on the balance between births and deaths.  ̂Therefore, it 
is important to detect the factors which directly affect the demographic indicators proper to these two 
concepts. *
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* The confrontation of both concepts makes it clear that the rate of urbanization consists in the 
discrepancy between the rate of urban growth and that of the total population. By the same token, as the 
rate of urbanization in Latin America declines, the rhythm of urban increases tends to become similar to 
that of the total population.
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Box H.2
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Note: Within each stage of demographic transition, countries are ordered alphabetically.
In sociodemographic analysis, urbanization is frequently understood as a contributing factor process to 
decreases in mortality and reduced birth rates, that is, as a supporting factor for progress in demographic 
transition. This link is based on a series o f characteristics proper to urban life which, in the case o f mortality, 
are related to greater ease in the execution o f preventive health and mass sanitary programmes among 
concentrated populations and die relatively better living conditions found in urban nuclei. A s for birth rates, 
it is noted that urban life encourages the emergence and expansion o f social classes and strata with 
possibilities o f social mobility in inverse correlation with birth rates, undermining traditional behavioural 
norms which hinder control o f offspring, and making children economically unattractive. Urban life also 
socializes "westernized” cultural patterns within the nuclear family and facilitates the implementation o f family 
planning programmes and the use o f contraceptive techniques, etc.
liie  graph reveals that the association between urbanization and demographic transition implies a 
network o f interrelations between demographic change and social transformation. It is certainly clear that 
empirical evidence supports the argument presented above, given that it is systematically observed that the 
more urbanized groups o f countries are in the more advanced stages o f demographic transition. 
Notwithstanding this general association, the graph also makes it possible to infer that the relation between 
the two processes is not causal, given that there are many countries in which the degree o f urbanization does 
not correlate wiUi the situation o f demographic transition. Thus, Bolivia, even though it is found in Group 
I o f demographic transition, has a higher percentage o f urban population than that observed for countries in 
full transition, such as Costa Rica and Panama; in the same way, Venezuela, whose degree o f urbanization 
is the second highest in Latin America, is still not in an advanced stage o f transition; and Cuba, included in 
Group IV of demographic transition, has a lower degree of urbanization than the other countries o f its group 
and even lower than some countries in full transition. These examples indicate that the effects of urbanization 
on demographic transition are linked to socio-economic and cultural transformations, more than to the mere 
concentration o f the populations involved in the process.
It can be concluded that, although there is evidence for asserting that urbanization encourages progress 
in demographic transition, in no way it can be attributed a causal character. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
indicate that there are historical specificities which define the rhythms o f progress and the intensities of 
association which fluctuate in time and space. In synthesis, the different socio-economic noodalities in which 
urbanization occurs generate diverse types and magnitudes o f effects on the components o f the dynamics o f 
the population; for its part, the course o f demographic transition is influenced by numerous factors, some o f 
which operate with considerable autonomy vis-à-vis the degree o f urbanization.
On the basis of a set of available empirical evidence, it is possible to argue that the natural rates 
of growth of Latin American urban population have tended to be lower than those of its rural counterpart. 
Such an observation is based on the higher birth rates observed in rural areas. However, the total rates 
of growth observed in urban populations have been systematically higher than those noted in rural areas. 
This ^parent paradox makes it possible to postulate that the increase in the degree of urbanization is 
essentially due to net rural-urban migration and the re-classification of localities. Without these 
phenomena, which involve unequal demogriq)hic interchanges between rural and urban areas, the 
population of Latin America would have become rural, simply because its rural areas have been the scene 
of the most vigorous rhythm of natural increase. Since the opposite has occurred (that is, urbanization 
in the region has been on the rise), the rural population must have contributed to the increase of the urban 
proportion, through movements or the reclassification of rural settlements.
In order to measure this assertion about urbanization with precision and perceive the difference 
between it and what has occurred in the area of urban population growth, it would be necessary to 
dispose of information about each of the factors involved; unfortunately, that data is not available, making 
it necessary to have recourse to an indirect estimate. A now conventional procedure consists in 
establishing inter-census comparisons among cohorts of the total and urban populations, using survival 
ratios. Proceeding in this way, estimates of the contribution of the net rural-urban transfer are obtained 
(or the joint effect of net rural-urban migration and of re-classification) and, residually, the effect of 
natural increases is derived separately. Calculations performed on the basis of data for selected countries, 
with reference to different inter-census periods from between 1950 and 1990, substantiate a reiteration 
of what was noted above, in the sense that the increase of the degree of urbanization has mainly been due 
to the contribution of the net rural-urban transfer. However, the results also indicate that that same factor 
has accounted for, on average, less than two fifths of the growth of urban populations in each interval; 
as well, the remaining three fifths can be attributed to the effects of natural growth.
The analyses performed lead to the conclusion, therefore, that urban population growth is mainly 
due to its own demographic increases and, less importantly, to the direct contribution of rural migration; 
on the other hand, urbanization, or the urban proportion of the total population, is basically nourished 
by the net transfer of population between rural and urban areas. Of course, the preceding estimates with 
respect to urban growth correspond to the total for each country, although considerable differences are 
possible for particular cities. These data call into question appreciations such as those which argue that 
the increase of urban dwellers is due to the effects of "excessive" migration from rural areas. That 
erroneous perception seems to arise from confusion of the two concepts discussed above (urbanization 
and urban growth). In this way, the information provided by the exercises performed helps clarify the 
role played by natural growth in the urban environment, a necessary antecedent in any attempt to 
introduce deliberate change in the trends of a population’s spatial distribution.
If the increase in the urban population of Latin America has been notable, the absolute figures 
involved may seem even more impressive. In fact, the number of urban inhabitants of the region grew 
from some 33 million, in 1930, to 66 million, in 1950, and to 320 million, in 1990, or virtually ten times 
more than the initial figure.® When the rhythm of growth of the urban percentage, or the rate 
of urbanization, tended to decline, in the 1950s, another facet of the process took on greater weight: *
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* Since the total population of Latin America quadrupled in those 60 years, the discrepancy between 
both factors of expansion (4 in the case of total population and 10, for urban populations) makes it 
possible to understand the increase in the degree of urbanization.
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BoxH .3
COMPONENTS OF URBANIZATION AND 
URBAN POPULATION GROWTH
The degree o f lubanizatioo o f a country or the peim itage o f its population which lives in urban localities only 
increases w h ^  the rhythm o f urban population growth is higher than that o f the rural populaticm. That 
difference may be due either to the effects o f natural growth or to the net transfer o f persons betwera rural 
and urban localities (NRUT). The latter factor includes both the balance o f migration betwe^i the two types 
o f localities and their re-classification. Frequmtly, it has b e^  observed that die rates o f vegetative growth 
of rural populations in Latin America are higher than urban rates, thus expressing their higher birth rates. 
Therefore, is the degree o f urbanization o f the total population has rismi, the explanation for that evolution 
must mainly be due to the contribution o f NRUT. By means o f indirect estimations, based on the use of 
survival ratios, it has been possible to confirm the high incid^ce which NRUT has had in the increase in the 
degree o f urbanization in most countries, as may be seen in the accompanying Table.
The same estimations show that the growth o f national urban populations, on the contrary, has mainly 
been due to their own vegetative growth. Only a small fiaction o f the growth in the number o f urban dwellers 
is attributable to NRUT. However, there are exceptions to that gmeralization. The opposite has occurred in 
Argentina and Cuba: in both countries, NRUT was the conqxment o f greatest growth for the urban 
populations. Givra situations o f low rates o f demographic increase, that situation seems to be due to the fact 
that the inq>act o f a transfer, however small in magnitude, acquires great relative weight. It seems logical to 
expect that something similar would occur in Uruguay; that it has not happened is probably due to the 
repercussions o f the high emigration experienced by that country in the 1970s, which would have canceled 
the NRUT contribution. As well, in Paraguay between 1972 and 1982, the combined effects o f return 
international migration and the re-classification of localities inflated the effects o f NRUT. The effects of 
re-classification was also notable in Brazil, Ecuador and Honduras.
Countries
Percentage of urban population growth 
attributable (by inter-census periods)
Natural increase




1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 1950-60 1960-70 1970-80
Argentina 35.5 45.0 . 64.5 55.0 _ 1.500 1.833 -
Brazil 50.4 55.1 50.8 49.6 44.9 49.2 1.101 1.124 1.113
Colombia 63.4 - 69.4 36.6 - 30.6 0.958 - 1.220
Costa Rica - - 64.1 - - 35.9 - - 1.052
Cuba - - 39.2 - - 60.8 - - 1.172
Chile 63.4 62.6 70.5 36.6 37.4 29.5 1.015 0.963 1.072
Ecuador 62.4 70.4 50.1 37.6 29.6 49.9 0.918 1.119 1.112
El Salvador 76.9 77.9 - 23.1 22.1 - 1.470 « -
Guatemala - 66.1 - - 33.9 - - 1.652 -
Honduras - - 55.9 - - 44.1 - - 1.282
Mexico - 68.3 69.5 - 31.7 30.5 - 1.023 1.116
Nicaragua 69.7 - - 30.3 - - 1.022 - -
Paiuma 68.8 59.8 70.3 31.2 40.2 29.7 1.698 1.237
Paraguay - 65.1 49.3 - 34.9 50.7 - * 1.460
Peru - 58.4 66.2 - 41.6 33.8 - 0.986 1.251
Dominican Rep. 56.5 51.8 - 43.5 48.2 - 1.081 0.966
Uruguay - 92.7 55.2 - 7.3 44.8 - « 0.966
Venezuela 63.3 72.7 72.1 36.7 27.8 27.9 1.021 1.006 1.140
Estimate (10) (13) (13) (10) (13) (13) (10) (10) (12)
averages 61.0 65.0 60.2 39.0 35.0 39.8 1.178 1.191 1.163
Source: Atuiex A-14.
urban increases began to assume greater proportions in total d^ographic growth. Thus, in the two 
decades prior to the 1990, nearly the entire increase in the Latin American population was "absorbed" 
by the urban ̂ vironment. A different, although complementary, perspective is gained by observing what 
hi^pened in rural populations. Generally, in spite of having higher rates of natural growth than their 
urban counterparts, the erosive impact of net migration and re-classifícation of localities has severely 
undermined their demographic potential.
Given these trends, die number of Latin American rural inhabitants has grown only slightly: from 
70 million, in 1930, they grew to 93 million, in 1950, and to 124 million, in 1990, accounting for only 
12% of the total demographic increase of Latin America in the last 40 years. Therefore, at the regional 
level, the rural population spears to be relatively stable in terms of absolute magnitude. On average, its 
rate of growth during the two decades prior to 1990 was only 0.4%. Moreover, in ail countries, die 
rhythm of rural demographic growth has been notably lower than that of urban growth. In countries with 
a high degree of urbanization, rural residents have decreased in absolute terms. However, in countries 
with relatively low urban percentages and continued rapid demographic growth —Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Honduras— rural areas have maintained a certain dynamism, in spite of the high rates of 
growth of the urban population.
When examining the evolution of the rural population of the region, it must be kept in mind that 
the majority is dependent on farming, a characteristic heightened by the decline of the rural bases of other 
economic activities. In fact, the degree of urbanization shows a nearly perfect negative correlation with 
die percentage of the population economically active in farm activities. This productive specialization 
suggests that the destiny of the rural population is closely linked to the processes occurring in the 
agricultural structures, which exercise strong influence on work options. A persistent condition of Latin 
American agriculture is its precariousness, heightened because the rural population does not own land or 
has little access to that resource. In seven of countries with the largest rural populations, this situation 
affects more than two thirds of rural families. These restrictions have led to the proliferations of 
mini-ranch-style exploitations, within which the rural population subsists, lacking real expectations of 
social mobility and tied to "traditional" cultural norms, reproducing itself rapidly, in spite of high rates 
of mortality.
Within this context, the absence of organization, the lack of systematic technical assistance and 
difficulties of access to credit have given rise to continued pressure on the land, with the consequent 
over-exploitation of basic resources and the existence of relative excess populations, which find their 
esci^e valve in territorial movements, either permanent or seasonal. It is an ironic paradox that this type 
of problem should occur in a region which finds itself in an advantageous position relative to other 
continents in terms of the availability of arable land, prairies and forests. However, the paradox does not 
end there: the countries with the lowest levels of rural population are those in which those resources are 
generally most abundant and which, nevertheless, have been least able to retain their rural populations. 
These antecedents may lead to the conclusion that rural poverty seems not to have originated from tiie 
increase in population density with respect to renewable resources, but rather that it is linked to the lack 




RURAL TRAJECTORIES AND LABOUR MARKETS
Throughout the region, rural populations can be divided into two categories: salaried workers and small 
formers with land. The social category which seems to be expanding is that o f the rural proletariat dep^dent 
on salaried work, bi this regard, the rural trajectory is différait from that followed in industrialized countries 
because, in those countries, the segmait o f limdowner formers grew over time. The demographic traid in this 
regiorud trajectory is different because the rootedness arising from land ownership is not the same as that 
which origiruites in the labour market, especially if  work is seasonal. The characteristics o f the profile o f rural 
or agricultural workers derive from situations of anomia and the lack of stability created by the geognq>hic 
or temporal discontinuity of their work, which nutke it difficult to create laws for labour relations. This is 
apparent in family and group relations and, above all, in the possibilities for articulating workers’ interests 
and their possibilities o f social representation. Urban workers turn ever more frequently to these labour 
noarkets, especially for seasonal work. In counterpoint, an ever growing proportion o f farm labourers work 
in non-agricultural activities, either in the countryside or elsewhere. For example, in Mexico, in 1980, 42.4% 
of the economically active rural population was engaged in non-agricultural activities, a phenomenon the 
importance of which can be seen by considering that, in 1970, that percentage was only 23.1%. A similar 
phenomraon is observed in Costa Rica, Nicaragiu and Eciuidor.
The dynamics o f die rural market have been changing in various ways. In the process o f transformation 
from patronage to business systems, the forms of rootedness o f the populations which permanently live and 
work the land in large units are ever more reduced and recourse is had to the markets o f independent labour 
located in die towns and even in die cities. Increased demand for labour for seasonal tasks (harvests, etc.) 
has led to the hiring o f work squads in the towns and cities beset by serious job opportunity problems. The 
seasonal nature of the demand for labour has made tenqiorary, rather than for steady, work more prevalent. 
In some areas, the supply of labour has saturated rural labour markets, to which the small landowner-farmer 
and landless rural workers turn. These markets are also ever more open and fluid, with ever greater radii of 
action, given the possibilities available to the urban and rural populations to find transportation to ever more 
distant places. There are also several modernized areas o f production, with crops requiring abundant labour, 
for which a certain scarcity o f labour is beginning to be felt.
In zones which employ labour intensively, allowing families to find work for sufficiently long periods 
that they are able to elaborate a survival strategy, there is a trend toward the establishment o f settlements of 
populations from areas which have fewer needs for labour or where poverty is greater, spurring, over time, 
migrations to localities offering better work opportunities. Changes in habits, together with demographic 
transition toward smaller families and greater acceptance o f women at work have created a climate of greater 
mobility for labour in function o f the available work options, even though these are temporary.
Extract from: Ortega, E. (1992), *La trayectoria rural de América Latina y el Caribe", Revista de la CEP AL. 
N “ 47, pp. 140-141.
Most of the rural population is distributed throughout a myriad of small settlements. The resulting 
demographic dispersion limits the real possibilities of satisfying üie basic demands of a population which, 
given these conditions, is in great need of health care, education and other essential services, such as 
drinking water, sewage or electricity. Given these patterns of geographic distribution, the provision of 
the needed services becomes extremely onerous due to the high costs involved. At the same time, 
deficiencies in rural organizations are an obstacle to participation in civic decision-making processes and 
hinder adequate social representation of workers, reducing the visibility of the problems which burden 
them.
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In spite of their significant contribution to the production of basic foodstuffs, progress in 
small-farmer agriculture has been hindered by, among other factors, the limited value assigned to their 
production functions and by the traditional protagonism conferred on patronage structures. To a large 
extent, the break-down of &e link between the population and renewable natural resources stems from 
this situation. Sharp inequities in the distribution of land thus become a cardinal element in the restrictions 
faced by Latin American agriculture in terms of the strategies of productive transformation. Even though 
the value of agricultural production tripled between 1950 and 1990, more than 60% of the rural 
population is included in the poor strata of Latin America; around half of the homes of this sector are 
indigent. All in all, the reproduction of rural culture among small farmers, and especially within 
indigenous communities, is an important factor in holding the population in place (Ortega, 1992). This 
factor sheds light on the no-migration of large rural segments, sunk in poverty.
At the same time, the new organizational modalities established in Latin American agriculture have 
introduced salaried and semi-salaried labour, although only a fraction of that work force has managed 
organic and stable insertion in the productive process, while the great majority remains subject to hiring 
modalities segmented over time and characterized by instability and long periods of unemployment. 
However, the relative dynamism of agriculture, especially during the critical stage of the 1980s, has 
resulted in the creation of rural labour markets which attract the unemployed urban population. As a 
result, the declining trend in the contribution of the agricultural sector to the gross domestic product was 
halted and even reverted between 1981 and 1989. Although an important pm of this apparent progress 
is attributable to the effects of the economic crisis on other sectors, revealing that agriculture has the 
capacity to absorb macroeconomic disturbances, it is also clear that there has been significant progress 
with respect to some products in several countries in which it was possible to expand non-traditional 
exports (tropical and temperate climate ftuits, vegetables, flowers, etc.).
Diverse uncertainties make it difficult to perceive the future of the new agro-exporter activities, 
which have been so important in the generation of seasonal work. Generally, the goods produced in these 
activities have been vulnerable to fluctuations of demand, while supply has been very sensitive to the 
emergence of new sources of supply, including the possibility of substitution by the importing countries 
themselves (Di Girolamo, 1992). Moreover, agricultural "modernization", within which these activities 
are classified, has been accompanied by serious environmental problems, generated by productive 
methods which rely heavily on the intensive use of chemical inputs, the use of which, moreover, implies 
health risks for workers. Highly seasonal work, in turn, originates serious problems for the provision of 
attention to the basic needs of essentially mobile labourers. Finally, since this type of exploitation 
involves large scale production, it has created a demand for new land, often obtained at the expense of 
small landowners. Thus, "modernization" has acquired the characteristics of a factor of de-ruraJization. 
Uprooted from their rural environment, farm labourers have sought "refuge" in urban areas from which 
they offer their labour in agricultural tasks.
Reflecting Latin American economic and social transformations, there has been a radical change 
in the modalities of work force distribution between activities based in either rural or urban areas. As late 
as 1950, more than half of the economically active population lived in the countryside; in contrast, by 
1990, less than a third of active persons remained there. At the beginning of the period, only in the 4 
most industrialized nations, was the proportion less than half; in 1990, that situation obtained in 14 
countries, with estimates that, by century’s end, in only 2 countries, Guatemala and Haiti, will the rural 
economically active population predominate. During the forty years prior to 1990, the Latin American 
work force grew at an annual average rate of 2.6%, while &e fraction linked to agriculture grew at a 
rhythm of 0.8%. These data illustrate the magnitude of die transfer of active rural persons to urban-based 
sectors. Moreover, as indicated above, most rural persons live dispersed in a multitude of localities with 
less than two thousand inhabitants.
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In contrast to the modalities of population dispersion observed in the Latin American countryside, 
the region has been characterized by the emergence of large nuclei of population concentrations. 
Traditionally, it has been said that this is a clear attribute of Latin American urbanization and that its 
rhythm of expansion is incessant. Some figures seem to corroborate that statement, although the 
inspection of the most recent data suggests that it is only partially true. By 1950, there were 7 cities with 
more than a million inhabitants; twenty years later, there were 18 and, by 1990, there were 38. The 
population of those centres grew from 17 million to 132 million persons in the last forty years. Moreover, 
in 1950, only one Latin American city had more than 5 million inhabitants, while, in 1990, there were 
five, with more than 66 million residents. In other words, in 1990, the residents of the 38 "millionaire" 
cities were more numerous than the entire rural population of the region (Table II.2).
Now, if the evolution of large localities is examined over time, it can be seen that their 
demographic dynamism has been losing force, becoming less dynamic than other centres in the national 
urban systems. Thus, examination of the rhythm of change of the 38 cities with more than one million 
inhabitants in 1990, reveals that their annual average rate of growth fell from 47 per thousand, between 
1950 and 1970, to 33 per thousand, between 1970 and 1990. This behaviour has meant that those cities 
have maintained the proportion of the urban population they represent at practically constant levels 
(around 40 or 43%), although it is also true that they have increased their weight within the total 
population (from 17 to 30%). The deceleration of the growth of the 7 cities which had more than one 
million inhabitants in 1950 has been even greater; their annual average rate of growth fell from 41 per 
thousand, between 1950 and 1970, when they were already growing at a slower rate than all cities taken 
together, to 28 per thousand, between 1970 and 1990. While, in 1950, those 7 cities held 26% of the total 
Latin American urban population, by 1990, they held only 22%. Overall, in 1990, the group of 38 
"millionaire" cities showed a trend toward slower demographic growth than the rest of the urban 
population of the region; from this, it is possible to infer that the capacity for relative increases of the 
population of those cities is less than that observed in mid-sized and small cities.
Therefore, in contrast to what was observed during the first years of the second half of the century, 
in most countries of the region and, presumably, since the 1960s, the largest metropolitan areas (Mexico 
City, Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Caracas) have been losing their relative 
importance within national urban contexts, a trend which will continue at least until the end of the 
century. This phenomenon does not seem to be limited to the largest countries; in Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Honduras, as well, the largest cities have displayed less dynamism than others in the mid demographic 
range. However, the phenomenon becomes most visible in Cuba where the capital, Havana, has become 
one of the cities with the slowest growth in the country (and in ail of Latin America), by virtue of 
deliberate policy decisions.
Table II.2
LATIM AMERICA: CONCENTRATION OF POPULATION IN LARGE CITIES 
1950-1970-1990
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Cities with 1 million 
or more inhabitants in:
Cities with 5 million 
or more inhabitants in:
1950 1970 1990 1950 1970 1990
Number of cities 7 18 38 1 4 5
Population (thousands 
of persons)
17 099 56 803 132 245 5 042 32 899 66 057
Percentage of 
total population 10.72 20.51 30.26 3.16 11.88 15.11
Percentage of the 
urban population 25.77 35.63 42.61 7.60 20.64 21.28
Cities with 
1 million or more 
inhabitants in 1990
Cities with 
1 million or more 
inhabitants in 1950
1950 1970 1990 1950 1970 1990
Number of cities 38 38 38 7 7 7
Population (thousands 
of persons)
26 931 69 008 132 245 17 099 38 648 67 840
Percentage of the 
total population 16.88 24.91 30.26 10.72 13.95 15.52
Percentage of 
urban population 40.59 43.29 42.61 25.77 24.25 21.86
Annual average 
rate of growth 
(per thousand) 47.05 32.52 40.77 28.13
Index of urban 
predominance 
(per thousand) ¿/ 3.22 -0.79 -3.04 -5.19
Source: CELADE (1991) 
§/ Corresponds to the average annual rate of 
of the urban population living in cities 
inhabitants.
growth of the percentage 
with more than 1 million
Another process observed together with this reduction in the intensity of metropolitan demographic 
dynamism is that related to spatial inequality in patterns of intraurban growth. Commonly, central areas 
have been losing population and the remaining population has been ageing, while the peripheral areas 
have been growing very quickly, rejuvenating Aeir age structures and generating the need to relocate 
services. This process, encouraged by certain speculative uses of land, has given rise to serious pressures 
on public resources and has had important environmental repercussions.
In spite of these trends, everything seems to indicate that the large Latin American metropolis will 
continue to grow, generating ever more extensive urban or suburban regions. Moreover, severd of these 
cities are reaching unheard of magnitudes and 4 of them are among the 10 most populous cities in the 
world. This expansion has strained the real possibilities of urban management in every way. Although 
it is true that such concentration creates a context of possibilities for the generation of economies of scale, 
both external and by agglomeration, with implications for other than exclusively economic concerns, for 
instance in diverse social and cultural areas, it is also true that the large cities are beset by serious 
problems. Among these, the severe limitations on the satisfaction of different types of needs, 
environmental deterioration and congestion are usually mentioned as outstanding. What is not clear, 
however, is the causal connection between those problems and the size of the cities. Rather, some of the 
problems are proper to the limitations of the societies within which those cities came to be. In that sense, 
concern should be centred, not so much on the demographic size of the city, but rather on the way it can 
survive in the face of those adversities. In this regard, it has been said that the inhabitants of the large 
metropolitan areas are, in many respects, among the privileged of the region, although, at the same time, 
those privileges are very unequally distributed and, in some cases, only obtain on a limited scale 
(ECLAC, 1992).
From an economic point of view, the large cities contain examples of the squandering of resources, 
as in the case of the dimensions of certain physical installations, designed in function of moments of peak 
use, the premature replacement of municipal structures (including entire neighborhoods), or the absence 
of coordination among projects requiring large investments. As for their environmental effects, large 
cities imply a series of new relations with their surroundings, altered through the use of technologies 
which have serious repercussions on quality of life itself and threaten to create future resource deficits, 
as occurs with the massive consumption of energy, the elimination of waste or the contamination of air 
and waters. In the larger cities, the forms of socisd segregation are also heightened by the ways in which 
space, housing and transportation are managed. However, even in the hypothetical case that these cities 
were to stop growing, these problems would subsist for a long time, given their intimate relationship with 
other dimensions of the modalities of development being implemented, one of the most visible 
manifestations of which are consumption patterns, which correlate very closely with socioeconomic 
inequities.
It must also be recognized that attention to certain of the requirements of metropolitan areas, such 
as those related to physical installations, usually involve large amounts of resources, especially because, 
once certain magnitudes of demand have been passed, it becomes necessary to implement changes of scale 
which involve the adoption of expensive technologies. One example is related to transportation and roads. 
Meanwhile, the decision to postpone investments in some areas, at times motivated by momentary 
economic restrictions, leaves the population of the large cities, especially the groups of the more 
unfortunate, exposed to serious risks. Deficiencies in the area of supplies of drinking water and sewage 
treatment became evident during the recent outbreaks of cholera. At any rate, although the efforts 
required for the satisfaction of the needs of metropolitan inhabitants are great, it is not clear that assigning 





la  part of the q>ecialized literature and in international forums, one iiequ^tly conies across apparaît 
consensus on the existaice of an "urban crisis*, which would be caused by the "excessive* size of the 
principal cities and by the problems produced by that situation in most countries of the region. This 
affirmation is seen to be supported by the undaiiable fact that the process of urbanization in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, with its accelerated and high degree of concaitration, has imdoubtedly been accompanied 
by serious deficiaicies in die satisfaction of every sort of need, in a frankly deteriorated ^vironmrat, and 
with severe management problems.
At the same time, a growing number of researchers believe that there are numerous possibilities, 
including the potential to pass beyond the threshold of underdevelopment, in the large Latin American city. 
They argue that the causal relation between urban size and urban problems is far from clear. By the same 
token, they insist that there is no direct and proportional causal association betwera urban size and poverty 
nor, moreover, does such a relation exist between size and a number of problems, such as transportation, 
which can occur even when considerable dimensions have not yet been reached and which seem more linked 
to technological, urban or cultural variables.
Usually, when the urban crisis is mentioned, problems such as low income, unemployment, housing 
deficits, lack of services, etc. are also mentioned, which, strictly speaking, bear no relation to the "urban 
fact", as such, and have an even less apparent relation to the size of cities. These are, in fact, national 
economic and social problems. They are mentioned among urban problems only because the high degree of 
demographic concentration determines, in turn, die concentration of those problems in the cities. In this 
regard, it is often said that the lack of resources, proper to developing countries, is the cause of Latin 
American urban problems. However, this argument is so general that, obviously, it could account for all of 
the problems of the region and not only urban problems. Moreover, if attention is paid to the fact that the 
problems described as being proper to cities reveal appreciable levels of economic inefficiency and waste, 
that explanation must be called into question; the way resources are used and distributed is as important as 
their scarcity. In this sense, the economic crisis has had the virtue of exposing the irrationality of the way 
in which resources are used in the Latin American metropolis, at least from the point of view of die general 
interest.
In brief, the most important metropolitan problems of the large cities are not necessarily directly related 
to their size; rather, they are linked to the ways in which growth and the distribution of urbanization costs 
and bmefits are organized. Inefficient economic management, atmospheric contamination, transportation 
problems and those related to the poverty of the city are more directly related to urban management and the 
contradiction between the privatization of benefits and the socialization of costs than to the demographic size 
of the metropolis.
Extract from: ECLAC (1989), La crisis urbana en América Latina. Reflexiones sobre alternativas de 
solución. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, Chile (LC/G.1571-P), 
pp. 81-87.
Serious as the problems which affect metropolitan areas may be, needs observed in odier localities, 
smaller but growing rapidly in terms of demographic growth, are equally severe. Some of these urban 
centres are "new" in the sense that their growth has been stimulated by the exploitation of fixed 
resources, the development of large economic projects, the concession of tax incratives or territorial 
occupation. In some cases, the future is uncertain, given that the very existence of tiiose centres 
dq>ends on the fluctuations of the principal, sometimes sole, activity in the area. They are also "new" 
in terms of their inhabitants, a high proportion of whom are recent migrants, who experience the 
difficulties of insertion into the socioeconomic and cultural context of these localities. In those 
conditions, attention to the fiindamental needs of the population is frequently lacking, producing 
generalized situations of vulnerability vis-a-vis different risks. At the same time, ^isodes of abrupt 
population increases in those localities often involve environmental repercussions. However, together with 
representing potential alternatives for re-settling the inhabitants of a country, these experiences could also 
become embryos in a process of decentralization, understood as part of a strategy of changing production 
patterns with social equity.
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C. SPATIAL MOBILITY AND INTERNAL MIGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA
The concept of internal migration refers to population movements over time and throughout the territory 
of a country. Although it is necessary to cover both dimensions, generally valid criteria are lacking for 
the definition and analysis of the units of reference to be used to achieve this purpose. There is no 
unequivocal means of defining the time period necessary for a given movement to be classified as a 
migration; analogously, there is no clear definition of the type of geographic frontier which must be 
crossed to constitute a migration. In the face of these ambiguities, it has been common practice to 
consider internal migration as the range of changes of habitual residence among the different territorial 
divisions of a country. This usage undoubtedly aids in the identification of the object of interest, given 
that it eliminates simple moves within geographical units. However, it also excludes a wide range of 
movements which, without involving the abandonment of the previous residence, constitute phenomena 
which should be analysed from the perspective of the social and economic transformations which have 
occurred in the region.
In Latin America, there is not only internal migration, as such, but also a set of forms of spatial 
mobility which include itinerant, periodic, seasonal, cyclical and circulatory movements, as well as some 
which involve short distances. Even though these movements, which do not imply a change of habitual 
residence, have occurred throughout history, as seen in seasonal worker movements for annual harvests, 
especially in agro-export areas, their magnitude and diversity seem to have grown in recent decades. In 
contrast to previous years, it has recently been observed that an important fraction of "temporary" labour 
has an urban base. However, this seasonal modality is not only linked to activities of the primary sector 
or to agroindustry. There is evidence that, for a long time, some small farmers and farm workers have 
been moving periodically to urban areas where they work in construction and certain service jobs and, 
having acquired some income, return to their rural residences. A somewhat similar phenomenon has been 
observed with respect to mining centres.
Among the determinant factors for the greater contemporary incidence of temporal mobility, there 
are, among others, the new conditions for the operation of labour markets, the effects of the economic 
crisis of the 1980s, the repercussions of structural adjustment policies, the impact of the reorientation of 
the overall dirust of the economy, the growing incorporation of ct̂ ital and tectoology into certain sectors 
of production, the diversifícation of exports with emphasis on non~traditional goods and the incorporation 
of advances in transportation and communications. This complex set of factors makes it possible to 
suppose that the patterns of social organization of the countries of the region are fully engaged in a 
process of restructuration, including signs and messages of the reestablishment of democracy, of formulae 
for reconciliation and consensus, together with cultural "modernization".
In sununary, a series of diverse alterations are encouraging forms of population movement 
throughout regional territories, constituting alternatives to migration, in a strict sense. Those same 
circumstances are producing a multiplication of residences, requiring, perhaps, a redefinition of the living 
spaces of an ample segment of the population. From another perspective, the increase of "floating" 
populations seems to have particularly severe effects on the provision of certain basic services, such as 
health care, generating pressures which fluctuate over time and in different spatial units. In other words, 
temporal mobility throughout the territory is accompanied by new expressions of the basic problems 
affecting the population.
Probably the most striking case of this type of change is that of temporal movements in function 
of the seasonal nature of agriculture production, the effects of which have been sharpened by the new 
labour relations being defined in urban and rural contexts. Agricultural "modernization" has implied the 
more intensive use of basic resources and of temporal salaried labour. Thus, during the critical harvest 
periods, workers, who do not necessarily live in the countryside and who have a certain level of 
qualification, are hired or sub-contracted. This style of hiring also occurs in some types of industries, 
such as agro-industry and in-bond assembly operations, as well as in the mining sector. In the case of 
mining, a sector in which the seasonal nature of work is linked to the fortunes of discovery and extinction 
of ore loads, together with the international fluctuations of ore prices, demographic fluidity is very 
common, as observed in the "garimpeoros" of Brazil, and of the "pirquineros" of the Andean countries.
Movements linked to the advance of population toward areas of colonization on the internal 
frontiers are one of the most important sociodemographic phenomena of the last 30 or 40 years. As well, 
there are temporal and cyclical forms of spatial mobility, with departure and return circuits. Current 
processes are diverse in nature, depending on the population and nature of the spaces involved. Thus, in 
Brazil, rural dwellers of the impoverished Northeast, profoundly affected by recurring cycles of severe 
drought, have moved into the lower Amazon basin, managing to reproduce their styles of working the 
land. Only part of this movement has occurred in response to official policy and programmes, while the 
greater part of that migration has been "spontaneous". At the same time, in the Gran Pantanal area and 
the upper Amazon basin, the pioneering action of agricultural workers from the states of Paraná and Sáo 
Paulo has been observed, places from which they have been expelled by the introduction of advanced 
technologies, crop substitution, and the implantation of quasi-industrial modalities of agricultural 
exploitation. Frequently, after a certain time, these areas of farm worker colonization are replaced by the 
intervention of companies which displace the initial occupants toward urban centres or to even more 





PERCEPTIONS OF TEMPORAL MOBILITY
On writing about ten^rary migration in Brazil, I imagined that I could avoid the traps those never-rading 
journeys laid for me by defining them concq>tually, as always: stopping that which moves, making present 
that which is absrat. We ask: how long a period of absoice is necessary to define temporary migration? Is 
it the few days a worker spoids in a nearby region harvesting oranges or the many years before a worker 
returns to his home, after spading his whole life in a fiictory in SSo Paulo? If, in demogn^hic terms, 
duratitm, *teir^rality”, is essratial to the study of internal migration, the notion of absence is vital, in 
sociological terms. If absence is at the heart of the consciousness of the temporary migrant, it is because he 
has not completed and closed the migratory process, with its two polar and exclusive moments: disocialization 
in the place of origin and resocialization in the place of "adoption”.
From a sociological per^iective, on returning, the temporary migrant is not the same. And, by leaving 
in the conditions in which he leaves, he changes the social relations of his group of origin; he alters family 
organization, the division of domestic labour, each one’s place in the family. What he finds on returning is 
not what he left. C^isus data are insufficient to render a clear image of ten^rary migrants. W h^ the c^isus 
is takai, on S^tember 1 of years ^ding in zero, thousands of farm workers, called "corumbas”, are leaving 
die Agreste region in the State of Pernambuco to cut sugar cane in the Mata area. They will only return to 
their homes in March, with the first rains. At diat same time, the farm labourers who had left the 
Jequitinhonha Valley in Minas Gerais to cut cane in the Ribeirao Preto Region of SSo Paulo are returning to 
their homes to prepare their own land for planting. These movements do not appear in the c^isuses, 
especially when the whole family moves, to return later, or when it is temporarily in a place for a long time, 
as happais with many workers and technicians who work on dam construction.
From a wide range of situations, three constitute clear modalities of temporary migration. First, there 
are the cyclical migrations, with clear departure and return times, a defined rhythm, usually combining 
différait agricultural cycles, constituting temporary migrations, properly so-called; they are dominated by the 
rhythm of the seasons of the year, the planting, growth and harvest of agricultural produce. Second, there 
is temporary migration regulated by the cultivation calendar of the migrant himself, in his place of origin; 
at his destination, that is, the large city, industry, or construction site, the work process is dominated by the 
lineal time of capital, continuous -if one worker goes away, he is replaced by another-, without seasons, 
without day or night. Finally, there are migrations dominated by the irregular rhythm of large projects, either 
public or private, such as the construction of dams and highways or other works requiring thousands of 
labourers, projects which need not obey the cycle of the seasons and which generate many jobs very quickly 
and, with the same intensity, much unemploym^t. This is where tenporary nrigration tends most oftra to 
become permanent.
Extract from: de Souza-Martins, J. (1986), ”E1 vuelo de las golondrinas: migración tenporaria en el Brasil” 
in PISPAL/CIUDAD/CENEP, Colegio de México, Mexico, pp. 183-205.
The eastern side of the Andes, especially near the rivers which flow to the Amazon and the 
Orinoco, has also been the site of vigorous, if irregular, settlement in recent decades. Again, farm 
exploitation has been the cutting edge of this form of penetration into "empty" spaces. At the same time, 
exploitation of hydrocarbons and forest products has caused semi-permanent population movements, with 
obvious depredatory effects on the environment. Moreover, in different areas, this penetration has put 
pressure on the indigenous populations, amounting to their virtual extermination. In more than one 
instance, the dynamic efíects of drug traffic have been observed, for example, in the eastern areas of 
Bolivia, the jungle of Peru and the Southeast of Colombia. The Paraná basin, in eastern Paraguay, has 
seen its population grow notoriously in recent years, constituting a significant redistribution of the farm 
population from the centre of the country toward the frontier with Brazil. In Honduras, Costa Rica and 
Panama, advances on the Caribbean coast have also been incessant, accompanied by serious disruptions 
of native ecosystems. All of these cases involve high levels of demographic fluidity.
Many processes of frontier occupation have had to face severe problems, such as relative isolation, 
difficult access to markets, the lack of technical and credit support and the absence of essential services. 
These circumstances seem to aggravate the challenges faced by strategies designed to promote productive 
transformation systematically and, certainly, they reveal the social inequities associated with these 
movements, which themselves reveal evident instability in population settlement. If the flow of persons 
into areas of colonization is of great demographic importance, their effects are counteracted by 
counter-flows of equal importance. This latter phenomenon is not only explained by the intervention of 
companies replacing colonizers, as mentioned above, but also by the extreme precariousness of daily life 
in recently occupied areas. Moreover, examination of the generally high indexes of the presence of males 
in those settlements reveals that the majority are unaccompanied young adult men, without their families, 
a fact which could be interpreted as indicating the tentative nature of the colonization phenomenon.
The very nature of the highly fragile, hot and rainy inter-tropical ecosystems, together with the 
absence of appropriate technology for operations in that type of environment, seem to make disastrous 
^isodes common, relevant not only at local levels but in global terms, as well. Instances of massive 
deforestation, produced by harvesting or burning off vegetation, by the leaching of soils, the high iron 
content of which oxidizes rapidly, by flooding of rivers, often contaminated with pesticides and other 
chemical agents, are only a few examples of the complications associated with the opening of frontiers. 
Naturally, this environmental impact is not only to be associated with periodic movements of workers, 
but also to the modalities of exploitation of non-renewable resources implemented by large companies.
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Another type of "emergent" spatial mobility in Latin America is fliat observed within large 
metropolitan areas, the evolution of which is intimately related to ever increasing segregation in patterns 
of the appropriation and use of urban space. Even though this trend is different from country to country 
and is not an instance of seasonal movement, it has become ever more prevalent, as the old, traditional 
"centres" of the cities have been replaced by new commercial and financial nuclei in high income 
neighborhoods. A case in point is Santiago, Chile, where, since the early 1980s, official policy promoted 
the massive removal of poor families living in marginal housing ("mushroom settlements"), located in 
central and high income areas ("high town"). These forced removals, known by the euphemism 
"transferals", implied relocating groups of poor persons to small units, of solid construction and offered 
at comparatively advantageous credit conditions, but located far from job sites, in peripheral sectors 
already occupied by hovels for years.
Transferals such as these have occurred in several of the larg^ cities of the region, albeit in 
different contextual conditions. Their effects on patterns of social and spatial stratification have made 
inequities more acute, clearly revealing the contrast between wealth and poverty. These population 
movements, motivated by regulatory decisions, have also had their impact on differentiated rev^uations 
of urban space. On the other hand, displacements of low income sectors, the homeless, to vacant land, 
as occurs in the precarious occupation ("invasions", "seizures") of those areas, constitute a type of 
intraurban spatial mobility which has taken on special meaning since mid century. An example of this 
phenom^on are the "young towns" of Lima, where the initial motive for the movements, linked to 
claiming the right to a roof, has led, in some cases, to novel forms of popular urbanization and styles of 
self-management.
Coherently with urbanization trends, recent studies of migratory flows for the purpose of changing 
residence (migration in a strict sense) between urban and rural areas show that, in most countries of the 
region and at least since the 1970s, the main flow is that in which both origin and destination are urban. 
For example, in Peru, between 1972 and 1978, inter-urban migration already accounted for 48% of the 
movements which involve the four types of flow connecting city and countryside.’ Meanwhile, in Chile, 
for the 1965-1970 five year period, rural-urban movements accounted for only a quarter of total 
migration. In countries with longer histories of urbanization and in the more advanced stages of 
demographic transition, such as Uruguay and Argentina, inter-urban mobility has been prevalent for many 
years. In Brazil, it has been discovered that, although a significant flow of migrants from the countryside 
to the cities continues, such a massive rural exodus as occurred between 1950 and 1980, which eventually 
involved numbers equivalent to a third of the total rural population at the beginning of the period, cannot 
be expected in the future. However, it must be noted that rural-urban flows will continue to be significant 
in countries with relatively low levels of urbanization.
Although several of the large cities of the region have had rates of demographic growth lower than 
those observed in the other national urban systems in recent years, this does not mean that emigration 
from metropolitan areas is predominant. In fact, this apparently reduced dynamism is, to a large extent, 
explained by the shift of fertility toward magnitudes clearly lower than those obtained in other localities 
of the same country. The migratory balances of most large cities continue to be positive, although their 
contribution to the total population rarely exceeds that of vegetative growth. This net balance is due 
essentially to urban immigration. At any rate, as noted above, the data available for recent decades make 
it possible to argue that the metropolitan areas of the region have lost their migratory attraction. 
However, even though it seems premature to speak of a reversion of what have been common migratory 
trends, the cases of Buenos Aires, Montevideo and Havana seem to suggest an important change in 
direction, at times taking the form of return migration, at times of international migration. Intermediate 
cities are different, given that in several countries they have displayed higher levels of attraction than is 
frequently suspected.
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’ The flows of demographic interchange bewteen urban and rural environments are of four kinds, 
considering both areas, successively, as origin and destination: rural-rural; rural-urban; urban-rural; 
urban-urban.
Rural-wban migration continued during the 1970s and 1980s in several countries of "tardy" 
urbanization, such as Paraguay, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras. However, even in those instances, the 
relative weight of diat flow has often been surpassed by movements between rural contexts, often closely 
linked to the occupation of "resource frontiers". However, as already noted with respect to temporary 
mobility, this type of migration seems to be losing force. Factors related to land tenancy, the availability 
of capital and technology, access to markets, the satisfaction of basic needs and environmental conditions 
have become serious obstacles to this type of colonization. Those fronts which have involved large human 
contingents, such as in Rondonia, Brazil, include movements among rural sectors and between those areas 
and the new urban storage and supply centres which have been springing up.
But the occupation of "empty" spaces has not been limited only to hot and rainy environments. The 
arid North of Mexico, a traditional sender of population in the past, has been a very attractive zone, 
especially since the 19S0s, when irrigation programmes became more intensive. The syndrome of the 
economic and sociocultural externalities of the border with the United States, where, together with 
constituting a long transit corridor, a number of dynamic urban centres have served as sites for the 
in-bond assembly industry, is another determinant factor for this phenomenon. On the other hand, in the 
extreme South of the continent, the Argentinean Patagonia has experienced sustained demographic 
growth, linked to the development of fruit production in the Rio Negro Valley, to the exploitation of 
diverse sources of energy and the location of industries under cover of protectionist laws. Although these 
experiences have not had the repercussions of those occurring in hot, rainy inter-tropical zones, they still 
indicate a certain degree of population instability.
According to censuses taken during the 1980s, migration between large geographic units seems to 
have decreased or remained stable, as can be observed in Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Honduras and 
Uruguay. It may be that those shifts were replaced by temporary movements which have not involved 
changes in residence. In other cases, migration and diverse forms of international mobility have 
contributed to virtually unobserved movements within national territories. In contrast to the 
decades immediately following the Second World War, the 1970s initiated the long critical period 
which has afflicted Latin America. It is highly probable that, under the sway of economic contraction, 
the factors which stimulated migration in the past have lost their validity. Economic growth rates 
tended to fall and episodes of massive unemployment became more frequent, especially in some areas of 
traditional migratory attraction. In some countries, it was also a time during which civil society was 
displaced, the management of which was taken on by repressive military regimes. Within these 
conditions, so-called "urban problems" tended to proliferate, together with military "solutions" which 
led to nearly permanent states of marshal law. These circumstances constituted a sort of inhibition for 
some migratory patterns.
It seems certain that movements throughout territories are highly sensitive to momentary 
fluctuations. The adversities of the so-called "lost Decade" seem to be reflected in the migration 
data yielded by the latest population censuses taken in some countries of the region. That information 
leads to the inference that those who could have constituted the cohorts of migrants delayed their 
decision to change their place of habitual residence, a resolution which, eventually, would mean diat 
they would not move later, because that delay was to coincide with their entrance in to those ages 
in which the impulse to move loses force. For example, in Honduras, the intensity of inter-departmental 
migration, between 1983 and 1988, was considerably less than what could have been expected 
in light of the rates of previous periods. Something similar occurred in Costa Rica between 1979 
and 1984. At that time, traditional sender regions proved more likely to retain population, while those
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which had been attractive receivers of population saw their immigration rates fall. This is still only a 
hypothesis.
With regard to the specific characteristics of spatial movements of population within each country, 
certain specially important attributes stand out, such as the age and sex of the migrants. It has already 
be^ noted that the tendency to migrate is not a constant by age; most of those who adopt the decision 
to change their habitual residence from one spatial unit to another are young adults, at the end of their 
normal schooling, soon to begin their life of work, and who have not yet constituted families ^art from 
those of their progenitors. Although adequate information is not available, current indicators suggest that 
several of these characteristics are also common among those who participate in many forms of temporary 
mobility. However, it is necessary to recognize that the presence of family groups is less frequent in the 
latter modality of movement. Clearly, this migrational selectivity by age produces enduring effects on the 
populations toth in areas of origin and of destination, in terms of marriage rates and reproductive 
behaviours, as well as in terms of impact on socioeconomic evolution.
Nevertheless, the most striking characteristics of Latin American internal migration and spatial 
mobility are, perhaps, those related to sex. Since the early 1960s, the clear predominance of women in 
rural-urban migration has been recognized. This frequent find is even more manifest in movements to 
large cities, involving low indexes of men which, for Ae last twenty years, has led to the supposition that 
women were also the majority among those who changed urban localities of residence. Ihe data from 
censuses taken during 1980s only confirms that impression. Everything seems to indicate that women 
form even larger majorities in countries with higher levels of urbanization. In contrast, men have been 
the majority in movements with rural destinations, as can be deduced from information about colonization 
zones in Costa Rica, Ecuador and Paraguay. It has also been possible to observe that, in migratory 
movements from more depressed to more dynamic spatial units, there tend to be more women than men. 
By virtue of these fairly enduring trends, rural areas in many Latin American countries have relatively 




COSTA RICA: MIGRATORY RETRACTION IN A CONTEXT OF CRISIS
In Costa Rica, according to the data yielded by the last two national population censuses, internal migration 
has tended to decrease: between 1969 and 1973, somewhat more than 100 thousand persons changed their 
resid^ce from one region to another, whereas between 1979 and 1984, only 9S thousand did so. That 
absolute decrease is reflected in a decrease in the overall rate of interregional migration, from 13 to 9 p »  
thousand. While in the first five year period, men predominated among migrants, in the second period, 
women were the majority. With respect to regional interactions, the Central region, which is the most 
urbanized, was the destination of 43 and 39%, respectively, of all interregional migrants in each five-year 
period. These proportions were higher for wom«i, suggesting that the capital (San José) attracts wom«i 
preferratially. The situation in the regions of Huetar Atlántica and Huetar Norte is quite différât, with fairly 
high immigration rates (the majority, men). The regions of Chorotega, Pacífico Central and, less so, Brunca, 
appear to be population sender regions, especially of women. Comparison of the data for the two five year 
periods reveals that the three regions preferred as destinations (Huetar Atlántica, Huetar Norte and Cotral) 
became less attractive, while the other three retained their condition as senders, although with lower relative 
magnitudes. These changes make it possible to sustain the hypothesis that, in more backward areas, the 
depressive effects of the economic crisis of the early 1980s were felt less intensely and, therefore, would have 
served as eventual "refuges” for the active population. Meanwhile, the activities of die heretofore attractive 
regions may have been more vulnerable to the depression, as can be seen, for exanq l̂e, in the increased 

























gration(5 years and more)
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Hnetar Norte 73085 77 237 65 586 11651 7 499 4 152 31.00 19.95 11.05
Huetar Atlantica 87148 96 168 78 484 17 684 8664 9 020 38.59 18.91 16.98
ToUl 1 596 305 1596 305 1496 170 100315 100135 0 1254 12.54 -
Population Population Immi- Emi- Net Rates (per thousand)
Regions 1968 1973 Non grants grants migrationmigrants 1968- 1968- 1968- lami- Emi- Net mi-
(5 years and more) 1973 1973 1973 gration gration gration
Central 1 319 212 1325 311 1 288 027 37 284 31185 6 099 5.64 4.72 0.92
Chorotega 177 520 166 668 159217 7 451 18 303 -10 852 8.66 21.27 -12.61
Pacif. Central 120 970 117 644 109280 8 364 11690 -3 326 14.02 19.60 -5.58
Brunca 190 742 189 450 177867 11583 12875 -1292 12.19 13.55 -1.36
Huetar Norte 114 155 115 168 102 835 12333 11320 1013 21.51 19.75 1.77
Huetar Atlantica 132995 141 353 123037 18316 9 958 8 358 26.70 14.52 12.19
Total 2 055 594 2 055 594 1 960 263 95331 95331 0 9.28 9.28 -
Source: CBLaDB-unfpa (1990), Población y espacio en Costa Rica: exploración de necesidades de cooperación en d  marco del Programa de Asistencia del 
Fondo de Población de las Naciones Unidas ci Gobierno de Costa Rica celada Santiago, Chile.
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Box n.8
MIGRATION, MOBILITY AND DEMOGRAFEHC 
STRATEGIES IN RURAL FERU
A set of studies of rural families in 4 zones in Peru includes analysis of the demographic strategies 
in^lem^ted in those areas. Two of these zones are poor, with ecological restrictions (Altiplano de Puno and 
Bajo Piura), while the other two afford better living conditions (Cañete and Tambopata). The demographic 
strategies developed in these zones seem to be more related to migration and mobility than to control of 
fertility.
The highest average birth rate was found in Bajo Piura, which also had the lowest ages for marriage 
and the briefest intervals between pregnancies of the four zones. The couples of this valley, the poorest of 
the studies’ sample, have the greatest number of dependrats and do not regulate their fertility. In contrast, 
the Altiplano families have the lowest birth rates, due to late marriages and prolonged intervals between 
births; late marriage seems to be related to inheritance customs and not to efforts to reduce fertility. However, 
an average of 3 years between births suggests birth control and there is evidence that this zone has one of the 
highest abortion rates in the country. In Cañete and Tambopata, no evidence of birth control was discovered.
In zones affected by economic recession, migration strategies were clearly in use, taking the form of 
sid in g  dep^d^ts away ñom most Altiplano and Bajo Piura homes pemumently: more than 23 % of the 
natives were living away at the time of the study. In Altiplano, more than 81% of homes had at least one 
emigrant older than IS years of age. The principal destinations were Lima for the migrants from Bajo Piura 
and Arequipa; Lima and Tambopata for those from Altiplano. Seasonal mobility was a common strategy in 
Altiplano: farm workers moved to colonization areas or to rice plantations on the Coast during the inactive 
period in the Altiplano. Permanent migration and seasonal mobility are combined strategies for balancing 
availability of and demand for domestic labour, the equilibrium of which is determined by average annual 
mdogenous demand; excesses result in permanent emigration and defrcits or temporary surpluses are resolved 
by hiring temporary labourers or by seasonal emigration. In Bajo Piura, seasonal mobility, consisting only 
in brief movements during the cotton harvest in cooperative farms, was the strategy used to increase cash 
income and achieve maximum use of labour.
Both permanent and seasonal migration to developing areas were of less inqmrtance. Most household 
heads in colonization areas were from the Altiplano. In Cañete, most farmers were natives of the valley. 
Immigration to this zone had been important in the 19960s and 1970s, as farms were collectivized by the 
Agrarian Reform. Many migrants became workers on the new cooperatives. In Tambopata, seasonal mobility 
continues on the part of Andean farm labourers who go down to the valley to harvest coffee and, then, return 
to the Altiplano. In summary, in contrast with the most recessive zones, neither fertility nor migration were 
decisive strategies for family subsistence in the more developed zones.
Extract from: Arambuni, C. (1990), "Familia y mano de obra en el sector rural del Perú", in Vlassoff, C. 
and Barkat-e-Kudha, eds.. Repercusiones de la modernización sobre el desarrollo v el comportamiento 
demográfico. CIID, Ottawa, pp. 106-109.
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in. INEQUITIES IN DEMOGRAPHIC BEHAVIOUR
There is ample evidence to indicate a close association b^ een  lower levels of development —or 
situations of poverty, in general— and higher rates of population growth, mainly stemming from high 
birth rates. Thus, national poverty levels are directly related to the classification of countries within the 
stages of demographic transition, even though situations of poverty and inequity occur in all countries, 
even in those with lower growth rates.
In fact, as mentioned above, the average demographic bdiaviour of the countries of the region, 
including those in the more advanced stages of the transition process, obscures important differences, both 
among geogrsq>hic areas and among the different social sectors of the population. Spatial and social 
differences are inter-related, given that those sectors with lower incomes usually occupy the most 
deteriorated land in the countryside and the most unhealthy areas in the cities. In other words, instead 
of one process of demographic transition in each country, there are rather sectors in different stages of 
transition, from sub-populations with very high birth and death rates to others which have completed the 
transition process.
With regard to geogriq)hic contexts, it is necessary to note that the behaviour of each biological 
rq)roduction indicator responds to its own socioeconomic and cultural particularities and not to simple 
taxonomic distinctions among them. Thus, for example, there are cities with demographic indicators 
which may be dissimilar, due to the fact that their social and economic structures have been historically 
different. What is important to note is that such heterogeneity, generally, implies situations of inequity 
in terms of the possibilities of access to the benefits of economic development.
A. DIFFERENCES IN DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS
Research performed on the basis of census data and surveys has made it possible to observe birth rate 
trends, measured by the number of children per woman and infant mortality, in countries in different 
stages of transition and to stratify the population according to selected variables, for example, the degree 
of urbanization and years of education of the mother.
Overall behaviour indicates that birth rates are higher in rural areas and within the most marginated 
social sectors. In countries in the early stages of transition, those differences are sharper and tend to 
become more acute, given that birth rates fall first in urban areas and, in them, probably among those 
populations with a certain level of education. In contrast, birth rates may rise in rural zones due to 
eventual improvements in certain aspects of the population’s health, unaccompanied as yet by changes 
in reproductive bdiaviour, a phenomenon observed in various countries of the region in the 1950s and 
early 1960s. In countries advancing rapidly in the transition process, with important changes in overall
birth rates, there is a trend toward convergence around a relatively low number of children, although, 
in all cases analysed, internal differences persist (Graph III.l). Table III.l presents recent data on birth 
rate differences, revealing that, in all of the countries analysed, uneducated women, such as those living 
in rural areas, have an average of 5 or more children, while in 5 of the 8 countries of that group, the 
overall birth rate among women with secondary educations or higher is around 2 children.
This evidence clearly shows that any population programme which includes maternal-infant health 
services or which proposes to affect birth rates must necessarily extend its services to rural sectors and 
to poorly educated women.
As is true for birth rates, estimates for infant mortality by place of residence and the mothers’ 
education, for countries in different stages of transition, reve^ important differences. According to the 
educational level of mothers, children in greatest risk of dying during their first year of life are found 
in rural sectors and were bom to illiterate mothers, whose children are, in some cases, more than three 
times more likely to die than those of mothers with secondary and university educations (Table III.l).
Sharp contrasts also appear when ethnic origin is considered, given that the death rate among 
children in indigenous communities is notoriously higher than that among other children, a fact which 
clearly demonstrates the vulnerability of those populations. For example, research based on census data 
shows that, in Bolivia (1976), the infant death rate of the Quecha-speaking only population was 218 per 
thousand live births, while for the Spanish-speakers it was 137 per thousand. In Guatemala (1981), the 
chances of dying before reaching two years of age was 128 per thousand for indigenous persons and 101 
per thousand for the non-indigenous population (OPS, 1990). Recent research in Chile (1988) shows that 
the infant mortality rate in indigenous communities was 45 per thousand, while, at the same time, the 
national rate was 17 per thousand and, in the better-off neighborhoods of Santiago, the capital city, it was 
slightly more than 10 per thousand.
In spite of the process of urbanization, half or more births occur in rural areas in the countries of 
Groups I and II. Exposed to higher risks of dying, the members of this group generate approximately two 
thirds of total infant deaths. Moreover, in countries with high mortality rates, most infant deaths (between 
60 and 80%) occur in homes of poorly educated women, due to both the backward conditions in which 
they live and the higher birth rates among them.
The fact that, within the poorest population, more children are born and die produces a dramatic 
situation in terms of demands for maternal-infant health services, among other considerations. A series 
of social problems linked to the high frequency of adolescent pregnancies and unwanted children, which 
in many cases lead to abortions with the consequent risk to the life of the mother, must be added. 
Although reliable figures are not available, it is possible to suggest that, in Latin America, deaths from 
causes related to pregnancy and birth are dozens of times higher than in developed countries, when, in 
most cases, those deaths could be avoided.
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Figure in .l
A V E R A G E  N U M B E R  O F C H IL D R E N  P E R  W O M EN  B Y  T H E  
M O TH ER '^ Y E A R S  O F F O R M A L  E D U C A T IO N , 19 6 0 -19 8 0  
( S E L E C T E D  L A T IN  A M E R IC A N  C O U N T R IE S )
C U B A  C H IL E
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H O N D U R A S P A R A G U A Y
Source: CELADE, IFHIPAL Project
70
LATIN AMERICA: OVERALL BIRTH AND DEATH RATES,
BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF MOTHERS, 
ACCORDING TO DATA FROM THE NATIONAL DEMOGRAPHIC 
AND HEALTH SURVEYS (DHS). 1980s
Table III.1
Country
Place of residence Educational level of mothers
Urban Rural None Prim.begun Prim.comp. Sec.and
1 Ola \
more
Overall birth rate (TGF)
Guatemala 1983-87 4.1 6.S 7.0 5.6 3.9 2.7 5.6
Bolivia 1984-89 4.0 6.4 6.1 5.9 4.5 2.9 4.9
Paraguay 1987-90 3.6 6.1 6.7 6.2 4.5 3.2 4.7
Peru 1984-86 3.1 6.3 6.6 5.0 3.1 1.9 4.1
Mexico 1984-86 3.1 5.2 6.1 5.7 3.7 2.5 3.8
Dorn.Rep. 1983-86 3.1 4.8 5.3 4.3 2.9 2.1 3.7
Brazi1 1983-86 3.0 5.0 6.5 5.1 3.1 2.5 3.5
Colombia 1981-86 2.8 4.9 5.4 4.2 2.5 1.5 3.3
Country
Place of residence Educational level of mothers
■ Tol
Urban Rural None Prim.begun Prim.comp. Sec.and more
Infant mortality rate (per thousand)
Bolivia 1979-89 79 112 124 108 65 46 96
Brazi1 1976-86 76 107 ** ** ** ** 86
Guatemala 1983-87 65 84 82 86 61 41 79
Peru 1981-86 54 101 124 85 42 22 76
Dorn.Rep. 1976-86 72 71 102 76 57 34 68
Mexico 1982-87 23 64 83 64 46 27 56
Colombia 1976-86 38 41 60 — 4 0 --- 28 39
Paraguay 1980-90 32 38 45 42 33 22 35
Notes: Educational levels: In Dominican Republic, Colombia and Peru, the educational groups are 
the following: no education, primary, secondary and university; in Bolivia, the groups 
are: no education, primary, intermediate, middle and more; in Paraguay, the no education 
group includes those with 2 years of education or less.
Place of residence: For Mexico, in urban areas, localities with more than 20,000 
inhabitants were included here.
•* Mot available.
Source: National Reports of Demographic and Health Surveys.
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B. DEMCXjRAPHIC dynam ics by  degree of poverty
Given current patterns of demographic growth by zones (sharp increase in urbanization) and the steady 
impoverishment of the cities, the poor are now fundamentally urban, although most rural inhabitants 
continue to be poor (ECLAC, 1990). At the national level, as a result of both the crisis of the 1980s and 
their own demographic dynamics, the poor have increased more than the rest of the population in several 
countries.
As observed above in the behaviour of demogr^hic variables by categories which amount to a 
characterization of poverty, that situation is usually associated with higher birth and death rates in poor 
homes. This reality is usu^ly reflected in traits such as more numerous families, with higher demographic 
dependence ratios (resulting from younger age structures), accompanied by lower levels of relative 
economic participation by family members -concentrated, moreover, in independent sector activities-, and 
is more prevalent in poorer countries. Due to both the levels and the delayed evolution of the components 
of natural growth, the main consequence for these groups is higher growth than that of the rest of the 
population, which in turn produces young age structures within them.
When the poor are the majority in a country, they usually represent its stage in demographic 
transition. Be that as it may, descriptions of the growth and age structures of poor sectors must be 
understood in light of the notion that the demographic dimensions of poverty are always correlated to the 
country and its specific contexts (for example, urban, rural).
In Latin America, very high mortality is, perhaps, the most characteristic demographic dimension 
of poverty. Since it is commonly recognized that higher death rates are nearly always accompanied by 
high birth rates, it is possible to affirm that the poor pay a high cost in overall reproduction, that cost 
being higher in poorer countries. Thus, the task of replacing a country’s members falls to the poorest 
population, as can be observed in its components of growth and age structures.
Two examples serve to characterize the rhythm and weight of natural demographic growth among 
the poor in terms of its impact on total annual births and deaths in a given country. In poor countries, 
such as Guatemala,* the high demographic growth in the poorest sectors, that is, among the indigent 
(3.4% annually), is made evident by the fact that the greater part of the net natural increase for the 
country occurs in those sectors (57% of the total).® This increase is obtained at the cost of a high number 
of deaths, compensated for by an analogously high number of births. Both of these phenomenon are of 
greater magnitude, proportionally, than that of the poor population within the national total (Table III.2). 
Births and deaths in the homes of the indigent account for 55% of the national total, and, if those 
occurring in homes below the poverty line are considered, for 80%. It is to be noted that the incidence 
of poverty in Guatemala rose from 71% of the population, in 1980, to 73%, in 1987 (poverty line), and, 
what is worse, came to be constituted mainly by indigents (ECLAC, 1990).
* The examples of demographic dynamics among the poor sectors of Guatemala and Costa Rica 
presented here are based on the data gathered by the home surveys used by ECLAC to estimate poverty.
® In rural areas, however, naturjd growth may be relatively low due to high mortality rates and the 
high rate of emigration among women in their child-bearing years.
COSTA RICA AND GUATEMALA: ANNUAL SOCIOOEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS 





L E V E L
Poor Non-poor Country
COSTA RICA (1988) 
X population 9 18 73 100
Birth rate 30 32 25 27
(per thousand) 
Death rate 7 5 4 5
(per thousand) 
Natural growth 23 27 21 22
rate (per thousand) 
Overall birth 4.5 4.1 2.7 3.2
rate
Life expectancy 71 73 76 75
at birth (years) 
X annual births 10 21 69 100
X annual deaths 14 20 66 100
Age structure (per hundred)
0-19 57 55 42 46
20-59 34 38 51 47
60 and over 9 7 7 7
Total 100 100 100 100
Relation of dependence 195 164 97 114
(per hundred)
Size of home (persons) 5.1 5.0 4.4 4.6
Gross rate of economic
participation
(per hundred) 20 23 41 36
Occupational structure 
(per hundred)
Salaried 55 74 71 71
Self employed 25 17 20 19
Unpaid domestic 
labour 15 7 4 5
Other 5 2 5 5
Total 100 100 100 100
COSTA RICA AND GUATEMALA: ANNUAL SOCIOOEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS 
BY LEVELS OF POVERTY a/
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Table III.2 (Cont.)
Country and L E V E L
indicator Indigents Poor Non-poor Country
GUATEMALA (1986-1987)
X population A8 25 27 100
X indigents by level 55 38 23 42
Birth rate U 34 30 38
(per thousand) 
Death rate 10 9 7 9
(per thousand) 
Natural growth 3A 25 23 29
rate (per thousand) 




60 63 71 62
X annual births 56 22 22 100
X annual deaths 55 25 20 100
Age structure (per hundred)
0-19 62 56 47 56
20-59 34 39 46 39
60 and over 4 5 7 5
Total 100 100 100 100
Relation of dependence 
(per hundred)
196 159 116 160
Size of home (persons) 6.0 5.4 4.4 5.3





26 33 43 32
Salaried 41 54 53 49
Self employed 
Unpaid domestic
35 30 31 32
labour 24 14 11 17
Other 0 2 5 2
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: CELADE, ECLAC.
a/ Costa Rica, 1988; Guatemala, 1986-1987.
Another example, this time from Costa Rica, a country not as poor as Guatemala, shows that 
greatest natural growth does not occur among the indigent groups, although higher rhythms of 
demogr^hic growth continue to be associated with poverty. Moreover, their contribution to annual births 
and deaths in Costa Rica, even though greater than the weight of poor sectors within the total population, 
is not the predominant contribution, given the lower incidence of poverty at the national level. At any 
rate, the population below the poverty line rose from 24%, in 1981, to 27%, in 1988 OECLAC, 1990).
It is interesting to note that, considering the levels of growth among indigent sectors and comparing 
that growth with the evolution of the size of those sectors during the 1980s, the reduced social mobility 
of the population surpassed their demogr2q;)hic contribution. In Guatemala, as in Costa Rica, this means 
that the evolution of die size of the poorest population group is certainly not caused only by demographic 
growth. Moreover, given their higher rates, the poor should generally constitute an ever-growing fraction 
of the population of each country, which is not necessarily the case, due to the influence of economic and 
social factors.
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The consequences of the greater demographic growth of the poor population is reflected in the 
increase of poverty and indigence among children and youth. In Guatemala, persons younger than 20 
years of age in situations of indigence constitute a third of the population, and account for nearly 4S%, 
if the poverty line criterion is used. In Costa Rica, those percentages are 5 and 15%, respectively.
Due to these age structure characteristics, the satisfaction of the demands for health care and 
education, of that population in particular, are of prime importance and it is clear, therefore, that not 
satisfying those demands constitutes one of the fundamental elements in the vicious circle of poverty. 
However, for older age groups, demands are concentrated around work and housing, two of the most 
basic needs, the frustration of which also contribute to the reproduction of poverty.
Thus, the demographic behaviour of poor sectors tends to reenforce the general situation of 
poverty. This can be understood if it is realized that their greater fertility and its effects on natural growth 
have inevitably brought a certain level of pressure to bear on health and educational systems and on the 
labour market, among other social elements. However, the effect of greater fertility is not direct, because 
it occurs through certain mechanisms of the intergenerational reproduction of poverty, for instance child 
labour and early pregnancies. Child labour —as a necessary survival strategy in many homes given their 
low incomes— seems to contribute to the reproduction of the situation of the previous generation by 
sacrificing education, that is, the acquisition of those qualifications which would allow younger family 
members to compete for better paying jobs. Early pregnancies, in significant correlation with single 
motherhood, establish the foundations of the childrens’ future, characterized by the cultural and material 
deprivations proper to the environment into which they were born (ECLAC, 1988 and 1991).
These reflections indicate, at least at the level of empirical fact, that the reproduction of poverty 
is closely linked to biological reproduction, to the extent that the poor sectors often account for the 
greater part of a country’s population growth in very disadvantageous conditions. Thus, both social and 
productive investments are urgently necessary. Among those social investments which would tend to 
improve those demogr:q)hic factors which contribute to the reproduction of poverty, responding, as well, 
to real demands of the lower income sectors, would be the extension of the right to opt for family 
planning to the whole population.
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IV. SOCIODEMCXÏRAPHIC REPERCUSSIONS OF POPULATION DYNAMICS
A. IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMICS 
FOR THE PROVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES
The analysis of the economic and social repercussions of population dynamics is a very complex matter. 
Although research into this problem has been going on for some time, most studies focus on the economic 
effects of demographic groulh. In order to quantify those effects, a set of demoeconomic models has been 
designed to project possible changes in diverse variables, such as the product, savings, investment and 
employment, within different contexts of demographic change. It has become :q)parent, however, that the 
application of those models, based on premises and causal relations not always adequately tested, has 
produced ambiguous results. As an alternative, less ambitious efforts, with varying degrees of technical 
elaboration, have been made using population projections and deriving estimates of the demands 
which will arise from specific sectors, such as those linked to the provision of social services. In 
spite of their undoubted value as a means of supplying reference elements for resource allocation, it must 
be recognized that their usefulness is limited. Although many restrictions lie in the lack of appropriate 
data, it is no less true that the theoretical frameworks used to identify the mechanisms through which, 
those effects are produced are insufficient. This is particularly evident in light of the fact that the 
implications of population change do not emerge from direct causal relationships, but rather from 
interactive correlations.
Among the socioeconomic repercussions attributable to population change are those directly 
related to the determination of demands for social services. For the purpose of discussing diverse aspects 
of this issue, a series of estimates related to specific sectors are presented below. Strictly speaking, 
they are numerical exercises limited to the detection of certain orders of magnitude, which will outline 
the demands in each case. Clearly, the degree of accuracy with which these figures represent real future 
needs depends on the nature of the premises involved. From the beginning, it will be presumed that 
demographic dynamics affect demands for social services in, at least, four ways. The first way 
corresponds to the rhythm of population growth which establishes the most general contours of those 
demands. The second comes from the evolution of the basic components of demographic increases, 
the relative intensities of which make those contours more precise. The third way consists in the age 
structure of the population, whose characteristics help specify the types of services required. The fourth 
is the spatial distribution of the population, which conditions the type and location of the demands.
Although the total range of social services is broad, the estimates presented here refer only to 
education, employment, health care, social security and housing. The general focus of govenunental 
social policy is toward these sectors. Public investment in these areas is usually understood as a means 
of achieving qualitative improvements in the human resources of the country, which, moreover, is a 
known prerequisite for strategies of productive transformation with equity. One way of discovering the 
implications of population change for the provision of social services consists in discovering the possible 
links between the different moments of demographic transition and the needs in each sector. In spite 
of its simplicity, an ŝ proach such as eqipears in Box IV. 1 makes it possible to focus on the diversity of 
transition phenomena present in the region, as well as to identify specific aspects of their effects on the 
spectrum of sector demands.
Thus, in the early stages of transition (Group I), characterized by high rates of demogrsq)hic 
growth, the provision of social services will have to expand rapidly. Especially, given current high birth 
rates and their effects on age structures, social services must also concentrate on attention for children 
and relatively young adults. Moreover, the patterns of death rates associated with low life expectancy 
suggest the need for preventive and public health measures in the area of environmental hygiene. If, as 
is usually the case, these general demographic conditions are accompanied by a low level of urbanization, 
a considerable proportion of the demands to be met may come from rural areas, at least in the short term. 
However, given that population rates of growth are now higher in urban areas, the rhythm of increase 
in the demands for social services will tend to be greater in those areas than in their rural counterparts. 
Where demographic transition can be characterized as moderate (Group II), it is highly probable that the 
profile of demands will be similar to those described above, but that the specific location of service 
responses will vary, depending on the particular manifestations of the process of urbanization.
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In situations of fall transition (Group III), with drastic reductions of birth rates, the intensity of 
increases in the number of demands, in areas such as primary education and maternal-infant health care, 
will tend to diminish only gradually. In contrast, the needs of youth and adults will remain high in areas 
such as employment, housing, university education and job training. These same transitional conditions 
reveal the need to broaden preventive and curative health services, through combined efforts. Since the 
countries which have achieved the category of fall demographic transition are characterized by 
predominantly urban populations, to the point that, in some countries, the number of rural inhabitants has 
dropped in absolute terms, it will be necessary to concentrate the provision of social services in urban 
zones. Finally, in situations of advanced transition (Group IV), the weight of the needs of the adult ages 
will become even more evident, especially in terms of employment, while the demand for services linked 
to the third age, such as for geriatric health care and pension systems, will gradually grow. At the same 
time, demands related to infant health care and for children and youth will reach a certain stability. 
Generally, even as the relative weight of the older generations becomes ever greater, the persistence of 
lower rates of demogriq)hic growth over time will lead to lower rhythms of increase in the demand for 
certain services. Moreover, the high proportion of urban population observed in countries of advanced 
transition has obvious repercussions on the placement of the resources allocated for the provision of social 
services.
Box IV. 1
DEMOGRAPHIC PARTICULARITIES OF DEMANDS 
FOR SOCIAL SERVICES
The id^tification of demands for social services is o ft^  undertake in function of the characteristics of 
national populations and the orientation of social policy in each country. National demographic particidarities 
arise from the rhythm of growth of the différât population segments which constitute target groups for those 
services. A first approximation can be made by refer^ce to the anticipated evolution of the age structure of 
the total population, which results from the net effect of the rate of demographic growth. The diagramme 
shows how the trajectory of population change (instances of demographic transition), expressed through 
changes in the relative weight of age groups, makes it possible to focus on certain typical demands. Naturally, 
emphasis on probable demographic effects does not inqily that the importance of the other dimensions of 
national reality which operate as intermediate variables in the relation established betwera the two columns 
of the diagramme ought to be ignored. Therefore, neither direct correspondence nor universal validity are 
presumed. As well, historical conditioning factors, associated with fluctuations in the economy and 
decision-making processes, which affect social policy activities and may alter the nature of demands, must 
also be recognized. In short, the diagramme only highlights a series of effects linked to certain patterns of 
population change.
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On the basis of the elements of reference provided by this approach, a series of estimates was 
generated with respect to the demands for social services for the last decade of the Twentieth Century 
(1990-2000). With regard to the provision of those services, it was presumed, in a simplified way, that 
pertinent coverage levels will remain the same as when the projections were performed (1990). An 
exception to this general rule was made for the employment sector, for which the projections of the 
economically active population were used. Given their illustrative purpose, the exercises were performed 
for only four countries in different stages of demographic transition; Haiti, El Salvador, Mexico and 
Uruguay. The results reveal significant differences. In die analysis of the results of these exercises, it is 
important to recall that the data are only indications of what will presumably be the direct effect of the 
conditions of demographic evolution.
Thus, if the percentage coverage levels of primary or basic school services existing at the end of 
the 1980s are maintained, the number of students would have to increase 25% in Haiti, while in Mexico, 
the increase would be 9% and in Uruguay there would be an absolute drop in the population in the 
corresponding ages. Given that these figures do not presume increased coverage, as noted above, any 
improvement in the school situation in Haiti and Mexico would involve even greater increases. For its 
part, institutional attention for births would have to be expanded 22% in El Salvador, maintaining the 
modest initial coverage, while, in Mexico, the increase in the number of such instances would be only 
2% and, in Uruguay, by 2000, the number would remain virtually the same as in 1990. With respect to 
projections for the economically active population, in Uruguay, the increase in the supply of labour would 
be relatively low, with an annual rate of growth around 1%, a figure derived from the increase in the 
population in their working years. In contrast, in the other three countries, the "pressure" for new jobs 
will remain high for the 1990s: in Mexico, for example, that population will grow at 2.9% annually; the 
intensity of that increase will be similar to that obtained in cases of incipient and moderate transition. 
According to these estimates, during the 1990s, the effects of the ageing of the population will only 
clearly be felt in Uruguay; the most notable implications are for the pension and Aird age health care 
systems. Notwithstanding these observations, this type of impact will begin to be felt by countries in full 
transition in the first half of the Twenty First Century.
78
These estimates, even with their limitations, provide some indication of the orders of the 
magnitude of demands social services which can be imputed to the population changes currently occurring 
within the different modalities of demographic transition in Latin America and the Caribbean. The 
examination of the results of these exercises could create the impression that, in situations of advanced 
demographic transition, the number of demands for services will tend to decrease. Although, in the light 
of these figures, that impression seems justified, it is necessary to bear in mind that, as the effects of 
sustained decreases in birth rates are combined with relatively high life expectancies, the trend toward 
an older population is strengthened, which, in the mid and long terms, may introduce additional 
complications. Among these, there would be the effects of a sustained increase in the burden on the 
financial situation of the pension system, the need to modify the focus of health programmes in order to 
give greater weight to expensive medical treatment and probable quantitative and qualitative rigidities in 
the supply of labour.
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BoxIV.2
DEMANDS FOR SOCIAL SERVICES 
ACCORDING TO DIVERSE DEMOGRAPHIC TRAJECTORIES
The relative magnitude of the changes anticipated in the demand for social services, in function of population 
dynamics during the last decade of the Tw^tieth Century, is illustrated in the following Table, which contains 
estimates for three countries with different demographic profiles and which rq>resoit an inqmrtant segment 
of the spectrum of variation within Latin America and the Caribbean.
Percemt change: 1990-2000 
El Salvador Mexico Uruguay
Births with qualified attrition 21.9 2.1 0.0
Studmits in primary education 18.6 8.4 -3.0
Housing units 28.4 21.0 5.8
urban n.d. 29.5 8.5
rural n.d. -2.6 -6.2
Labour force 37.8 34.2 9.7
Passive sector 44.3 45.0 9.6
ratio passive/active 6.5 10.8 -0.1
Source: Aimexes A-16 to A-19. Pertinent coverage and average family size are presumed constant, except 
with respect to the labour force and passive sector, which are based on projections of rates of labour 
participation.
These figures reveal significant differences among countries in the anticipated effects of demographic 
evolution on the demand for social services. In a country long noted for its low indexes of population growth, 
such as Uruguay, the demands associated with births and childrra will probably tend to decrease. In contrast, 
in El Salvador, where demographic transition is still moderate, that type of demand will increase sharply. 
Mexico is in an intermediate position, in full demographic transition. Even though, in all cases, increased 
"pressure” for jobs is anticipated, die relative weight of that increase is notably diverse in the countries under 
consideratimi. Moreover, changes in demands for housing, together with varying in accordance to the 
evolution of demographic change, also illustrate how population distribution in urban and rural areas can 
affect housing needs. The incremental effects of population ageing, built up during the demographic transition 
process, become evident when the increase in the passive/active ratios for El Salvador and Mexico are 
compared. However, as a country enters the more advanced stages of transition, the relative weight of the 
elderly population tends to become stable, as suggested by the case of Uruguay, whose passive/active quotimit 
—currently one of the highest in Latin America and the Caribbean— will not change significantly in the 
period imder consideration.
It is important to analyse the results of these exercises with a degree of caution. First, the 
magnitude of the population which could become the "target" of each social programme does not always 
correlate exactly with the resources required. In fact, the operation of each service supposes certain fixed 
costs which are relatively independent of the eventual number of beneficiaries. Thus, cost functions in 
some sectors are not always lineal, requiring abrupt increments when certain thresholds are crossed. For 
example, the apparent reduction in demographic "burdens" associated with lower birth rates may not be 
reflected in reduced costs. It is also necessary to note that, although the components of a given service 
have different costs (primary vis-a-vis secondary education, preventive vis-a-vis curative health care), 
changes in the age structure of the pertinent populations do not have analogous effects at the financial 
level. As well, certain "inflexibilities" must be recognized, which affect resource allocation and restrict 
the possibility of realizing intersector transfers.
A second cautionary note concerns the use of average national coverage figures. In some countries, 
the relevant indexes may be high, but do not reveal "pockets of poverty" which may require additional 
efforts and, together with entailing fairly specific cost structures, may also imply institutional action of 
a type different from that required in national-level programmes. Of course, given that the figures 
generated by the exercises presume stability in coverage deficiencies, in countries where these are fragile 
tile number of requirements would have to increase if progress in the satisfaction of unmet needs is to 
be made. Finally, since the philosophy of promoting productive transformation with equity entails 
effecting urgent improvements in several social services, the figures produced by these exercises are 
clearly insufficient in the face of this challenge.
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Given its broad focus, this approach does not allow for identifying the historical specificities of the 
demographic transition of each country. Although each of the four groups presented in Box IV. 1 includes 
national cases which are similar to a degree, in terms of the rhythms of population increase, it is no less 
true that they also embrace important differences. A country such as El Salvador, profoundly affected 
by internal conflict during the 1980s, does not fully fit the conditions of case II. In fact, its modality of 
demographic transition contains a series of particularities which makes it unique —intense international 
migration, severe uprooting of the population throughout the territory with impact on the behaviour of 
couples and increased adult death rates— and which will become more evident during the 1990s through 
such effects as important fluctuations in the school-age population. Moreover, Mexico and Peru, even 
though they are in the same group, have had different rhythms of transition, meaning, for example, a 
substantially greater relative increase in the provision of maternal-infant health care services in the latter. 
As well, the rapidity with which demographic changes have occurred in Cuba would seem to suggest that 
there are considerable oscillations in the size of social programme target populations, a trend for which 
it is difficult to discover a similar case in the other countries of the region; these same specific conditions 
will, in the fiiture, cause considerably more rapid reductions in the rhythm of growth of the working age 
population than that foreseen for other countries. Naturally, these particularities, as others which could 
be mentioned, are not to be explained by demographic parameters, per se, but rather by the characteristics 
of the respective historical contexts witiiin which the behaviours which gave them validity were defined.
The social, economic and cultural heterogeneity of Latin America and the Caribbean pose special 
challenges for the analysis of the eventual impact of population change. Of course, by identifying the 
diverse modalities of demogrjqihic transition occurring throughout the region, one is recognizing that that 
phenomenon is one manifestation of that structural heterogeneity. Each type is defined by its peculiar 
traits of the process of population change, which may indicate specific socioeconomic effects. In spite of 
the fact that countries within each group of demographic transition share certain quantative traits in terms 
of their current stage in that transition, they also maintain considerable differences among each other with
respect to the historical moment in which they entered into that stage of change. By the same token, both 
the socioeconomic repercussions implied by diverse styles of demographic evolution over time and the 
potential of each society to adapt or react to them will 1  ̂different. Moreover, the distinction established 
between national units is insufficient; within each country there are obvious differences in demogr^hic 
phenomena among spatial units and social (and ethnic) groups. By not taking into account the specific 
requirements of those national population sub-groups, the risk would be run of using aggregate values 
which, although valid as averages, are not realistic in the area of policy formation. As well, the 
evaluation of their impact would have to take into account die capacity of the different social groups, 
spatially dispersed, to face them. Clearly, given the reciprocal relations of causality involved, this type 
of approximation is very complex.
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B. DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY
Habitually, sociodemogr^hic analysis uses the individual as its unit of study or object of reference, as 
do many social policies. However, many repercussions of demographic trends take on special meaning 
when interpreted in terms of groupings of persons, dedned in function of family ties, modalities of 
residence, marriage situation, work activities or other characteristics associated with persons’ life cycles. 
Reference will be made below to several socioeconomic phenomena related to this type of grouping, to 
the persons belonging to them and their implications for policy.
Most population censuses in Latin America and the Caribbean gather information based on homes 
rather than on families. However, given that a high percentage of homes have only one family, it is 
possible to verify that the size of the family has decreased in most countries of the region. As was to be 
expected, that reduction arises mainly from lower birth rates, although it has also been affected by 
changes in patterns of co-residence. In countries in the early stages of demographic transition, with birth 
rates still high, the decrease in family size has been slight, or remains stable, as in Bolivia, where it has 
remained around 4.5 members for the last 15 years. It has also been possible to observe a diversification 
of domestic units, characterized by a fairly common decrease in extended and combined homes, an 
increase in housdiolds headed by women without spouses (resulting, to a considerable degree, from an 
increase in divorces and separations), and an increase in one person households. It is very important to 
take these trends into account when interpreting estimates of the future housing demands discussed in the 
previous section, because they can substantially modify both the volume of resources destined to housing 
programmes and the policy orientations which define the types of homes toward which efforts in this area 
should be made. It is also important to review the interaction between demographic trends and policy in 
this area. An example of this is the trend toward an increase of the relative weight of nuclear homes: 
although in most countries of the region the percentage of those homes is higher in urban areas, in some 
countries (Bolivia, Peru, Dominican Republic and Cuba) nuclear homes are more frequent in rural areas. 
However, while in those three countries that higher frequency is indicative of the importance of 
rural-urban migration and the period of integration into cities, in Cuba, it is the result of housing 
construction policy for rural areas.
Within the diversity of models of nuclear families, one outstanding trend is the increase of 
housdiolds headed by women. In some countries, the increase is notorious, as in Cuba, where it rose 
from 18%, in 1970, to 28%, in 1980; in Puerto Rico, where it rose from 19%, in 1970, to 23%, in 
1980; or in Brazil, where it rose from 12%, in 1978, to 20%, in 1989. These are usually mono-parent 
homes, that is, a mother without spouse, who lives with her children, a situation at least partially 
attributable to increased s^arations. Different studies have shown that housdiolds headed by women are 
among the poorest, with a high percentage of young children and heads of housdiold with lower 
educational levels. However, it has also been argued that these homes have lower incomes due to the 
difficulty encountered by all women in generating income, arising from discrimination in the areas of 
salary and stable job opportunities, especially when they are less well educated. The identification and 
characterization of this type of home is relevant for nearly all dimensions of social policy, including 
actions geared to alleviate poverty, improve work conditions, and broaden opportunities for better social 
and labour insertion for women.
Some demographic processes and dimensions are so intimately interrelated that it is inadequate, if 
no simply incorrect, to analyse their repercussions separately and independently of each other. This is 
the case for the links between pregnancy and adolescent fertility, consensual unions, and illegitimate 
births. It was indicated above that there are several Latin American countries in which the rates of 
adolescent fertility drop less slowly than overall rates, even rising in some countries. In Jamaica, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Dominican Republic and Guadalupe, rates were over 100 births per 
thousand women between 15 and 19 years of age. However, even in countries with lower adolescent birth 
rates, such as Puerto Rico, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile, the phenomenon is still a matter of 
governmental and general social concern. The increase in consensual unions is closely linked to this 
phenomenon: according to information gathered around 1980 for 24 Latin America and Caribbean 
countries (United Nations, 1990), most of these unions involve women between 15 and 19 years of age. 
In this issue, as in others, it is important to distinguish those situations in which this type of union is 
legitimate within the traditional culture, as in Caribbean countries, from situations in which consensual 
unions are forms of forced adaptation to adverse economic circumstances, as occurs in the poor strata 
of many countries, and from situations which can be interpreted as innovative responses to recent 
economic and sociocultural change. Linked to this, an increase in the number of illegitimate births has 
been observed which, although it occurs in mothers of all ages, is mainly associated with adolescent and 
young adult mothers. In Chile, for example, between 1970 and 1988, the percentage of illegitimate births 
among all births to women less than 20 years of age nearly doubled (from 31%, in 1970, to 60%, in
1988), while in other countries it is also possible to detect a high proportion of illegitimate children 
among adolescent mothers.
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These trends have consequences for the way in which the emphases of family planning programmes 
are conceived and defíned: to the degree to which there is true concern for adolescent pregnancy and birth 
rates and taking into account the interrelations mentioned above, it is clear that family planning 
programmes and services must assign greater importance to the components of information, education 
and communication which will emphasize responsible parenthood, the importance of a family environment 
favourable for children and the implementation of projects of alternative life styles for young women. It 
is even possible that the consideration of these factors will lead to the review of current emphasis in the 
area of the simple provision of contraceptives. The growing use of sterilization instead of reversible 
methods does not seem the most functional alternative to the needs of younger couples.
Another trend, mentioned above, is that related to the greater relative weight of the elderly 
population, which is inseparably linked to the more advanced stages of demographic transition. It is worth 
recalling diat this is an aspect of demogr^hic transformation which has a practically universal 
particularity linked to sex: given that women’s death rates are lower than those for men, the elderly 
population has a majority of women, especially in urban areas where differences in death rates tend to 
be more significant. The lower birth and deadi rates which accompany the ageing process may have 
r^ercussions both on co-residence and types of home and on intrafamily relations. Children have a 
growing possibility of knowing one or more grandparent alive; grandfathers and grandmothers, in turn, 
have ever fewer children and grandchildren, but it will be ever more common that the grandparents may 
live with their grandchildren during the early years of the generation of their own descendants. This 
implies that individuals will be raised in direct interaction with fewer members of their own generation, 
but with greater possibilities of interrelating with relatives of other generations and for interchanging 
personal knowledge and experience with them.
The economic consequences arising from the ageing of the population depend, in part, on the type 
of productive contribution made by the elderly population. Studies of the role of the aged within die 
family indicate that they perform important services, such as to continue working, although only part 
time, especially in rural areas, and housekeeping and care of grandchildren while their children work. 
Some elder women adopt an essential role in the raising of their grandchildren, either in rural zones 
when their children emigrate in search of work or in urban contexts, in order to allow the mother to 
work outside the home. Information available for Latin American countries reveals that the rate of labour 
participation of the elderly population is significant, especially in the younger age ranges. The 
incidence of this phenomenon is greater in relatively less develop^ countries, in rural areas and among 
men, a fact due in part to the low coverage of pension benefits and other social security services in 
many countries of the region. However, given that most elderly persons are not economically active, 
the overall ageing of the population may also give rise to certain intergenerational conflicts, as 
financing for current retirement systems organized on the basis of transfers between cohorts becomes 
more difficult. This may be aggravated by the perception of the cohorts currently in the work force that 
they are paying a high cost in exchange for uncertain support for their own old age and by the political 
power which die elderly may come to exercise against changes oriented to improve intergenerational 
equity. This type of problem is more evident in countries with older populations, but the potential for 
change is greater in countries in the intermediate stages of demographic transition, such as Mexico and 
Peru, given that the key index for financing pensions, the passive/active ratio, may change more notably 
in those countries than in others with practically stable age structures, such as Argentina and Uruguay. 
That this occurs depends on changes in other factors of the system: for example, if countries in the 
intermediate stages of the transition manage to broaden coverage of those currendy active, they may 
compensate, to a large extent, for the undesirable effects derived from changes in the demographic 
structure of their populations.
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In general, growth of the population in the working years, as seen in the previous section, produces 
certain "pressures" on the labour market which can be expressed in terms of the investment required to 
absorb that growth, but it is also true that demographic trends have had favourable r^ercussions on 
relations of dependence (measured as the number of inactive persons for every economically active 
person) in most countries of the region. In fact, many of them have had important decreases in infant 
dependence, without as yet experiencing too significant increases in the degree of elderly dependence. 
In this sense, our countries are in a favourable demographic moment compared with many others in the 
world in either the very incipient or very advanced stages of transition. As in the case of urbanization 
discussed below, this situation is an opportunity for the generation of higher levels of income and savings.
as it is also an important challenge in terms of adequately absorbing the large work force and making the 
investments required to take advantage of this opportunity.
Certain demographic changes generate indirect repercussions on the work force which, however, 
can be of fundamental economic importance. A case in point is lowered birth rates. To the extent that 
fertility has come increasingly under the control of the couple, it has become possible to postpone the 
birth of the first child and to broaden the lapse between births. Although interrelations exist, what is to 
be noted here is the facilitating role these factors have played, especially in countries in full transition, 
by making it possible to acquire more education and creating conditions for more intense and more stable 
labour insertion for women, thus contributing to improved indexes of dependence and improved labour 
force productivity. Lower death rates have similar effects because they have contributed to increasing the 
person-years of economic activity over time: while, during the 1950s, persons in Latin America could 
expect an average of 32 active years, currently, that expectancy is around 40 years, a figure which should 
rise in the future. Given that lower death rates are associated with improved health conditions, those years 
will presumably be more productive, as well.
The growing labour insertion of women presents both quantative and qualitative particularities. The 
evolution of the rate of participation in the region as a whole has been gradual but sustained, rising from 
around 13%, in the 1950s, to 20%, in the 1970s, and to around 30%, currently. However, this trend 
ought to be examined, not only in terms of quantity, but also of quality or the conditions of this 
incorporation. For some women, the decision to work may be taken mainly in function of the search for 
favourable income and employment conditions in the formal market, as well as for reasons of personal 
fulfillment. However, for many women, incorporation has been motivated by low family income and has 
occurred in unfavourable conditions, such as informal work, low pay and long hours. In many countries 
of the region, the participation of married women is lower than its potential due to the discrimination 
implicit in the higher fixed costs of their work (maternity leave, for example), lower pay for the same 
work as that performed by men, scarcity of support services (day care, extended school hours) and the 
unavailability of domestic technology which facilitates work outside the home. These are policy areas 
which must be recognized as factors for the realization of the potential contribution of women, within a 
context in which the demographic trends are already opening up this type of possibility.
One of the most outstanding manifestations of Latin American demographic dynamics is the process 
of urbanization, the economic and social repercussions of which are of major importance. Thus, the 
population trend toward concentrations in cities constitutes a factor of increased demand, insofar as it 
implies denser goods and service markets and contributes to the configuration of agglomerated economies. 
These involve, among other elements, a large supply of labour, with diverse degrees of qualification, 
within geographically concentrated labour markets. In these conditions, economies of scale in the 
provision of social services are practicable, lowering relevant per unit costs. In contrast, providing those 
services to dispersed populations is more costly and, in some cases, virtually impossible. Naturally, it 
must be recognized that taking advantage of those economies requires large investments, as occurs, for 
example, in the case of physical inffastructure projects (drinking water, sewage, electrical, road and 
communication systems). In contexts of scarce resources, above all in times of crisis, such as the 1980s, 
the priority of this type of investment passes to a secondary level, which increases negative externalities 
(contamination, congestion) and the deterioration of public networks for lack of maintenance. Even 
though the treatment of these issues involves the consideration of a multiplicity of intervening factors, 
it is worth noting here that any development strategy must take into account the relatively high degree 
of urbanization achieved by the population of the countries of the region. In this sense, those strategies 
could contemplate taking deliberate advantage of the opportunities offered by the situation, in the attempt
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to n^tralize or compensate for those externalities adverse to die quality of life in cities. Policy action in 
this sense does not flow from the basic criteria of equity or productive efficiency automatically, for which 
reason they require particular attention.
Another r^ercussion of current demographic trends worth highlighting, especially when resource 
allocation options are examined, are the ^parent savings derived from reduced demogr^hic growth. 
Thus, a reduced rhythm of increase in the population younger than 18 years of age is usually considered 
to constitute a possibility to save education costs. Given the importance attributed to education in current 
strategies of equity and productive transformation, this argument is incomplete. In fact, the need to raise 
the qualifications of human resources and close significant service g^s imply the challenge of analysing 
different investment alternatives in the same sector. Thus, for exanqile, in countries in the incipient or 
intermediate stages of demographic transition, in which educational coverage is severely deficient, it will 
be necessary to undertake serious efforts to fill historical voids rsqiidly, as well as to attend to the new 
requirements of a vigorously growing population. Moreover, in countries in advanced stages of the 
transition, the task will be to improve education, achieving equity in the supply of services to different 
socioeconomic groups located in the diverse areas of the nation’s territory.
In the medium term, the progressive ageing of the population, associated with the more advanced 
stages of demographic transition, will involve greater demands for health care and pensions. The current 
debate in Latin America and the Caribbean about systems for providing these and other services for the 
elderly arises from the detection of trends toward ever greater deficiencies in those sectors. That debate 
does not always take sufficient notice of factors, such as population change, which have impact on those 
deficiencies. It is clear that, although they evolve more slowly than economic fluctuations, demographic 
elements do constitute one of the determinants of the mid term financial viability of the systems under 
consideration. The accumulation of funds, truly destined to cover the costs of retirement and diverse risks 
(unemployment, infirmity, and other contingencies) would help avoid possible deficits in those systems 
and, at the same time, would constitute a source of resources for those national savings needed to finance 
investments in a context of restrictions and uncertainty with respect to external financing. From this point 
of view, it is important that the role of those funds be considered in Latin American and Caribbean 
development strategies, not only for their relevance in terms of equity, but also for their potential in 
productive transformation. This type of opportunity seems greater in countries in the intermediate stages 
of demographic transition, given their populations with large proportions of persons in their active years 
and low indexes of dependence.
Finally, it is worth highlighting the important role of population policy and programmes as 
contributing factors to achieving the objectives of equity. To the extent that resources destined to provide 
health care are oriented toward the more vulnerable groups of the population and family planning 
programmes effectively facilitate access to information which allows for regulating fertility according to 
the desires of the couple —especially where unsatisfied demand is high—, direct progress will be made 
toward greater equity and, indirectly, toward reducing the rhythm of population growth. This is a policy 
area in which, as occurs in various of the issues mentioned above, there is no contradiction between the 
objectives of equity and productive transformation: rather, there exists the possibility of achieving 
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL POPULATION, 1950-2000 (THOUSANDS)
Region and country 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Regional total 165121 216615 283198 358925 441063 522961
Latin America 158810 209211 274538 349198 430182 510939
Argentina 17150 20616 23962 28237 32322 36238
Bolivia 2766 3428 4325 5581 7171 9038
Brazi1 53444 72594 95847 121286 149042 172777
Colombia 11946 15939 21360 26525 32300 37822
Costa Rica 862 1236 1731 2284 3034 3798
Cuba 5850 6985 8520 9679 10608 11504
Chile 6082 7614 9504 11145 13173 15272
Ecuador 3310 4413 6051 8123 10547 13090
El Salvador 1940 2570 3588 4525 5172 6425
Guatemala 2969 3964 5246 6917 9197 12222
Haiti 3261 3804 4520 5353 6486 7959
Honduras 1401 1935 2627 3662 5138 6846
Mexico 27297 36530 50328 67046 84486 102555
Nicaragua 1109 1502 2063 2802 3676 5169
Panama 839 1105 1487 1956 2418 2893
Paraguay 1351 1774 2351 3147 4277 5538
Peru 7632 9931 13193 17295 21550 26276
Dominican Republic 2353 3231 4423 5697 7170 8621
Uruguay 2239 2538 2808 2914 3094 3274
Venezuela 5009 7502 10604 15024 19321 23622
The Caribbean and others 6311 7404 8660 9727 10881 12022
Netherlands Antilles 116 137 162 171 175 178
Bahamas 79 110 170 210 255 295
Barbados 211 231 239 249 257 268
Belize 67 91 120 146 189 229
Dominica 51 60 70 75 72 71
Grenada 76 90 94 89 91 94
Guadeloupe 210 275 320 327 390 437
French Guyana 25 33 49 69 98 130
Guyana 423 569 709 759 796 883
Jamaica 1403 1629 1869 2133 2420 2677
Martinique 222 282 326 326 360 391
Puerto Rico 2219 2358 2718 3206 3530 3853
Saint Lucia 79 86 101 115 133 152
Suriname 215 290 372 352 422 500
Trinidad and Tobago 636 843 971 1082 1236 1365
Other territories 279 320 370 418 457 499
Anguila 5 6 6 7 7 8
Antigua and Barbuda 46 55 66 61 65 70
Aruba 57 59 61 60 61 63
Malvinas (Falkland) Islands 2 2 2 2 2 2
Cayman Islands 6 9 10 17 27 40
U.S. Virgin Islands 27 33 64 98 107 109
British Virgin Islands 6 7 10 12 16 21
Montserrat 14 12 11 12 11 11
Saint Kitts and Nevis 44 51 47 44 42 41
St.Vincent and the Grenadines 67 80 87 98 107 117
Turks and Caicos 5 6 6 7 12 17
Source: CELADE, United Nations (1992).
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH. 1950-2000
(Rates per hundred)
Region and cowtry 1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000
Regional total 2,71 2.68 2.37 2.06 1.70
Latin America 2.76 2.72 2.41 2.09 1.72
Argentina 1.84 1.50 1.64 1.35 1.14
Bolivia 2.15 2.32 2.55 2.51 2.31
Brazil 3.06 2.78 2.35 2.06 1.48
Colombia 2.88 2.93 2.17 1.97 1.58
Costa Rica 3.60 3.37 2.77 2.84 2.25
Cuba 1.77 1.99 1.28 0.92 0.81
Chile 2.25 2.22 1.59 1.67 1.48
Ecuador 2.88 3.16 2.94 2.61 2.16
El Salvador 2.81 3.34 2.32 1.34 2.17
Guatemala 2.89 2.80 2.77 2.85 2.84
Haiti 1.54 1,72 1.69 1.92 2.05
Honduras 3.23 3.06 3.32 3.39 2.87
Mexico 2.91 3.20 2.87 2.31 1.94
Nicaragua 3.03 3,17 3.06 2.71 3.41
Panama 2.75 2.97 2.74 2.12 1.79
Paraguay 2.72 2.82 2.92 3,07 2.58
Peru 2.63 2.84 2.71 2.20 1.98
Dominican Republic 3.17 3.14 2.53 2.30 1.84
Uruguay 1.25 1.01 0.37 0.60 0.57
Venezuela 4.04 3.46 3.48 2.52 2.01
The Caribbean and others 1.60 1.57 1.16 1.12 1.00
Netherlands Antilles 1.66 1.68 0.54 0.23 0.17
Bahamas 3.31 4.35 2.11 1.94 1.46
Barbados 0.91 0.34 0.41 0.32 0.42
Belize 3.06 2.77 1.96 2.58 1.92
Dominica 1.63 1.54 0.69 -0.41 -0,14
Grenada 1.69 0.43 -0.55 0.22 0.32
Guadeloupe 2.70 1,52 0.22 1.76 1.14
French Guyana 2.78 3.95 3.42 3.51 2.83
Guyana 2.97 2.20 0.68 0.48 1.04
Jamaica 1.49 1.37 1.32 1.26 1.01
Martinique 2.39 1.45 0.00 0.99 0.83
Puerto Rico 0.61 1.42 1.65 0.96 0.88
Santa Lucia 0.85 1.61 1.30 1.45 1.34
Suriname 2.99 2.49 -0.55 1.81 1,70
Trinidad and Tobago 2.82 1,41 1.08 1.33 0.99
Other territories 1.37 1.45 1.22 0.89 0.88
Anguila 1.82 0.00 1.54 0.00 1,34
Antigua and Barbuda 1.79 1.82 -0.79 0.64 0.74
Aruba 0.34 0.33 -0.17 0.17 0.32
Malvinas (Falkland) Islands 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cayman Islands 4.05 1.05 5.31 4.63 3.93
U.S. Virgin Islands 2.01 6.62 4.26 0.88 0.19
British Virgin Islands 1.54 3.57 1.82 2.88 2.72
Montserrat -1.54 -0.87 0.87 -0.87 0.00
Saint Kitts and Nevis 1.48 -0.82 -0.66 -0.47 -0.24
St.Vincent and the Grenad. 1.77 0.84 1.19 0.88 0.89
Turks and Caicos 1.82 0.00 1.54 5.39 3.48
Source: CELAOE, United Nations (1992).
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: OVERALL BIRTH RATES BY FIVE YEAR PERIODS,























Latin America 5.9 5.9 6.0 5.6 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.1 2.8
The Caribbean
and others 5.2 5.1 5.5 5.0 4.4 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.8
Group I
Bolivia 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.2 5.5 5.0 4.6 4.1
H aiti 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.0 5.8 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.8 4.6
Group I I
El Salvador 6.5 6.8 6.9 6.6 6.1 5.7 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.6
Guatemala 7.1 6.9 6.9 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.1 5.8 5.4 4.9
Honduras 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.4 7.4 6.6 6.2 5.6 4.9 4.3
Nicaragua 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.0 4.5
Paraguay 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.4 5.7 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.3 4.1
Group I I I
Brazil 6.2 6.2 6.2 5.3 4.7 4.2 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.4
Colombia 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.3 4.7 4.1 3.5 2.9 2.7 2.5
Costa Rica 6.7 7.1 7.0 5.8 4.3 3.9 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.0
Ecuador 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.7 6.1 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2
Guyana 6.7 6.8 6.2 6.1 4.9 3.9 3.3 2.8 2.6 2.3
Mexico 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.7 6.4 5.0 4.3 3.6 3.2 2.8
Panama 5.7 5.9 5.9 5.6 4.9 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.9 2.7
Peru 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.6 6.0 5.4 4.7 4.0 3.6 3.2
Dominican Rep. 7.4 7.4 7.3 6.7 5.6 4.7 4.2 3.8 3.3 3.0
Suriname 6.6 6.6 6.6 5.9 5.3 4.2 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
Trin. & Tob. 5.3 5.3 5.0 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.5
Venezuela 6.5 6.5 6.5 5.9 5.0 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.9
Group IV
Argentina 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.7
Bahcunas 4.2 3.7 3.9 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.9
Barbados 4.7 4.7 4.3 3.5 2.7 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.9
Cuba 4.1 3.7 4.7 4.3 3.5 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.0
Chile 5.1 5.3 5.3 4.4 3.6 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6
Guadeloupe 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.2 4.5 3.1 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.0
Jeunaica 4.2 5.1 5.6 5.8 5.0 4.0 3.6 2.7 2.4 2.1
Martinique 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.0 4.1 2.7 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9
Puerto Rico 5.0 4.8 4.4 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.1
Uruguay 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.3
Source: CELADE, United Nations (1992).
a /:  Includes Anguila, Antigua, Aruba, United S ta tes and B ritish  Virgin Islands, Cayman
Islands, Dominica, Grenada, M ontserrat, Netherlands A n tille s , Saint K itts  and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Turks and Caicos.
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LATIN AMERICA: BIRTH RATES BY AGE, WITH COUNTRIES GROUPED 





15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 TGF
Group I 
B olivia 1950-55 100 275 307 281 222 120 46 6.8
1985-90 86 237 247 197 138 73 23 5.0
H aiti 1950-55 77 207 284 273 217 132 71 6.3
1985-90 55 196 240 214 162 96 36 5.0
Group I I
El Salvadorl950-55 142 314 332 263 162 64 15 6.5
1985-90 139 247 210 155 102 48 4 4.5
Guatemala 1950-55 174 313 321 280 209 93 27 7.1
1985-90 133 276 277 229 157 70 13 5.8
Honduras 1950-55 151 305 320 286 212 116 21 7.1
1985-90 118 279 261 204 164 77 7 5.6
Nicaragua 1950-55 170 353 356 273 211 95 29 7.4
1985-90 169 270 260 201 140 56 14 5.6
Paraguay 1950-55 95 283 324 293 222 119 24 6.8
1985-90 79 196 216 191 144 74 16 4.6
Group I I I  
B razil 1950-55 83 264 302 251 189 98 44 6.2
1985-90 48 170 181 131 78 30 3 3.2
Colombia 1950-55 128 287 323 280 214 92 28 6.8
1985-90 74 159 146 104 63 27 7 2.9
Costa Rica 1950-55 119 334 331 261 203 83 15 6.7
1985-90 98 182 165 123 75 26 3 3.4
Ecuador 1950-55 140 294 320 278 213 105 32 6.9
1985-90 83 222 206 153 101 44 11 4.1
Mexico 1950-55 115 300 322 287 200 100 26 6.8
1985-90 93 209 177 126 82 28 5 3.6
Panama 1950-55 145 283 278 208 136 63 23 5.7
1985-90 91 185 159 105 62 22 5 3.1
Peru 1950-55 130 283 317 278 205 113 45 6.9
1985-90 72 188 203 161 121 45 10 4.0
Dorn.Rep. 1950-55 166 335 340 300 211 107 22 7.4
1985-90 79 216 195 140 85 28 8 3.8
Venezuela 1950-55 155 330 308 239 167 70 24 6.5
1985-90 79 191 177 125 78 34 8 3.5
Group IV 
Argentina 1950-55 62 160 172 128 76 26 7 3.2
1985-90 71 158 162 115 63 20 4 3.0
Cuba 1950-55 67 234 231 158 90 33 7 4.1
1985-90 85 123 93 48 24 8 1 1.8
Chile 1950-55 84 224 255 212 148 77 20 5.1
1985-90 67 158 147 99 54 18 2 2.7
Uruguay 1950-55 60 150 148 104 60 20 4 2.7
1985-90 61 135 133 91 49 15 1 2.4
Source: CELADE, United Nations (1991).
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH,
WITH COUNTRIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO THE STAGES OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION. 1950-2000











LATIN AMERICA 51.8 61.3 66.7 2.4 1.8 69.8
CARIBEAN AND
OTHERSa/ 52.0 63.1 67.6 2.8 1.5 70.3
GROUP I
BOLIVIA 40.4 46.7 58.8 1.6 4.0 64.5
HAITI 37.6 48.5 54.7 2.7 2.1 59.4
GROUP II
EL SALVADOR 45.3 58.8 62.4 3.4 1.2 69.1
GUATEMALA 42.1 54.0 62.0 3.0 2.7 68.1
HONDURAS 42.3 54.0 64.0 2.9 3.3 68.2
NICARAGUA 42.3 55.2 62.4 3.2 2.4 69.2
PARAGUAY 62.6 65.6 66.9 0.7 0.4 67.9
GROUP I I I
BRAZIL 51.0 59.8 64.9 2.2 1.7 68.0
COLOMBIA 50.6 61.6 68.2 2.8 2.2 70.7
COSTA RICA 57.3 68.1 75.3 2.7 2.4 77.1
ECUADOR 48.4 58.9 65.4 2.6 2.2 68.2
GUYANA 52.3 60.0 63.2 1.9 1.1 67.7
MEXICO 50.8 62.9 68.8 3.0 2.0 72.0
PANAMA 55.3 66.3 72.1 2.8 1.9 73.5
PERU 43.9 55.5 61.4 2.9 2.0 67.9
DOMINICAN REP. 46.0 59.9 65.9 3.5 2.0 69.7
SURINAME 56.0 64.0 68.8 2.0 1.6 72.1
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 58.2 65.7 70.1 1.9 1.5 73.1
VENEZUELA 55.2 66.2 69.7 2.8 1.1 71.3
GROUP IV
ARGENTINA 62.7 67.3 70.6 1.1 1.1 72.3
BAHAMAS 59.8 66.6 71.1 1.7 1.5 73.9
BARBADOS 57.2 69.4 74.6 3.1 1.7 76.8
CUBA 59.5 71.0 75.2 2.9 1.4 76.3
CHILE 53.8 63.6 71.5 2.5 2.6 72.7
GUADELOUPE 56.5 67.8 73.6 2.8 1.9 75.9
JAMAICA 57.2 68.6 72.5 2.9 1.3 75.1
MARTINIQUE 56.5 69.2 75.4 3.2 2.1 77.3
PUERTO RICO 64.8 72.5 74.3 1.9 0.6 75.9
URUGUAY 66.3 68.8 72.0 0.6 1.1 73.0
Source: CELADE, United Nations (1992).
a /:  Includes Anguila, Antigua, Aruba, Baheunas, United S ta tes and B ritish  Virgin Islands,
Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, M ontserrat, Netherlands A n tille s , Saint K itts  and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Turks and Caicos.
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INFANT MORTALITY RATES 1950-55, 1970-75, 1985-90 AND 
PROJECTIONS FOR 2000, ANNUAL BIRTHS: 1985-90, COUNTRIES GROUPED 
ACCORDING TO THE STAGES OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
fRates per thousand>
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M ortality  ra te Five year period Rate Annual b ir th s
decrease for 1985-90
Region and year
countries 1950- 1970- 1985-■ 1950- 1970- 2000 Thousands %
1955 1975 1990 1970 1985
LATIN AMERICA 127 81 54 11.5 9.0 40 11514
CARIBBEAN AND 
OTHER a/ 124 73 52 12.8 7.0 41 203
Total 11717 100.0
GROUP I 
BOLIVIA 176 151 98 6.3 17.7 67 248
HAITI 220 135 97 21.3 12.7 72 224
Total 472 4.0
GROUP II  
EL SALVADOR 151 99 59 13.0 13.3 36 172
GUATEMALA 141 95 59 11.5 12.0 37 350
HONDURAS 185 94 63 22.8 10.3 45 189
NICARAGUA 167 100 71 16.8 9.7 42 150
PARAGUAY 73 55 49 4.5 2.0 44 139
Total 1000 8.5
GROUP I I I  
BRAZIL 135 91 63 11.0 9.3 48 3801
COLOMBIA 123 73 40 12.5 11.0 33 802
COSTA RICA 94 53 16 10.3 12.3 12 82
ECUADOR 140 95 63 11.3 10.7 49 321
GUYANA 119 79 56 10.0 7.7 39 21
MEXICO 114 68 41 11.5 9.0 28 2400
PANAMA 93 43 23 12.5 6.7 19 62
PERU 159 110 88 12.3 7.3 63 636
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 149 94 65 13.8 9.7 46 213
SURINAME 89 49 33 10.0 5.3 22 11
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 79 42 24 9.3 6.0 15 32
VENEZUELA 106 49 36 14.3 4.3 30 519
Total 8900 76.0
GROUP IV 
ARGENTINA 66 49 32 4.3 5.7 25 669
1
BAHAMAS 80 32 26 12.0 2.0 17 • • •
BARBADOS 132 33 12 25.8 7.0 9 4
CUBA 81 39 15 10.5 8.0 13 182 4
CHILE 126 70 18 14.0 17.3 15 301
GUADELOUPE 68 42 14 6.5 9.3 11 7
JAMAICA 85 42 17 10.8 8.3 11 57
MARTINIQUE 65 35 11 7.5 8.0 9 6
PUERTO RICO 63 25 14 9.5 3.7 12 65
URUGUAY 57 46 24 2.8 7.3 16 54
Total 1345 11.5
Source: CELADE, United Nations (1992).
a /:  Includes Anguila, Antigua, Aruba, Bahamas, United S ta tes and B ritish  Virgin Islands,
Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, M ontserrat, Netherlands A n tille s , Saint K itts  and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Turks and Caicos.
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RELATIVE POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN COUNTRIES GROUPED 




<15 15-64 65 + <15 15-64 65 + <15 15-64 65 +
Latin America 40.4 56.1 3.5 35.8 59.5 4.7 31.7 62.9 5.4
The Caribbean and others 39.5 55.9 4.6 31.2 62.3 6.5 30.2 63.0 6.8
Group I
Bolivia 42.0 54.9 3.1 41.4 55.0 3.6 38.1 57.7 4.2
Haiti 36.8 58.0 5.2 40.2 55.7 4.1 39.9 56.3 3.8
Group II
El Salvador 42.8 54.2 3.1 43.5 52.7 3.8 38.9 56.7 4.4
Guatemala 44.1 53.4 2.6 45.4 51.4 3.2 42.9 53.3 3.7
Honduras 44.7 53.4 1.9 44.6 52.2 3.3 41.2 55.4 3.5
Nicaragua 44.0 53.0 3.0 47.9 49.1 3.0 43.6 53.2 3.2
Paraguay 42.9 53.9 3.2 40.4 56.1 3.6 38.3 58.2 3.6
Groif) III
Brazil 42.0 55.5 2.5 34.7 60.7 4.7 29.1 65.3 5.6
Colombia 42.7 53.7 3.7 35.3 60.5 4.2 30.4 64.9 4.7
Costa Rica 43.3 52.9 3.7 36.5 59.3 4.2 33.1 61.8 5.1
Ecuador 41.9 53.5 4.6 39.3 56.9 3.8 34.8 61.0 4.2
Guyana 48.4 48.3 3.3 33.4 62.8 3.8 29.3 66.4 4.3
Mexico 43.0 52.8 4.2 38.0 58.3 3.7 33.8 61.7 4.5
Panama 41.0 55.1 3.9 35.0 60.3 4.8 31.5 63.1 5.4
Peru 41.6 55.0 3.5 37.6 58.6 3.8 33.6 61.8 4.6
Dominican Republic 44.5 52.3 3.2 37.9 58.7 3.4 33.9 61.9 4.3
Suriname 47.5 48.4 4.1 34.0 61.8 4.2 30.9 64.0 5.1
Trinidad and Tobago 43.0 53.0 4.0 34.0 60.5 5.5 30.5 64.0 5.5
Venezuela 43.6 54.6 1.8 37.2 59.1 3.7 32.4 63.1 4.5
Group IV
Argentina 30.5 65.3 4.2 29.9 61.0 9.1 27.2 62.9 9.8
Barbados 38.1 55.2 6.7 24.5 63.7 11.8 22.2 66.7 11.1
Cuba 35.8 59.3 4.9 22.7 68.8 8.5 23.4 67.3 9.4
Chile 36.7 59.0 4.3 30.6 63.4 6.0 29.4 63.9 6.7
Guadeloupe 43.1 51.8 5.1 27.0 64.1 8.9 27.4 62.8 9.8
Jamaica 41.7 54.0 4.3 33.2 60.2 6.6 28.6 65.0 6.4
Martinique 42.4 53.1 4.5 24.1 65.9 10.0 25.3 63.4 11.3
Puerto Rico 42.8 52.0 5.2 26.0 63.5 10.5 24.6 64.3 11.1
Uruguay 27.9 63.9 8.2 25.8 62.6 11.6 23.9 63.5 12.7
Source: CELADE, United Nations (1991).
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATES OF ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH IN COUNTRIES GROUPED 




1960-19TO 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000
<15 15-64 65 + <15 15-64 65 + <15 15-64 65 + <15 15-64 65 *
Latin America 2.7 2.7 3.5 1.7 2.9 3.3 1.1 2.6 3.0 0.5 2.3 3.1
The Caribbean and others 1.3 1.5 3.3 -0.7 2.2 3.3 -0.6 1.8 2.4 0.1 1.4 1.4
Group I
Bolivia 2.4 2.3 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.1 2.8 3.4 1.5 2.8 3.7
Haiti 2.1 1.5 1.0 1.6 1.8 1.1 1.8 2.1 1.1 2.0 2.2 1.4
Group II
El Salvador 3.6 3.1 4.1 2.2 2.4 3.4 0.8 1.7 3.4 1.1 2.9 3.6
Guatemala 2.8 2.8 3.5 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.9 2.3 3.2 4.4
Honduras 3.5 2.6 4.2 3.4 3.2 4.8 2.8 3.9 4.3 2.1 3.5 3.4
Nicaragua 3.3 3.1 2.2 2.9 3.2 3.1 2.8 2.6 4.4 2.5 4.2 4.1
Paraguay 2.6 3.1 3.1 1.9 3.7 3.1 2.7 3.4 3.4 2.0 3.0 2.6
Group III
Brazi1 2.5 2.9 4.5 1.2 3.1 4.0 1.2 2.5 3.6 -0.3 2.2 3.3
Colombia 2.8 3.0 3.1 0.8 3.2 3.4 0.7 2.7 3.2 0.1 2.3 2.8
Costa Rica 3.1 3.6 3.3 1.1 4.0 3.9 2.2 3.1 4.5 1.3 2.7 4.1
Ecuador 3.3 3.1 2.5 2.5 3.4 2.7 1.6 3.3 3.1 0.9 2.9 3.2
Guyana 2.0 2.3 2.8 -0.8 1.9 1.8 -1.5 1.8 0.2 -0.2 1.7 2.4
Mexico 3.4 3.1 2.3 2.4 3.4 2.4 0.8 3.4 2.8 0.8 2.5 3.9
Panama 3.1 2.8 3.0 1.9 3.4 2.9 0.7 3.0 3.6 0.7 2.3 3.1
Peru 3.0 2.7 2.9 2.2 3.1 3.1 1.2 2.9 2.8 0.9 2.5 3.8
Dominican Republic 3.3 3.0 3.0 1.4 3.5 3.0 1.2 3.0 3.0 0.7 2.4 4.2
Suriname 2.7 2.4 2.0 -2.5 1.0 0.9 0.2 2.9 1.1 0.7 2.0 3.6
Trinidad and Tobago 1.2 1.5 2.4 -1.0 2.2 3.5 1.6 1.8 1.5 0.4 2.0 1.5
Venezuela 3.4 3.5 5.2 2.4 4.3 4.5 1.5 3.1 4.1 0.6 2.7 3.9
Group IV
Argentina 1.0 1.5 3.8 1.9 1.3 3.3 1.3 1.2 2.4 0.2 1.5 1.9
Barbados 0.0 0.2 2.5 -1.8 1.3 2.8 -1.7 0.9 1.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.2
Cuba 2.8 1.3 4.0 -0.3 1.9 3.4 -2.4 2.2 2.0 1.1 0.6 1.9
Chile 2.1 2.2 2.9 0.0 2.5 2.6 0.8 2.1 2.4 1.1 1.6 2.6
Guadeloupe 1.4 1.6 0.9 -2.8 1.8 4.5 -1.1 1.0 2.3 0.8 0.4 1.6
Jamaica 2.5 0.1 4.0 -0.2 2.4 3.1 -0.5 2.7 1.3 -0.4 1.8 0.8
Martinique 1.2 1.5 2.9 -3.7 1.7 4.8 -1.2 0.9 2.2 1.1 0.2 1.8
Puerto Rico 0.0 2.3 3.7 0.1 2.3 3.6 -1.1 1.3 3.7 0.4 1.1 1.5
Uruguay 1.0 0.9 1.9 0.0 0.3 2.1 0.2 0.6 1.6 -0.2 0.7 1.5
oo
Source: CELAOE, United Nations (1991).
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THE AMERICAS: POPULATION RECORDED BY CENSUS IN COUNTRIES 






Born in  Latin American and 
Caribbean countries
Born in  neighbouring 
countries






ARGENTINA 1970 23390 2193 9.4 « • • • • • 580
1980 27947 1858 6.7 747 40.2 734 98.3
BOLIVIA 1976 4613 58 1.3 43 74.1 37 86.1
BRAZIL 1970 93139 1229 1.3 72 5.9 67 93.1
1980 118675 1111 0.9 109 9.8 86 78.9 5
H-•
COLOMBIA 1964 19735 74 0.4 38 51.4 31 81.6
COSTA RICA 1973 1872 46 2.5 37 80.4 27 73.0
1984 2415 89 3.7 74 83.1 51 68.9
CUBA 1970 8569 130 1.5 32 24.6 29 90.6
CHILE 1970 8884 89 1.0 30 33.7 25 83.3
1982 11330 84 0.7 38 45.2 30 79.0
ECUADOR 1950 3203 24 0.8 17 70.8 17 100.0
1982 8073 75 0.9 54 72.0 41 75.9
EL SALVADOR 1971 3554 22 0.6 20 90.9 17 82.1
GUATEMALA 1973 5160 38 0.7 28 73.7 23 85.2






Born in  Latin American and 
Caribbean countries
Born in  neighbouring 
countries






HAITI 1971 4330 6 0.1 3 50.0 3 100.0
HONDURAS 1961 1885 51 2.7 47 92.2 46 97.9
MEXICO 1970 48226 191 0.4 25 13.1 7 28.0
1980 67396 269 0.4 36 13.4 4 11.1
NICARAGUA 1971 1878 21 1.1 16 76.2 12 75.0
PANAMA 1970 1428 57 4.0 29 50.9 16 55.2
1980 1825 48 2.6 32 66.7 16 50.0 o
PARAGUAY 1972 2358 80 3.4 64 80.0 61
hO
95.3
1982 3029 169 5.6 150 88.8 144 96.0
PERU 1972 13539 67 0.5 23 34.3 19 82.6
1981 17005 67 0.4 24 35.8 16 66.7
DOM. REP. 1970 4010 32 0.8 22 68.8 20 90.9
URUGUAY 1975 2788 132 4.7 37 28.0 33 89.2





















VENEZUELA 1971 10722 583 5.4 221 37.9 181 81.9
1981 14517 1075 7.4 651 60.6 514 79.0
BARBADOS 1980 249 19 7.6 2 10.5 2 100.0
GUYANA 1980 73 6 8.2 1 16.4 1 100.0
JAMAICA 1960 1610 22 1.4 7 31.8 5 71.4
TRINIDAD
AND TOBAGO 1970 945 61 6.5 10 16.7 8 80.0
CANADA 1971 21568 • • • • ♦ • • • • • • • • • • • • •
1981 24343 3843 15.8 265 6.9 • • • • • •
UNITED
STATES 1970 203235 9619 4.7 1725 17.9 760 44.1
1980 226546 14080 6.2 4232 30.1 2199 52.0
oOJ
Source: CELAOE (1989) and (1992). 
a / With respec t to  to ta l  population, 
b / With respec t to  population born abroad.
£ / With respec t to  population born in  Latin American and Caribbean coun tries.
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UNITED STATES: LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN PROFESSIONALS, 
TECHNICIANS AND TOTAL IMMIGRANTS IN 1970 AND 1980 CENSUSES











Argentina 4882 7766 59.1 44803 68887 53.8
B razil 2138 3474 62.5 27069 40919 51.2
Chile 1984 4045 103.9 15393 35127 128.2
Colombia 5240 8724 66.5 63538 143508 125.9
Uruguay 488 919 88.3 5092 13278 160.8
Venezuela 631 1773 181.0 11348 33281 193.3
Bolivia 999 1809 81.1 6872 14468 110.5
Ecuador 1901 3436 80.8 36663 86128 134.9
Peru 2396 4853 102.6 21663 55496 156.2
Paraguay 276 444 60.9 1792 2858 59.5
Total 20935 37243 77.9 234233 493950 110.9
MEXICO 12689 34937 175.3 759711 2199221 189.5
Costa Rica 1110 1773 59.7 16691 29639 77.6
El Salvador 686 2202 221.0 15717 94447 500.9
Guatemala 1008 2058 104.2 17356 63073 263.4
H aiti 2654 5832 119.7 28026 92395 229.7
Honduras 1816 1487 -18.1 27978 39154 40.0
Nicaragua 813 1696 108.6 16125 44166 173.9
Panouna 1859 5335 187.0 20046 60740 203.0
Dominican Rep. 1520 3373 121.9 61228 169147 176.3
Cuba 26705 42066 57.5 439048 607814 38.4
J 2unaica
Trinidad
7283 15899 118.3 68576 196811 187.0
and Tobago 2004 5372 168.1 20673 65907 218.8
Total 47458 87093 83.5 731464 1463293 100.1
TOTAL 81082 159273 96.4 1725408 4156464 140.9
Source: CELADE (1989); Martinez (1989) and Pellegrino (1991) •
A-11
PROFESSIONALS AND TECHNICIANS BORN IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AS RECORDED BY CENSUS IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THAT OF BIRTH
|Cen*u«w around 1980)








COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE AND CENSUS YEAR 
BOUVIA CHILE ECUADOR GUATEMALA 








ARGENTINA 1776 2907 142 454 797 328 44 82 1007 1250 8786
PARAGUAY 4698 76 788 8 26 20 22 6 8 __ 226 5878
CHILE 3629 2894 2217 267 501 — 912 56 152 143 101 10672
BOLIVIA 2602 446 1831 29 — 349 67 4 17 36 18 5398
URUGUAY 4372 740 1596 36 19 133 80 10 14 202 — 7202
BRAZIL 613 261 19 163 151 120 16 23 374 423 2163
ECUADOR 93 944 129 39 22 112 — 17 102 7 1465
PERU 1763 2387 749 113 278 305 181 26 95 24 5889
VENEZUELA 56 — 93 60 12 24 83 9 21 10 368
DOMINICAN REP. 629 11 17 4 5 17 8 16 707
COLOMBIA 280 12994 293 217 106 153 2027 60 428 14 16572
HONDURAS 50 31 120 1 14 14 183 34 447
CUBA 1416 44 162 3 31 46 39 119 I860
GUATEMALA 43 83 184 3 10 18 — 42 383
MEXICO 83 390 112 161 26 65 83 200 100 9 10 1238
NICARAGUA 208 117 1069 4 13 13 194 151 1709
EL SALVADOR 90 40 404 2 14 32 558 112 1252
PANAMA 244 92 260 7 17 41 37 — 698
COSTA RICA 211 12 — 4 11 29 106 177 550
HAITI 112 12 7 1 3 6 4 4 149
TOTAL L. AMERICANS 18179 28777 11145 3307 1632 2224 4113 1573 1693 1771 2083 73046
TOTAL FOREIGNERS 60721 49101 63154 4723 4692 6938 8188 3121 3021 3169 5161 201969
OLn
Souraa: C E L A D E  (1 9 8 9 ) and Martfnoz (1 9 8 9 ) .












Latin America 19984.4 158810 209211 274538 349198 430182 7.95 10.47 13.74 17,47 21.53
Argentina 2766.9 17150 20616 23962 28237 32322 6.20 7.45 8.66 10,21 11.68
Bolivia 1098.6 2766 3428 4325 5581 7171 2.52 3.12 3.94 5.08 6.53
Brazil 8512 53444 72594 95847 121286 149042 6.28 8.53 11.26 14.25 17.51
Colombia 1139 11946 15939 21360 26525 32300 10.49 13.99 18.75 23.29 28.36
Costa Rica 51.1 862 1236 1731 2284 3034 16.87 24.19 33.87 44.70 59.37
Cuba 110.9 5850 6985 8520 9679 10608 52.75 62.98 76.83 87.28 95.65
Chile 757 6082 7614 9504 11145 13173 8.03 10.06 12.55 14.72 17.40
Ecuador 283.6 3310 4413 6051 8123 10547 11.67 15.56 21.34 28.64 37.19
El Salvador 21 1940 2570 3588 4525 5172 92.38 122.38 170.86 215.48 246.29
Guatemala 108.9 2969 3964 5246 6917 9197 27.26 36.40 48.17 63.52 84.45
Haiti 27.8 3261 3804 4520 5353 6486 117.30 136.83 162.59 192.55 233.31
Honduras 112.1 1401 1935 2627 3662 5138 12.50 17.26 23.43 32.67 45.83
Mexico 1958.2 27297 36530 50328 67046 84486 13.94 18.65 25.70 34.24 43.14
Nicaragua 130 1109 1502 2063 2802 3676 8.53 11.55 15.87 21.55 28.28
Panama 77.1 839 1105 1487 1956 2418 10.88 14.33 19.29 25.37 31.36
Paraguay 406.8 1351 1774 2351 3147 4277 3.32 4.36 5.78 7.74 10.51
Peru 1285.2 7632 9931 13193 17295 21550 5.94 7.73 10.27 13.46 16.77
Dominican Republic 48.7 2353 3231 4423 5697 7170 48.32 66.34 90.82 116.98 147.23
Uruguay 177,4 2239 2538 2808 2914 3094 12.62 14.31 15.83 16.43 17.44
Venezuela 912.1 5009 7502 10604 15024 19321 5.49 8.22 11.63 16.47 21.18
o(T̂
Source: CELADE, based on national figures.
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Degree of urbanization (per hundred) b/ Rate of urbanization (per thousand) £/












Argentina 57.2 60.5 65.3 72.0 78.5 83.0 85.9 5.6 7.7 9.7 8.6 5.6 3.4
Bolivia 24.5 27.0 30.0 33.5 38.2 44.7 52.4 9.8 10.5 11.0 13.2 15.7 16.0
Brazil 24.0 26.4 36.0 44.9 55.9 67.3 73.9 9.5 30.9 22.3 21.7 18.6 9.4
Colombia 24.5 30.6 38.1 48.5 57.4 64.2 69.5 22.2 21.9 24.1 16.9 11.2 7.8
Costa Rica 20.0 26.0 33.5 34.2 38.7 43.1 46.7 26.1 25.4 2.0 12.2 10.9 8.0
Cuba 51.0 53.7 56.3 58.5 60.2 68.0 74.8 5.2 4.7 3.8 2.8 12.3 9.5
Chile 49.5 52.4 59.9 68.1 75.1 81.2 84.6 5.7 13.4 12.9 9.7 7.8 4.2
Ecuador 22.0 25.0 28.5 34.4 39.6 47.1 56.3 12.9 13.0 19.0 13.8 17.5 17.9
El Salvador 28.0 31.5 35.7 37.0 39.4 43.0 46.8 11.7 12.6 3.5 6.3 8.8 8.5
Guatemala 20.0 22.0 24.5 32.5 34.4 37.2 38.1 9.5 10.8 28.3 5.6 7.9 2.3
Haiti 10.0 11.3 13.0 16.0 19.7 24.5 30.6 12.2 14.1 20.9 20.9 21.6 22.4
Honduras 12.0 14.5 17.6 22.0 28.0 34.8 40.7 18.5 19.3 22.4 24.4 21.8 15.6
Mexico 33.5 35.1 42.7 50.8 59.0 66.4 72.7 4.7 19.5 17.4 15.1 11.8 9.1
Nicaragua 25.5 30.0 35.0 39.6 47.0 51.1 55.3 16.4 15.3 12.4 17.1 8.5 7.9
Panama 30.0 33.5 35.9 41.4 47.2 49.6 52.9 11.3 6.7 14.2 13.2 4.9 6.4
Paraguay 30.0 31.8 34.6 35.6 37.0 41.5 47.4 5.7 8.5 3.0 3.8 11.5 13.3
Peru 26.5 30.5 35.5 46.3 58.1 64.2 70.0 14.0 15.3 26.5 22.6 10.1 8.5
Dominican Rqp. 17.5 20.0 23.8 30.2 39.3 50.1 58.6 13.1 17.5 24.1 26.1 24.3 15.8
Uruguay 63.0 67.0 72.5 78.0 82.0 85.1 88.8 6.1 7.9 7.3 5.0 3.7 4.2
Venezuela 27.0 33.5 47.0 62.0 75.0 83.0 87.5 21.5 33.9 27.7 19.0 10.1 5.3
Latin America 32.0 34.7 41.6 49.4 57.7 65.6 71.2 8.3 18.1 17.1 15.5 12.9 8.1
Source: Villa (1992).
a/ "Urban" population defined according to the criteria used by national statistical organisms. Estimates prior to 1950
are approximate and 1990 figures (with the excq>tion of Venezuela) were projected by CELADE.
b/ Determined by the percentage of the total population living in localities defined as "urban" by national statistical
organisms.
c/ Average annual rate of growth of the degree of urbanization (urban percentage); its value is equal to the difference
between rates of growth (calculated exponentially) of the urban population and total population.
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LATIN AMERICA: ESTIMATE OF THE GROWTH COMPONENTS OF 
URBAN POPULATION AND URBANIZATlONa/ (Inter-caisus periods)^/
A-14
Peim itage o f  urban population growth 
attributable to (by period):
Natural increase N R U T c/
NRUT % contribution 
to urbanization 
(by periods) d/
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Argentina 35.5 45.0 64.5 55.0 1.500 1.833
Brazil 50.4 55.1 50.8 49.6 44.9 49.2 1.101 1.124 1.113
Colombia 63.4 - 69.4 36.6 - 30.6 0.958 - 1.220
Costa Rica - - 64.1 - - 35.9 - - 1.052
Cuba - - 39.2 - - 60.8 - . 1.172
Chile 63.4 62.6 70.5 36.6 37.4 29.5 1.015 0.963 1.072
Ecuador 62.4 70.4 50.1 37.6 29.6 49.9 0.918 1.119 1.112
El Salvador 76.9 77.9 - 23.1 22.1 - 1.470 ♦ -
Guatemala - 66.1 - - 33.9 - - 1.652 -
Honduras - - 55.9 - - 44.1 - - 1.282
Mexico - 68.3 69.5 - 31.7 30.5 - 1.023 1.116
Nicaragua 69.7 - - 30.3 - - 1.022 - -
Panama 68.8 59.8 70.3 31.2 40.2 29.7 1.698 1.237
Paraguay - 65.1 49.3 - 34.9 50.7 - * 1.460
Peru - 58.4 66.2 - 41.6 33.8 - 0.986 1.251
Dominican R ^ . 56.5 51.8 - 43.5 48.2 - 1.081 0.966
Uruguay - 92.7 55.2 - 7.3 44.8 - * 0.966
Vraezuela 63.3 72.7 72.1 36.7 27.8 27.9 1.021 1.006 1.140
Estimate (10) (13) (13) (10) (13) (13) (10) (10) (12)
averages e/ 61.0 65.0 60.2 39.0 35.0 39.8 1.178 1.191 1.163
Source: Villa (1992)
a/ Indirect estimate o f  net rural-inban transfer throtmh census survival ratios; the contribution o f  natural 
increases is obtained residually. The symbol - s ig n ify  that complete, appropriate census information is not 
available.
b / The inter-census periods were identified, by country, as follows:
- (l)1950s: Argentina (1947-60); Brazil (1950-60); Colombia (1951-64); Chile (1952-60); Ecuador 
(1950-62); El Salvador (1950-61); Nicaragua (1950-63); Panama (1950-60); Dominican Rep. (1950-60); 
Venezuela (1950-61).
- (2) 1960s: Argentina (1960-70); Brazil (1960-70); Chile (1960-70); Ecuador (1962-74); El Salvador 
(1961-71); Guatemala (1964-73); Mexico (1960-70); Panama (1960-70); Paraguay (1962-72); Peru 
(1960-72); Dominican Rep. (1960-70); Uruguay (1963-75); Venezuela (1961-71).
- (3) 1970s: Brazil (1970-80); Colombia (1973-85); Costa Rica (1973-84); Cuba (1970-81); Chile 
(1970-82); Ecuador (1974-82); Honduras (1974-88^, Mexico (1970-80); Panama (1970-80); Paraguay 
(1972-82); Peru (1972-81); Uruguay (1975-85); Venezuela (1971-81).
c / D ie  net ruial-urban transfer (NRUT) includes the effects o f  net migration betw e^  rural and urban localities 
and their re-classification.
d/ Corresponds to the quotient between the average annual rate o f  net rural-urban transfer and the rate o f
~  urbanization. The symbol indicates that the rate o f  urbanization is less than 5 per thousand, which yields
an unstable basis for calculating the proportional NRUT contribution to urbanization, 
e/ Sinqile average for each period.
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POPULATION GROUPS AND PRINCIPAL SOCIAL SECTOR REQUIREMENTS TO BE NET 
IN THE FACE OF POPULATION GROWTH BY STAGE 
IN DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION (thousands)
(SELECTED COUNTRIES)
HAITI
POPULATION GROUPS 1990 1995 2000
TOTAL PEA (15 years and older) 2988 3294 3648
YOUTH PEA (15-34 years) 1657 1820 1988
WOMENS PEA 1485 1623 1781
PASSIVE SECTORS/ 177 198 225
REQUIREMENTS
DOCTORS^ 1 1.1 1.2
DOCTORS IN IMPROVED SITUATIONc/ 1 1.3 1.6
HOSPITAL BEDS^ 5.5 6.0 6.6
BIRTHS ATTENDED BY QUALIFIED PERSONNELS/ 85 90 94
DEATHS, YOUNGER THAN 15 YEARSf/ 165 157 148
DEATHS, 15-59 AGE GROUPf/ 115 118 121
DEATHS, 60 YEARS AND OLDER GROUPf/ 125 130 137
PRIMARY SCHOOL STUDENTSa/ 891 996 1100
SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTSii/ 168 183 206
PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERSj/ 34.3 38.3 42.3
SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERSj/ 6.6 7.2 8.1
HOUSING UNITSk/ 1227 1349 1479
POPULATION WITH DRINKING WATERl/ 2719 2988 3276
POPULATION WITH TOILETSm/ 1436 1578 1730
Source: CELADE (1991).
a/ Passive sector is defined as the population in retirement age (60 years and 
older) which is not in PEA.
^  A constant ratio of 1.53 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants is presumed.
c/ The doctor per inhabitant ratio is presumed to rise to 1.82 per 10,000 
inhabitants by 1995, and to 2.04 per 10,000 inhabitants by 2000.
^  A constant ratio of 8.5 hospital beds per 10,000 inhabitants is presumed.
e/ Constant coverage of 40X is presumed.
f/ The figures are projected deaths for the 1985-1990 (low year=1990), 1990-1995 
(low year=1995) and the 1995-2000 (low year=2000) five year periods.
3/ A Gross Enrollment Rate (denominator = 6-11 year old age group) of 89.5X is 
presumed.
h/ A Gross Enrollment Rate (denominator = 12-17 year old age group) of 19.2X is 
presumed.
iy A constant ratio of 26 students per teacher is presumed.
j/ A constant ratio of 25.5 students per teacher is presumed.
1^ A constant ratio of 5.3 persons per housing unit at the national level is
presumed.
1/ Includes population with connections and easy access. Coverage of 41.8 is
maintained constant.




POPUUTION GROUPS AND PRINCIPAL SOCIAL SECTOR REQUIREMENTS 
TO BE NET IN THE FACE OF POPULATION GROWTH 
BY STAGE IN DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION (thousands) 
(SELECTED COUNTRIES)
EL SALVADOR
POPULATION GROUPS 1990 1995 2000
TOTAL PEA (15 years and older) 1639 1931 2259
YOUTH PEA (15-34 years) 975 1186 1410
WOMENS PEA 450 554 671
PASSIVE SECTORS/ 169 204 244
DOCTORS^ 3.4 3.8 4.4
DOCTORS IN IMPROVED SITUATIONc/ 3.4 4.0 4.7
HOSPITAL BEDS^ 7.9 8.9 10.1
BIRTHS ATTENDED BY QUALIFIED PERSONNELS/ 64 71 78
DEATHS, YOUNGER THAN 15 YEARSf/ 82 67 65
DEATHS, 15-59 AGE GROUPf/ 67 56 58
DEATHS, 60 YEARS AND OLDER GROUPf/ 58 64 75
PRIMARY SCHOOL STUDENTSa/ 1008 1062 1195
SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTSli/ 102 109 115
PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERSi/ 22.4 23.6 26.5
SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS!/ 4.4 4.7 5.0
HOUSING UNITSy 972 1101 1248
POPULATION WITH DRINKING WATER!/ 2140 2422 2746
POPULATION WITH TOILETSjS/ 3177 3596 4077
Source: CELADE (1991)
a/ Passive sector is defined as the population in retirement age (60 years and older) which is not 
in PEA.
^  A constant ratio of 6.47 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants is presumed.
c/ The doctor per inhabitant ratio is presumed to rise to 6.73 per 10,000 inhabitants by 1995, and
to 6.97 per 10,000 inhabitants by 2000.
^  A constant ratio of 15 hospital beds per 10,000 inhabitants is presumed, 
e/ Constant coverage of 35.2X is presumed.
f/ The figures are projected deaths for the 1985-1990 (low year=1990), 1990-1995 (low year=1995) 
and the 1995-2000 (low year^2000) five year periods.
a/ A Gross Enrollment Rate (denominator = 6-11 year old age group) of 111X is presumed.
h/ A Gross Enrollment Rate (denominator = 12-17 year old age group) of 12.4X is presumed.
y  A constant ratio of 45 students per teacher is presumed.
y  A constant ratio of 23.2 students per teacher is presumed.
y  A constant ratio of 5.4 persons per housing unit at the national level is presumed.
y  Includes population with connections and easy access. Coverage of 40.75 is maintained constant,
ig/ Includes connections to sewers and septic tanks. Coverage of 60.5 is maintained constant.
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POPULATION GROUPS AND PRINCIPAL SOCIAL SECTOR REQUIREMENTS 
TO BE NET IN THE FACE OF POPULATION GROWTH 
BY STAGE IN DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION (thousands) 
(SELECTED COUNTRIES)
MEXICO
POPULATION GROUPS 1990 1995 2000
TOTAL PEA (15 years and older) 27739 32447 37213
YOUTH PEA (15-34 years) 16804 19173 21031
WOMENS PEA 6241 7448 8693
PASSIVE SECTORS/ 4262 5117 6179
REQUIREMENTS
DOCTORS^ 86 95 104
HOSPITAL BEDSc/ 85 94 103
BIRTHS ATTENDED BY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL^ 2291 2336 2340
DEATHS, YOUNGER THAN 15 YEARS£/ 710 611 523
DEATHS, 15-59 AGE GROUPe/ 758 97 839
DEATHS, 60 YEARS AND OLDER GROUPe/ 950 1097 1271
PRIMARY SCHOOL STUDENTSf/ 15196 15967 16480
SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTSa/ 4436 4395 4654
PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERSh/ 447 470 485
SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERSj/ 233 231 245
HOUSING UNITS!/ 15252 16861 18457
POPULATION WITH DRINKING WATERS 60875 67312 73679
POPULATION WITH TOILETSl/ 40029 44262 48448
Source: CELADE (1991).
a/ Passive sector is defined as the population in retirement age (60 years and older) which is not 
in PEA.
^  A constant ratio of 9.7 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants is presumed.
£/ A constant ratio of 9.6 hospital beds per 10,000 inhabitants is presumed.
^  Constant coverage of 94% is presumed.
e/ The figures are projected deaths for the 1985-1990 (low year=1990), 1990-1995 (low year=1995) 
and the 1995-2000 (low year°2000) five year periods.
f/ A Gross Enrollment Rate (denominator -  6-11 year old age group) of 117.57X is presumed.
g/ A Gross Enrollment Rate (denominator - 12-17 year old age group) of 34.84% is presumed.
h/ A constant ratio of 34 students per teacher is presumed.
\J  A constant ratio of 19 students per teacher is presumed.
U  A constant ratio of 5.81 persons per housing unit at the national level is presumed.
\(J Includes population with connections and easy access. Coverage of 68.7 is maintained constant.
\J Includes connections to sewers and septic tanks. Coverage of 45.18 is maintained constant.
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POPULATION GROUPS AND PRINCIPAL SOCIAL SECTOR REQUIREMENTS 
TO BE MET IN THE FACE OF POPULATION GROWTH 
BY STAGE IN DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION (thousands) 
(SELECTED COUNTRIES)
URUGUAY
POPULATION GROUPS 1990 1995 2000
TOTAL PEA (15 years and older) 1355 1423 1487
YOUTH PEA (15-34 years) 637 666 693
WOMENS PEA 526 556 580
PASSIVE SECTORS/ 411 435 451
REQUIREMENTS
DOCTORS^ 5.9 6.1 6.3
HOSPITAL BEDSc/ 14.2 14.6 15.1
BIRTHS ATTENDED BY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL^ 52 52 52
DEATHS, YOUNGER THAN 15 YEARSe/ 8 7 6
DEATHS, 15-59 AGE GROUPg/ 29 28 28
DEATHS, 60 YEARS AND OLDER GROUPe/ 108 119 128
PRIMARY SCHOOL STUDENTS^/ 303 292 294
SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTSfl/ 236 233 223
PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERSh/ 14.4 13.9 14
SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERSi/ 23.6 23.3 22.3
HOUSING UNITSj/ 910 940 963
POPULATION WITH DRINKING WATERS 2628 2705 2781
POPULATION WITH TOILETSy 1869 1924 1978
Source: CELADE (1991).
a/ Passive sector is defined as the population in retirement age (60 years and older) which is 
not in PEA.
^  A constant ratio of 19.07 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants is presumed.
c/ A constant ratio of 45.9 hospital beds per 10,000 inhabitants is presumed.
^  Constant coverage of 96.3% is presumed.
£/ The figures are projected deaths for the 1985-1990 (low year=1990), 1990-1995 (low 
year=1995) and the 1995-2000 (low years2000) five year periods.
y  A Gross Enrollment Rate (denominator = 6-11 year old age group) of 94.7% is presumed.
a/ A Gross Enrollment Rate (denominator s 12-17 year old age group) of 71.95% is presumed.
h/ A constant ratio of 21 students per teacher is presumed.
\ J A constant ratio of 10 students per teacher is presumed.
y  A constant ratio of 3.4 persons per housing unit at the national level is presumed.
y  Includes population with connections and easy access. Coverage of 81.9 is maintained 
constant.
y Includes connections to sewers and septic tanks. Coverage of 60.4 is maintained constant.
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REQUIREMENTS AND POPULATION GROUPS IN SEVERAL SOCIAL SECTORS 
IN TERMS OF POPULATION GROWTH 




1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
URBAN HOUSING^ 426 647 11261 14586 833 904
RURAL HOUSING^ 1024 1128 3991 3926 99 83
URBAN PEA 884 1340 21228 30380 1085 1240




1990 coverage or ratios of persons over existing resources are maintained constant. For 
housing, the ratio used is from the last Population Census.
For Uruguay and Haiti, figures refer to homes.

